On December 3rd, 2024, South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol declared martial law on the basis that the “North Korean Communist forces” and “Anti-State forces” had infiltrated the legislative branch.A motion to initiate impeachment proceedings against Yoel was filed just moments before the law’s enactment. The National Assembly, dominated by the Democratic Party, had accused Yoel of wrongdoing in relation to his wife’s influence-peddling scandal and his excessive vetoes of bills passed by the political opposition. Moreover, Yoel’s influence in decision-making was substantially weakened after representatives rejected the Republican Party’s proposed budget, signaling inadequate support for his administration and party affiliation.This, coupled with pressure from his constituents, prompted an emergency military takeover. Yoel’s enactment of martial law constitutes a clear example of executive aggrandizement, a highlight of democratic backsliding. However, as Gamboa explained, the presence of institutional resistance has allowed democracies like South Korea to prevail.
Bermeo described executive aggrandizement as the process through which democratic institutions are dismantled or undermined to concentrate more power under the executive incumbent. In this case, Yoel enforced martial law to prevent the National Assembly from convening and political parties from assembling to discuss their policy agenda. He also used these formal legal mechanisms to subject media channels to military oversight and halt public protests. By explicitly targeting democratic deliberation and media platforms, Yoel intended to increase the executive branches’ power and subvert institutional checks on its actions. These encroachments are particularly troubling as it attempts to disengage constituents from expressing their discontent with the government. Specifically, media censorship can restrict their participation in popular uprisings and the electoral process to hold elected-officials accountable. Through these means, the government begins to lose its legitimacy as chosen by the people, for the people.
Additionally, by enlisting the military to interfere with parliamentary deliberations and sidelining Democratic-elected representatives, Yoel risked turning South Korea into a dominant one party system. This shift can alter the balance of power between competing parties and subsequently, marginalize some segments of the electorate. Oftentimes, the absence of meaningful opposition and the reliance on coercive apparatuses can amplify and embolden a dominant party’s authoritarian trajectory. This creates democratic erosion as it places more power in the hands of one party and tends to make it difficult to hold them accountable, primarily because of the military serving as an allied vessel. Ultimately, Yoel’s decision was taken to preserve his consolidation of power and remain in office. In the midst of the backlash, Yoel felt politically cornered, and the urgency to protect his tenure galvanized him to exhaust all options. He relied on exploiting martial law to salvage his political career, despite the Constitution stipulating that martial law can only be used by the executive if there are serious threats to the nation’s security. Using these constitutionally legal channels for personalistic political gain can enable authoritarian rule.
Alternatively, the existence of robust institutions can aid democratic governments in relation to actions taken by the executive to reinforce authoritarianism. Cleary argued that, “opposition actors…even institutions likes legislatures, which are controlled by actors who oppose the incumbent and act in unison,” can limit these executive maneuvers and thus, contribute to the state’s democratic survival. In fact, the opposition party used these institutional pathways to impeach President Yoel with a two-thirds majority from the unicameral chamber. Additionally, South Korea’s Constitutional Court unanimously approved his removal from office. The cooperation between these two institutions shows that similar outcomes can be produced on the legitimacy of the president’s actions with one branch, namely the judiciary, operating independently and impartially to interpret and rule based on the law. In other words, there were no ideological stakes or vested interests in how they came to this decision, as opposed to, perhaps, the Democratic party in the legislature. This outcome also showed that the president’s actions transcended party-lines in the legislature, with some Republican officials choosing to vote for his impeachment. These outcomes lend significant merit and trust to the democratic process, as they show the vibrancy of these institutions in keeping the executive in check.
Do you think tha South Korea could survive another coup? Due to the failure of this coup under the previous president, could this event simply give the next coup leader a playbook on what not to do?
I do not believe South Korea will experience another attempted coup, at least for a while. The swift response to the president’s call for martial law demonstrates a strong commitment to preserving the democratic process. I am also confident that South Korean citizens would not remain passive, especially if their government begins to resemble anything close to North Korea’s authoritarian regime. If you notice, the accusations the president made against his political opponent, like accusing them of posing as “North Korean Communist” forces, show that there’s a clear shared dislike/animosity by both the representatives and population towards the other country. Such accusations can be perceived as “politically damaging” to their position.
I liked the focus of this post on Yoon’s declaration of martial law as a political mechanism. The former President’s often publicized frustration with his lame duck status and general unpopularity were major factors leading to the martial law declaration. Robust institutions in South Korea, particularly in the legislature and judiciary, have made it possible to weather a series of corruption allegations plaguing most (if not all) of the country’s former presidents. The opposition’s presence in the legislature is critical, as it has significantly lowered the barrier to holding Yoon accountable for his autocratic power grab. However, there are some fears that others in the country may attempt more blatant methods of corruption in the future. Do you think the door is open for more power grabs in South Korea due to Yoon’s actions?
This is a very interesting look at how South Korea’s democratic institutions reacted to President Yoon’s martial law announcement. Your use of Bermeo’s idea of executive aggrandizement really puts the situation into perspective, showing the risks of constitutional tools being misused for personal political interests. The quick response from the National Assembly and the Constitutional Court highlights the strength of South Korea’s democratic system. It’s impressive to see how institutional checks can work well even when under pressure, potentially serving as a model for other democracies facing similar issues. However, the intense political divide that emerged after Yoon’s impeachment, as noted by various reports, raises worries about the long-term health of democratic values in South Korea. While the institutions stood strong this time, ongoing vigilance and public involvement are essential to avoid future declines. Do you think the current political environment in South Korea will help strengthen these democratic institutions, or could it lead to more divisions that future leaders might take advantage of?