Apr 18, 2025

How to Erode a Democracy: Hungary’s Illiberal Turn Under Orbán

By: Sanishka Shah

Prime Minister Viktor Orbán turned Hungary from a hopeful post-communist democracy into the first “illiberal democracy” since taking office in 2010. Originally rated “Free, Hungary is now only “Partly Free,” reflecting a consistent drop in political rights and civil liberties, Freedom House rates. From the constitution to electoral laws, Orbán’s ruling Fidesz party changed the rules of the game using its parliamentary supermajority, so strengthening its grip on power. This case shows, even inside the EU framework, how democratic erosion may result from legalistic manipulation of institutions and populist nationalist mobilization. Using major scholarly frameworks – executive aggrandizement and stealth authoritarianism, authoritarian warning signs, populism, and polarization – I investigate Hungary’s democratic slippage in what follows. Hungary’s concrete evidence of constitutional revisions, media control, electoral engineering, anti-immigrant nationalism, attacks on the court and civil society highlights these ideas in action.

Using the tools of democracy – a parliamentary majority, new laws, and a new constitution – Orbán has freely stated his intention to create a “illiberal state” in Hungary, so erasing democratic checks and balances. Orbán chipped away steadily, using legal systems to consolidate authority, instead of eradicating democracy overnight. According to Nancy Bermeo, this contemporary kind of backsliding is known as “executive aggrandizement,” in which elected officials’ erasure of checks and balances without a clear coup Orbán’s government passed laws and a new constitution meant to destroy or subjugate autonomous institutions. These developments allowed Fidesz to appoint loyalists and extend their terms, so capturing important institutions.

Adoption of a new constitution written and approved unilaterally in 2011 was among the first actions taken. Along with later changes, this Fundamental Law undermined judicial independence. Fidesz ousted senior judges and let the government name new ones, so lowering the required retirement age for judges. Orbán reinstated the judges without returning them to their original courts when the European Court of Justice decided this violated EU law. As researcher Kim Lane Scheppele noted, Hungary’s leaders pieced together a self-serving “Frankenstate” created from legal components, but essentially underlined democracy was being undermined. This is consistent with what Ozan Varol describes as “stealth authoritarianism”, in which incumbents hollow out the substance of democracy while presenting a front of democracy.

A key component of Orbán’s approach has been media control. The government has been steadily undermining media freedom since 2010. It established a loyalist-filled Media Council, centralized government control over public broadcasting, and directed state advertising funds toward pro-government media. Independent media have been coerced or acquired. Following a takeover, Index, a significant news website, changed its position to one that supports the government. According to Human Rights Watch, this is a component of a larger attack on the rule of law. Orbán’s government “freezes out” critical media through market manipulation and legal pressures as opposed to outright censorship.

Fidesz’s power has also been solidified by electoral manipulation. 2011 saw rule changes and a redivision of electoral districts under Orbán’s administration. Boundaries were gerrymandered and the number of parliamentary seats was reduced. The opposition was disadvantaged when the two-round election system was replaced with a single-round plurality. Because of these modifications, the opposition required a lot more votes to secure seats that were equal. Through what Bermeo refers to as “strategic electoral manipulation”, Orbán was able to solidify his hold on power without resorting to outright fraud.

Civil society and opposition voices were also silenced through legal means. NGOs were restricted by law, particularly those that received foreign funding. A 2018 law labeled organizations that help asylum seekers as “foreign agents”. Following changes in accreditation, Central European University was forced to relocate. Loyalists dominated the prosecution and judicial branches, guaranteeing selective enforcement. Investigations into corruption against allies are rarely carried out. Hungary was labeled a “hybrid regime” by 2020. Fidesz “consolidated control over independent institutions” and hindered critics, according to Freedom House. The EU has had difficulty taking decisive action. A “competitive authoritarian regime” has emerged even while it was in power.

Orbán’s dominance cannot be explained by legal changes alone. Deep polarization and his populist nationalist rhetoric are also important factors. He positions himself as the Hungarian people’s protector against foreign threats and liberal elites. He referred to Hungary as a “illiberal state” in 2014, eschewing liberal democracy in favor of conservative principles. Müller’s definition of populism – claiming exclusive representation of a morally pure “people”– is reflected in this. Orbán portrays opponents as traitors and positions Fidesz as the nation’s voice.

A hallmark of his populism is anti-immigrant nationalism. During the 2015 refugee crisis, Orbán constructed border fences and disseminated propaganda linking migrants to criminals during the 2015 refugee crisis. He portrayed himself as defending Christian Europe against a Muslim “invasion.” His story implies that George Soros and Brussels are attacking Hungary’s identity. The Roma, immigrants, and LGBTQ individuals have all been targeted by Orbán’s administration. Müller contends that minorities are frequently singled out by populists as the people’s enemies.

Orbán’s populism was emphasized in his 2018 speech on “George Soros and Brussels”. He characterized Soros as a global, rootless foe in a subtly anti-Semitic trope. Critics were labeled “traitors” by state-affiliated media. Propaganda for years divided the populace into “patriots” who supported Fidesz and “undesirables.” McCoy et al. warn that polarization like this threatens democracy. Politics turns into a zero-sum game. Opponents are marginalized by Orbán; they encounter legal harassment and campaign obstacles. Many Hungarians view opposition as illegitimate. Orbán uses polarization to mobilize his supporters and defend his anti-democratic actions.

The decline of democracy in Hungary serves as a warning. Orbán subverted democracy by using its instruments. His legalistic strategies eliminated checks and balances. Today, backsliding is frequently concealed by institutions that appear democratic, as pointed out by to Bermeo. Varol demonstrates how covert authoritarianism can flourish in the face of global restrictions.

Orbán’s use of populist nationalism is equally important. He delegitimized critics and rallied support by presenting politics as a matter of national survival. His actions are normalized by polarization. According to McCoy et al., norms like accountability are undermined by profound societal divisions. In Hungary, regime narratives are reinforced by state-run media. Polarization promotes erosion and prevents power shifts.

Hungary demonstrates how democracy can erode gradually but effectively. Legalism is just as destructive as coups. Law by law, Orbán destroyed democracy. Hungary emphasizes the importance of upholding pluralism, the rule of law, and institutions. It also demonstrates the need for international organizations to take action before illiberalism solidifies. Under the guise of appeals to the people and the country, democracy may end with a whimper rather than a bang.

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