Sudan was a country with a prosperous democratic future in 2019, yet today the nation remains worse off than it initially began. With significant military violence and a brutal civil war being waged between the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a nation once ready to take on more democratic practices finds itself in a position of extreme vulnerability (Mitsanas). Widespread humanitarian crisis is occurring, displacement of millions, severe food shortages, and violence in the streets. How can these issues be linked back to the erosion of democratic practices so infantile in nature?
The current situation in Sudan is an expansion upon the civil war which began in April of 2023 between the SAF and RSF. The conflict can be best described as a civil war with no end in sight. This war is encroaching upon the creation of democratic processes promised to Sudanese people following the split from South Sudan. Some consequences include at least 20,000 deaths and over 10 million civilian displacement as well as ethnic cleansing and humanitarian crisis allegations (Al Jazeera).
In brief, the SAF and RSF represent competing political and military interests. The United States Institute of Peace explains the two sides as follows. The SAF is more focused on the maintenance of national security and is seen as a party focused on representing the state’s sovereignty and traditional styles of top down governance, more resistant to democratic efforts. The RSF, which was initially a group formed by militias, has grown in repertoire and size now focused on the autonomy of state security and decisions, attempting to make Sudan a more authoritative regional agent and pushing for a more decentralized government.
Neither side can be seen as genuinely pro-democracy yet the SAF has taken a more supportive role for a civilian style of government where the RSF is more supportive of local autonomy consistent with authoritarian tactics. Both groups generally resist any form of power sharing though which has resulted in the current situation in Sudan. Additionally both groups have taken stances that support the definition and exemplify practices of stealth authoritarianism.
When examining democracy vs authoritarianism on a sliding or scale like platform, Sudan is toward the authoritarian end but this can be described by the recentness of the nation’s independence and ventures into democratic rule. This infancy in democratic practices also makes the country more susceptible to conflict and infiltration such as the debating ways to lead the nation as outlined by the SAF and RSF.
Defined by Ozan O. Varol in his writing on Stealth Authoritarianism, this new wave of authoritarian rule offers practices that can make authoritarian rule more durable by cloaking anti-democratic actions under legal legitimacy. Stealth authoritarianism can be very relevant to Sudan through the current practices set in place. Varol outlines six specific routes in which this can be accomplished, several evident in the current situation in Sudan. Some of these factors include consolidation of power through judicial review, electoral laws, non-political crimes and surveillance laws, all present in Sudan’s democratic situation today.
Issues with the judiciary present an avenue for clear democratic erosion and authoritarianism in Sudan (Varol). Due to the lack of clear and complete mechanisms within the judiciary and constitutional court of Sudan, there are extreme limits on power. These limits on power in turn have led to a consolidation of power, allowing unchecked legislative and executive actions in the absence of independent oversight. This in turn enables the military authorities to consolidate power and bypass constitutional constraints with zero accountability, a major erosion of in place democratic processes. (Sudan Attacks on Justice 2000).
Most recently issues with surveillance and non-political crimes have become rampant issues facing Sudan. In terms of surveillance and limits of control on surveillance, opposition figures are currently being monitored closely, signalling authoritarian control in the area. These laws facilitate a system of fear for public dissent and create a situation where citizens are forced to fall in line with the current rhetoric of the leading factions. Additionally, non-political crimes are extremely problematic as well with individuals being framed for criminal charges due to their opposition beliefs. Protesters have been seen getting arrested for supporting dissent, falling in line with both surveillance and non-political crimes, as their criminal reports have been false in nature. Both of these situations contribute to democratic erosion by fostering a climate of fear, where citizens and media outlets are less likely to criticize the government. Such tactics support stealth authoritarianism by disguising control as state security, further limiting democratic freedoms without explicit prohibitions (Varol). All in all these situations and fear have contributed to the “unimaginable horror” inflicted upon Sudanese people through the ravagement of their society (“Death Came to Our Home”).
The situation in Sudan exemplifies democratic erosion through the consolidation of power by military leaders who undermine civilian governance, avoid accountability for human rights violations, and manipulate electoral laws to suppress dissent. The portrayal of a commitment to democracy is countered by violent crackdowns and limitations on opposition parties, illustrating a broader trend of authoritarianism disguised as governance. This erosion of democratic principles has created an environment where civil liberties are systematically violated, leading to a humanitarian crisis and diminishing prospects for genuine democracy.
In conclusion, Sudan’s political crisis evocatively describes democratic erosion in the real world. Both the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have continued to exhibit authoritarian qualities and tactics under the false narrative of “governance” and supporting the people. The extreme lack of judicial precisions and accountability coupled with the intimidation factors of non-political crimes and surveillance as well as consolidation of power by military factions reveal a pattern of stealth authoritarianism that suppresses civil liberties and political opposition. These consistencies with the behaviors echoed with Stealth Authoritarianism by Ozan O. Varol bring this situation to one of extreme concern for democracy.
Unfortunately current events and this situation indicate the decline from the democratic potential Sudan once held to a state entrenched with authoritarian rule and military propaganda. This disruption leading Sudanese governance to a place of significant democratic erosion, underscoring the fragility of democracy especially in its infantry stages.
Hi Sarah!
I really appreciate your focus on the erosion of an infantile democracy, I feel like we often talk about democratic backsliding in the context of nations with long-held histories of democracy such as the United States, and it is interesting to consider how erosion may look different where democracy is not fully established. I do wonder then, if democracy can not be said to have entirely existed in the first place, is erosion the right word for such cases as Sudan? Perhaps we can think about the civil war and consolidations of power in Sudan more as democratic prevention—or as you call it in your title a ‘hijacked’ democracy? How might thinking about the situation as democratic prevention vs erosion change the analysis?
I was also interested in your point on Varol’s concept of Stealth Authoritarianism and the use of preexisting institutions to cloak “anti-democratic actions under legal legitimacy.” Perhaps in Sudan pre-existing institutions are being used to at least nominally legitimate authoritarian actions, but do you think it’s been successful at hiding these anti-democratic actions, particularly from external organizations/nations? To me, it seems, the authoritarianism in Sudan is now explicit.