Feb 12, 2025

The Rise of Right-Wing Populism in Former Satellite States

Written By: Cassandra Fitts
Protestors in Poland wave up European Union flags and hold signs with the Polish word for constitution.

Poland, among other Eastern European countries, is experiencing democratic backsliding related to rising populism. Many former satellite states democratized quickly, but are now moving in reverse.

Former Soviet satellite states that were once poster children for democratization following the decline of European communism have been making drastic pivots towards autocracy in recent years. In 1989 following the fall of the USSR, previously Soviet-occupied Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia (now the separate states of Czechia and Slovakia) began to develop towards democratic governance, joining the EU in 2004. However, there has since been a massive uptick in right-wing populism, and coinciding incidences of democratic backsliding in these three countries. So what happened? How are all of these countries that previously observed strong, enthusiastic pushes for democracy slowly regressing?

There are two key traits of populism that help to explain this phenomenon. The first notable trait is that populism criticizes established elite groups. Populism thrives on discontent with the status quo. The other important factor is that populists frame themselves as the party of the people. For populism to take hold, the general public must be dissatisfied with the government, and they must buy into the idea that the populist party represents their interests. The implication of this is that existing democratic institutions are often framed as untrustworthy and unrepresentative of the people since they were not established by the populist demagogue.

Following the fall of the Soviet Union, many formerly communist nations were eager to democratize, transition to a free market, and join the European Union. As a result, changes occurred rapidly and parties in these countries became depolarized, running on similar platforms of swift globalization. This meant that these parties were not offering any differentiated platforms or policies, but rather focusing on reforms that they all agreed on. Additionally, these rapid changes caused economic instability, mass migration, and changes in wealth distribution which were going unaddressed. These things affect day-to-day life, stirring up mass fear and distrust, and creating a sort of identity crisis for the countries experiencing it. Under these circumstances, populism thrives, because populist parties become a main source of criticism against a system that the citizens recognize is not addressing their concerns.

Hungary is a clear case study of this. Current Prime Minister, and member of the Fidesz party, Viktor Orbán, began his political career as an advocate of democracy. However, in the 1990s, Fidesz, transitioned into a conservative populist party, and began to quickly gain popularity. Since 2010 Fidesz has held enough seats to constitute a supermajority. This allows them to modify Hungary’s constitution and legal framework, minimizing the chance of the autocracy being pushed out of power.

While Hungary is a more extreme example, Poland has also seen the rise of populism. The Law and Justice Party, also known as PiS, is a conservative populist party that maintained a one-party majority from 2015 to 2023. They did not have a constitutional supermajority, but still held an overwhelming majority of the seats in the government. PiS ran on the platform that the initial push for democracy following the fall of the Soviet Union was a bad compromise that sold out Poland’s interests and has since pushed for a return to autocracy. However, after eight years of populist rule, the PiS-backed presidential candidate was defeated in the 2023 election. This marked a notable win for democracy in Poland, and Europe at large, although the next few years will be crucial in determining whether it remains that way.

In Czechia, ANO, is a nationalist populist party founded in 2011 by Andrej Babiš. ANO critiques the EU and democratic institutions as corrupt and ineffective. The party has held the plurality of seats since 2017, but has been losing power as it was allied with President Miloš Zeman who recently retired in 2023. His seat was taken by Petr Pavel, a more democratic candidate who has spoken up against many populist actions in Czechia.

In Slovakia, Robert Fico was re-elected Prime Minister with a platform surrounding distancing themselves from Ukraine, with whom they were previously strongly allied. The Prime Minister has allied with Orbán-controlled Hungary, leaving the future of democracy uncertain.

One of the difficult realities of populist takeovers and democratic erosion at large is that once in power, both formal institutions and informal norms on which democracy is built are degraded over time to increase the powers of the populist group, and ensure their continuing dominance. In the breakdown of formal institutions, the judiciary is typically a primary target. As one of the main checks on the power of parliament, it is often packed or placed under parliament to limit its independent checks. Oversight and regulatory institutions such as independent watchdogs and local governments are suppressed or replaced by loyalists. Legal frameworks such as the constitution and electoral laws are modified to maintain office, and minimize the cost of losses if they cannot be prevented. Informal norms of mutual tolerance and forbearance are ignored. For instance, the populist party will denounce their opponents as illegitimate, and the media as agents of the opposition. They will abuse formal institutions to suppress their opponents once in positions of power. Populist groups can do severe damage to democratic governments, accelerating erosion and in severe cases leading to full regression into autocracy.

While this is all concerning, polling shows that democracy remains popular amongst voters worldwide, even if they dislike the way it currently functions. In the aforementioned cases of Poland and Czechia, the influence of formerly powerful populist groups is declining. To prevent autocracy, it is up to democratic institutions to stop anti-democratic populist groups from taking hold. The actions of political elites once backsliding begins determine whether democracy will ultimately survive. Parties committed to democracy have a responsibility to ally with other democratic parties over anti-democratic ones, and prevent the conditions that allow for populism. It is important to note that populism comes from a place of genuine distrust and frustration with the system. As long as governments remain responsive and accountable to the constituency, the threat can be limited.

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4 Comments

  1. Dorsa Hajmaghani

    Cassandra, this is an in-depth and well-structured analysis of how populism has driven democratic collapse in former Soviet satellite states. Your analysis of how fast democracy, economic instability, and depolarized political parties paved the way for right-wing populism is very insightful. The way you connect this to populist narratives that dismiss post-Soviet democracy as a “bad compromise” is an important warning that democratic revolutions are not irreversible.

    Your case study on Hungary and Viktor Orbán’s transition from pro-democracy politician to populist autocrat is particularly compelling. His constitutional supermajority, which allows him to maintain Fidesz dominance, is an instance that shows how populists modify democratic institutions to consolidate power. Poland’s recent electoral setback of PiS-backed politicians, on the other hand, raises the question of whether this will show a reversal of democratic backsliding, or if PiS will attempt to reclaim power through institutional manipulation.

    I appreciate your thoughts on Czechia and Slovakia, especially how populist leaders like Babiš and Fico have strategically linked with Orbán. Given the interconnection of these movements, do you believe regional collaboration among democratic forces is a realistic strategy for countering populist influence? Your conclusion is particularly strong, highlighting that, while populist disintegration is dangerous, democracy continues to enjoy widespread support. However, as you point out, the sustainability of democracy is dependent on political elites deciding to oppose rather than accept anti-democratic individuals.

    • Cassandra Fitts

      Dorsa, thank you for your input! I appreciate your receptiveness to my commentary. To answer your question about regional collaboration, I would say that collaboration is helpful but must always be handled carefully. One of the best ways to ensure that anti-democratic groups do not gain legitimacy is for democratic forces to always to choose to ally and work alongside those committed to democracy rather than just whomever agrees with their stances. However, depolarization is also the root cause of certain instances where populism suddenly gained influence. Democratic forces must strike a careful balance between consensus and dissention while being receptive to the desires of voters, so as not to drive them into the hands of these autocratic groups.

  2. Josephine Hale

    Hey Cassandra! Your analysis of how populism and democratic backsliding in former Soviet states is, without a doubt, related to what’s happening in Georgia right now. Your breakdown of how rapid democratization, economic instability, and depolarized politics created a vacuum for right-wing populism really resonates. Georgia’s experience follows a similar trajectory to Czechia and Slovakia —after years of striving for democratic reforms and closer ties with the West, disillusionment and frustration have fueled a ruling party that consolidates power under the guise of stability.

    Your discussion of Hungary and Orbán’s use of constitutional supermajorities to entrench Fidesz’s rule is a clear warning sign of democratic backsliding. In Georgia, the ruling Georgian Dream party is taking similar steps—undermining judicial independence, suppressing opposition, and responding to mass protests with violent crackdown instead of fostering dialogue. However unlike the PiS party from Poland, Georgia’s government is not showing progress in maintaining their democratic mechanisms because election results have proved to be quite the opposite.

    In Poland, mass mobilization played a role in reversing democratic backsliding. Given how interconnected these democratic struggles are, do you think Georgia’s protest movement has the potential to achieve the same level of impact?

  3. Amenah Elgazzar

    Hi Cassandra! I think you introduce a great analysis of the current political situation in Eastern Europe. I would be interested to see how these nationalist narratives that are often tied to historical oppression from the Soviet Union are shaped in these populist leaders’ rhetoric. Could this perhaps explain why populist leaders are such staunch defenders of racial homogeneity and proponents of anti-immigration sentiments? I agree that it is crucial for democratic parties to join forces and work together to preserve these democratic practices. I fear that populism has gained prominence in places like the United States, so perhaps it might continue to evolve.

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