Ballots and Bullets: How Political Violence Is Undermining Democracy in Mexico

In 2024, Mexico held one of the largest and most consequential elections in its recent history—electing over 20,000 officials nationwide, including a new president, Claudia Sheinbaum Pardoof the National Regeneration Movement (Morena). She won the elections with a legitimate electoral majority (nearly 60 percent of the vote), inheriting the deeply centralized political architecture built by her predecessor. Indeed, former President Andrés Manuel Lopez Obrador, has systematically concentrated power in the executive, by weakening independent institutions and sidelining key oversight bodies. In 2024, while the electoral process captured headlines, a darker and more alarming trend unfolded in parallel: the pervasive use of violence against political candidates, especially at the local level. According to Freedom House (Freedom in the World 2025 Report), at least 37 candidates have been assassinated, and more than 330 incidents of political violence were recorded in the months leading up to he June 2024 general elections. Many of those targeted were running for local office in areas where criminal networks hold considerable sway, and opposition to the ruling party, Morena, was especially strong. For instance, in the state of Morelos a candidate for state deputy from Morena was shot and killed, while in the state of Chiapas armed men targeted two senate candidates affiliated with the opposition coalition Strenght and Heart for Mexico. Candidates were not the only political figures targeted during the latestelectoral cycle. Over 40% of the 540 documented cases of targeted violence were aimed at sitting or former public officials who werenot running  for office, including mayors and civil servants (FiveKey Takeaways from the 2024 Elections in Mexico – ACLED).

The violence followed a clear pattern of intimidation, targeted killings, and forced withdrawals, particularly in contested municipalities. What’s more disturbing is how these acts unfolded against the backdrop of increasing executive control over the military and domestic security. In September 2024, a constitutional reform transferred full control of the National Guard to SEDENA, Mexico’s Ministry of Defense—militarizing a force that had been initially designed as civilian (Freedom House, 2025). Human rights groups continue to raise concerns about torture, impunity, and extrajudicial killings, with over 120,000 people registered as disappeared as late of 2024, and more than 72,000 unidentified bodies in forensic services as of September.

Nancy Bermeo’s theory of executive aggrondizement argues that today’s democratic backsliding rarely comes from coups or the sudden collapse of institutions. Instead, it happens through “executive aggrandizement” —when elected leaders legally and gradually weaken checks and balances, centralize authority, and undermine opposition without openly dismantling democracy itself (Bermeo, 2016). For istance, in November 2024 the Congress approved a constitutional reform that eliminated several autonomous goverment institutions, including the country’s access-to-information agency (Freedom House, 2025). Not only does the constitutional reform place more coercive power in the hands of the executive, while weakening oversight, transparency, and accountability. It also means that members of the National Guard now fall under military, not civilian, jurisdiction—makingit harder to investigate abuses or prevent political interference.

At the same time, widespread political violence functions as de facto tool of democratic erosion. As Levitsky and Ziblatt argue in How Democracies Die, democracy is sustained not only by institutions and laws, but also by informal norms such as mutual toleration and restraint (Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018). When governments fail to protect political candidates or tolerate an environment in which violence disproportionately benefits the ruling party, democracy can be gradually hollowed out—without the need to change a single formal rule. In Mexico, political violence has effectively “filtered” who can safely run for office. The deaths and intimidation of opposition candidates don’t just affect individuals—they reshape the democratic process itself. Elections can still happen, but the choices on the ballot are increasingly shaped by fear rather than free political competition. A striking example is the case of Zulma Carvajal Salgado, who was attacked shortly after declaring her candidacy for municipal office in Iguala. The attack, which killed her husband, was part of a broader pattern of violence aimed at preventing perceived rivalsor unaligned figures from contesting elections—well before ballots were even cast (ACLED, 2024). Moreover, what’s particularly alarming, is how little has been done in response. Despite calls from civil society, human rights groups, and international observers, the Mexican government has not adopted a robust national strategy to confront electoral violence or dismantle the networks—whether criminal or political—that enable it. As of March 2025, President Sheinbaum has shown no intention of departing from the authoritarian trajectory initiated by her predecessor, López Obrador. On the contrary, she continues to defend controversial judicial reforms, promotes the dismantling of independent institutions such as the transparency agency (INAI), and resists constitutional checks — reinforcing the consolidation of executive power and raising further concerns about the state of democracy in Mexico. Yet perhaps the most unsettling aspect of Mexico’s current political moment is not simply the erosion of democratic norms—but the fact that it is happening with broad public support. How do we explain a 60% electoral victory for a ruling party that has steadily concentrated power and weakened oversight? As Aguilar and colleagues (Aguilar et al., 2025) argue, Morena has skillfully framed its centralization of power as a defense of “the people” against corrupt elites and unaccountable institutions. Through welfare programs, symbolic appeals, and populist rhetoric, the party has convinced many voters that weakening institutions is a necessary step toward justice, building a powerful narrative of inclusion and transformation. In this way, democratic erosion is not merely tolerated—it is actively legitimized at the ballot box as a tool for social justice and national renewal. Mexico’s case reminds us that democratic backsliding does not always require voter repression or blatantfraud; sometimes, it is delivered through a popular mandate.

REFERENCES

Bermeo, Nancy. “On Democratic Backsliding.” Journal of Democracy, vol. 27, no. 1, 2016, pp. 5–19.

Levitsky, Steven, and Daniel Ziblatt. How Democracies Die. New York: Crown Publishing, 2018.

“Five Key Takeaways from the 2024 Elections in Mexico.” America’s Quarterly, 2024.

“Mexico: Freedom in the World 2025.” Freedom House Report, 2025.

Azul A. Aguilar, et al. “Is Mexico at the Gates of Authoritarianism?” Journal of Democracy, vol. 34, no. 3, 2023.