In the United States’ hyper-polarized political environment, endorsements that cross party lines are relatively rare. Yet in 2024, several high-profile Republicans urged their own party members to vote for Kamala Harris, a Democrat, rather than support Donald Trump’s reelection bid.
Many prominent Republicans, including former Trump administration officials, spoke at the Democratic National Convention. Additionally, over 200 individuals who had served under Presidents George H.W. Bush and George W. Bush, as well as Sen. Mitt Romney and the late Sen. John McCain, signed a letter endorsing Harris. Former Republican Congresswoman Liz Cheney, an outspoken critic of Trump, actively campaigned with Harris across swing states, urging fellow Republicans to cast a “country over party” vote. Even her father, former Vice President Dick Cheney, a longstanding figure in Republican politics, endorsed Harris.
The “Republicans for Harris” movement was not just a strategic, though ultimately unsuccessful, tool used by the Harris campaign – it also serves as a significant marker in the broader narrative of democratic health, particularly when viewed through the lens of Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt’s “How Democracies Die.”
Democratic Gatekeeping
Levitsky and Ziblatt argue that democracies are not exclusively undone by coups or revolutions; instead, they may deteriorate gradually as norms erode under the influence of anti-democratic authoritarian leaders. They highlight autocratic leaders throughout history whose rise to power was enabled by establishment politicians, many of whom underestimated these outsiders’ ability to dismantle their country’s democracy. Conversely, they also point to democracies that have successfully resisted such demagogues, such as Finland and Belgium, emphasizing that their success was not simply the result of smart voters, but of the proactive efforts of political parties and their elites.
Central to their argument is the concept of democratic gatekeeping, where mainstream political parties act as guardians of democracy, often forming alliances – even with an ideologically opposing party – to isolate and defeat an extremist.
In the deeply polarized U.S., it’s hard to imagine mainstream parties uniting with their opponents over almost anything; Levitsky and Ziblatt offer the theoretical example of Senator Edward Kennedy and other liberal Democrats campaigning for Ronald Reagan to illustrate this point. However, the endorsements of Harris by figures like the Cheneys arguably mirror this very scenario.
The Republicans who endorsed Harris made it clear that their opposition to Trump was not about policy differences but about their perception of him as a threat to democracy. For instance, Dick Cheney explicitly cited the dangers Trump poses to the Constitution as his motivation, reinforcing that his endorsement is a call to preserve democratic norms. Many Republican figures and former Trump administration officials within the “Republicans for Harris” movement used similar language, further supporting the notion that they intended to counteract a perceived authoritarian threat, which aligns with Levitsky and Ziblatt’s theory.
When Reaching Across the Aisle Fails
Simply put, the strategy didn’t work.
In 2024, conservatives voted for Trump by even larger percentages than in 2020. There was a red shift across most of the country, among nearly every possible demographic group.
Even locations where Harris campaigned with Liz Cheney remained red. In Ripon, Wisconsin, where a rally with Cheney gained national attention, Trump won by an even greater margin than in 2020.
There are numerous reasons that these efforts might have failed. First, the Republicans who backed Harris may not have been popular enough with conservative voters to sway them. Dick Cheney, for example, hasn’t held office in over 15 years and ended his VP term with staggeringly low approval ratings; likewise, Liz Cheney isn’t particularly well-liked among conservatives. If different, more current conservative figures had joined this effort, there might have been more success.
Moreover, by spending significant time and resources campaigning with Liz Cheney and promoting the endorsements from other Republicans, Harris may have neglected members of her Democratic voter base whose support was more crucial.
Could Political Parties Still Block Authoritarian Leaders?
The efficacy of democratic gatekeeping depends on major political parties’ ability to deter voters from an authoritarian candidate, even one with populist appeal. However, the current state of party strength in the U.S. lowers the chance that parties could successfully fulfill this role, even if they intended to.
To put it mildly, Americans are dissatisfied with national politics. This frustration applies to all three branches of government, political leaders and candidates, and both major political parties. In fact, since the mid-1990s, the percentage of Americans with negative views of both parties has more than quadrupled; research even shows that dislike for the opposing party now surpasses the affection people feel for their own party, pointing to a decline in party identification.
Parties used to wield significantly more power in American politics. It wasn’t until reforms following the 1868 presidential election that the nomination process was altered, giving voters more power in deciding who would represent the party in the general election.
While many argue that shifting power to ordinary party members instead of elites makes the process more democratic, it also reduces parties’ ability to act as gatekeepers against authoritarian candidates. With reduced control over who can run under their party label, especially as outside groups can provide a candidate with financial support, parties now have less leverage to discourage the rise of an extremist. In an era of weakened party influence, even a high-profile bipartisan effort may be unable to sway voters.
Ultimately, the “Republicans for Harris” initiative highlights democratic gatekeeping – and its limitations – in American politics. Though the high-profile endorsements from conservatives attracted significant media attention, they failed to effectively persuade the electorate and may have been unsuccessful even under more favorable conditions. In the years ahead, deep political polarization and weak party strength may hinder even the most concerted efforts to isolate figures who threaten democratic norms.
This blog post brought up a lot of things that I had not thought about since the election eneded in November. I am not one to cast a vote based solely off of political party but I do know that many people do cast their vote this way because of their strong conservative or liberal ideals. Having influential Republican officials urge republican voters to vote for a candidate from another party really puts into perspective how damaging they believe President Trump can be.
Westray, I found your discussion on the Republican endorsements of Kamala Harris fascinating, especially considering the many controversial actions the Trump administration has taken in the past months. Your use of Levitsky and Ziblatt’s concept of democratic gatekeeping was an insightful lens through which to view the rationale behind many Republicans supporting Harris due to their worries about Democracy. I resonated with your explanation of this Republican support failing as Americans on both sides of politics are frustrated, signaling larger worries about parties and their voters being more likely to ignore leaders who undermine democratic institutions.
Continuing to use Levitsky and Ziblatt’s reasoning, I am left wondering how the semi-loyal democrats in Congress will respond to the threats American democracy is facing under Trump’s administration, like Musk’s DOGE or defunding USAID. For instance, Brian Fitzpatrick, a PA Republican representative, has consistently avoided questions on whether he supports the second Trump administration’s decisions that could jeopardize democracy, such as the pardons of January 6th rioters. These GOP moderates could be considered semi-loyal democrats as they claim to support democracy but often downplay Trump’s actions or fall to their party’s pressures to not be outspoken. Considering this, I wonder: Will this failure of Republican endorsement for Harris sway GOP semi-loyal democrats to be hesitant to defy Trump if they see democracy being undermined?
Westray, your discussion of democratic gatekeeping in the context of the 2024 election raises important questions about the role of political alliances in countering extremist candidates. The historical comparison to Democrats potentially endorsing Reagan emphasizes the rarity and significance of the “Republicans for Harris” movement. However, as you pointed out, their effort ultimately failed, highlighting the limitations of bipartisan endorsements in today’s political climate. I wonder if the results would have been different if she had not entered the race within a few months of the election and under unfavorable conditions. Obviously, she did not have much control over Biden’s decision to drop out, but it is interesting to hypothesize what could have happened if she had been given more time to campaign.
One point you discussed that I think is worth exploring further is how the Harris campaign’s focus on Republican and celebrity endorsements may have created blind spots regarding key Democratic voter bases. While she did have a limited time to campaign, by investing heavily in attempting to sway dissatisfied Republicans and non-voters on the premise that Trump was bad for the country, her campaign may have neglected mobilizing certain groups who felt left behind by the political system.
Their focus ties into the “waiting in line” model outlined in chapter 9 of Hochschild’s book Strangers in Their Own Land: Anger and Mourning on the American Right, where frustration grows among voters who perceive others as unfairly benefiting before them. Trump successfully capitalized on these emotions, mobilizing nonvoters and deepening political polarization. Harris, as seen by the election results, was not as successful in doing so. These results, for me, raised the question: Did the Harris campaign’s strategy unintentionally alienate party voters who needed reassurance that their concerns were being addressed?
More broadly, the Democratic Party’s struggle to counter Trump’s previous and future erosion of democratic norms raises the question: rather than appealing to specific factions, how could the Harris campaign have better capitalized on voters who feel stuck in line? Your analysis offers a strong foundation for these discussions, and I’d love to hear your thoughts on whether alternative strategies, such as direct economic appeals, a focus on working-class concerns, or a more aggressive counter-narrative against Trump, could have produced different outcomes.
I found your points about the final hour 2024 “Republicans for Harris” movement in relation to Levitsky and Ziblatt’s idea of democratic gatekeeping very interesting. Additionally, I think your discussion about why this didn’t work raises important questions that should be examined.
The trend of democratic erosion in the 21st century is unfortunately not secluded to the United States. Democracies in many countries across the world have seen the rise of democracy threatening demagogues. Additionally, the setting is extremely similar- in the 1980-90s as a result of globalization changes in economies occurred and left wing parties shifted, ultimately leaving a space for a right-wing ethno-nationalist faction with the “left behind man”. In recent years governments have been able to gatekeep their democracy. For example in Sweden the government signed an agreement leaving out the right wing ethno-nationalist party from any government coalition.
The question arises why was the United States unable to coordinate some form of a signed agreement that denied Trump power, as other democracies have done. One reason that you mentioned may be that citizens are overall dissatisfied with all political parties in conjunction with increased power of these parties. Another answer may be that Trump did not technically run under a new party, as many democratic backsliders in other countries did. Therefore it could be that it was too late in the US for an effort at successful democratic gatekeeping, compared to when other democracies acted. It is important for scholars to keep researching this question, as it could lead preserving our democracy.