It is an open secret that Emirati planes are touching down at remote Chadian military bases with boxes of “humanitarian aid” – aid that is instead guns, ammo, and drones, destined for the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) currently at war with the Sudanese Army (SAF) across all of Sudan. Since the war broke out in April 2023, the RSF has been accused of conducting a genocide against the Masalit people in West Darfur and an ethnic cleansing campaign against civilians in Gezira State, along with numerous massacres and war crimes in territory they control. 

The RSF was formed in 2013 as a government-sponsored wing of the Janjaweed, a loosely-knit Arab pro-government militia directly implicated in the Darfur genocide. After a popular revolution overthrew longtime dictator Omar al-Bashir in 2019, a joint civilian and military council led the country. Sudanese Army commander-in-chief Abdelfattah al-Burhan and RSF commander Mohamed Hamdan “Hemedti” Dagalo seized power in 2021 in a coup by kicking out the civilian half of the council. The war itself began over debates on integrating the RSF into the Sudanese Army, which the RSF resisted.

The United Arab Emirates has been the primary sponsor of the RSF throughout the current war, building new bases in the neighboring countries of Chad and the Central African Republic to give weapons to the RSF, extract resources from mines in RSF-controlled territory in Sudan, and even operate on wounded RSF militants. While the Sudanese Army has found allies in Russia, Iran, Egypt, and Ukraine, none are as crucial to the SAF as the UAE is to the RSF. Emirati aid to the RSF is not just physical, however, and extends into the diplomatic and online realm as well. It is here where the future of Sudanese democracy is at threat of illegitimacy.

Negotiations to end the impending conflict stalled between the two parties in March 2023. The SAF cancelled prematurely citing that the Forces for Freedom and Change, a coalition of civilian committees that played a key role in ousting Bashir and later led the civilian half of the transitional government, were RSF plants. When the war broke out in April, the RSF justified attacks on SAF bases on the basis of restoring Sudanese democracy, reversing the coup, and purging Bashir-era Islamist figures. Several prominent FFC politicians have outright or subtly supported the RSF since the war’s eruption, and new pro-democracy voices have emerged with Emirati support.

The largest of these pro-RSF voices shrouding themselves in demagogic behavior is former civilian Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok. In an interview with the BBC in Arabic, Hamdok refused to comment on RSF war crimes and denied Emirati involvement in the conflict. Hamdok founded Taqaddum in October 2023 as a civilian coalition designed to end the war, but the group has faced criticism for whitewashing RSF crimes. Alaa el-Din Naqd, the group’s spokesperson, stated in January 2024 that the UAE is pushing for democracy in Sudan.

Disinformation networks utilized by the RSF ran rampant on X (formerly Twitter) throughout 2023 and 2024. Public personalities stressed that the group was fighting for democracy in Sudan, although the fighters themselves posted media and statements cheering the genocide of non-Arab groups in Darfur. These networks also pushed fake reports of Iranian intervention on behalf of the SAF, and attributed RSF-perpetrated massacres, such as the Ardamata massacre in November 2023, to the SAF despite no SAF soldiers being present.

By attempting to co-opt themselves with the most prominent democratic movement in Sudan while simultaneously killing its countrymen and plundering the country’s most sacred sites, the RSF has tainted the idea of democracy in Sudan. The SAF commander, Abdelfattah al-Burhan, has made it clear that he won’t participate in peace talks that don’t end with him in power, but young Sudanese continue to flock to the SAF because the SAF promises the continued existence of state institutions where Sudanese can make their own future not at the whim of the UAE.

There is not much left for democratic erosion to chip away at in Sudan. The war has displaced over 10 million people, much of the capital city of Khartoum has been destroyed or looted, and the few remaining state institutions are reduced to the SAF’s rump state in eastern Sudan. Sudan’s civilian leaders have denigrated democratic dreams by showing that they care more about intangible words and coalitions than opposing the militia terrorizing and killing Sudanese civilians. What the SAF offers over the RSF is the stability and independence from foreign backers needed for democratic change to occur, even if this change is slow and vulnerable.