Nayib Bukele has become one of the most infamous populist leaders in Latin America, winning international praise for his aggressive anti-gang policies and his unapologetic, millennial persona. But under the surface of his popularity lies a much more troubling concern: Bukele is systematically undermining El Salvador’s democratic institutions in ways that echo other 21st-century populist autocrats.
Bukele’s rise follows a now-familiar pattern of democratic backsliding—not through military coups or violent crackdowns, but through the gradual erosion of institutional democratic constraints. As explained by Matthew Cleary and Aykut Oztürk in their article Perspectives on Politics, backsliding can lead to democratic breakdown when institutions are weakened and the opposition fails to coordinate an effective response. For Bukele, his Nuevas Ideas (new ideas) party has used its legislative majority to consolidate power, most notably by removing and replacing judges on the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court, otherwise known as the
Supreme Court of El Salvador. These strategic moves resemble the tactics of other authoritarian leaders who used their popularity and legislative dominance to redesign the playing field in their favor.
Bukele’s strategy shares clear parallels with the democratic dismantling carried out by former Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega in the 2010s. As Jay Ulfelder notes in his blog post Daniel Ortega Shows Us How to Dismantle a Democracy, 21st-Century Style, Ortega “moved quickly to undermine rival power centers, using legal and constitutional means to do so.” Bukele has followed a similar method, using legal reforms and his political capital to weaken the judiciary and increase his executive power. In both cases, the erosion of checks and balances has not provoked an immediate crisis like the break out of sectarian conflict, but rather a slow and steady decline in democratic norms.
What makes Bukele’s case particularly interesting is how little resistance he faces from the public and Salvadoran citizens. As explained in the Keough School’s analysis, many Salvadorans continue to support Bukele, even as he undermines democratic structures which are ultimately unsustainable. Before Bukele came to power, El Salvador struggled with how “Weak post-war institutions failed to address pervasive poverty and social inequality, creating fertile ground for gang activity.” This paradox can be explained, in part, by a public disillusioned with traditional parties and institutions. As the article points out, “For a population long accustomed to the constant threat of gang violence, these gains are more than statistical—they represent a restoration of basic security and dignity.” Bukele’s popularity is driven by a sense that he is actively delivering immediate results—particularly in reducing gang violence—where previous governments failed.
However, as Cleary and Oztürk argue, popularity and perceived effectiveness do not justify the erosion of democratic constraints. In fact, it is often the very success of leaders like Bukele that makes the coordination of an opposition force more difficult. When citizens are willing to trade democratic norms for security and stability, it becomes easier for leaders to push through undemocratic reforms without facing strong resistance.
President Bukele’s case demonstrates how democracies can go out not with a bang, but with a series of legalistic and ultimately backsliding moves supported by the general population. As in Ortega’s Nicaragua, El Salvador’s democratic institutions are being dismantled while the public observes—or even supports. The lesson from El Salvador and Nicaragua is clear: democracy does not die solely through coup d’etats or violent conflict; it can die from within, when leaders abuse the public’s trust to dismantle checks and balances, and when citizens prioritize short-term gains over long-term institutional health. It is very unfortunate that Salvadorans are being put in a situation where their democratic rights are being undermined in the interest of pure survival in an unstable society.
Bibliography:
Cleary, Matthew R. and Aykut
Ozt¨urk. 2020. “When Does Backsliding
Lead to Breakdown? Uncertainty and Opposition Strategies in Democracies at
Risk.” Perspectives on Politics.
Ulfelder, Jay. “Daniel Ortega Shows Us How to Dismantle a Democracy, 21st-
Century Style.” Dart-Throwing Chimp. November 20, 2011.
Poma, Santiago. “Why Do Voters Support Leaders Who Undermine Democracy? The Case of El Salvador.” Keough School of Global Affairs, University of Notre Dame, March 28, 2024.
Democracy Now! “Trump Hosts El Salvador’s Bukele at White House Amid Uproar over U.S. Transfers to CECOT.” Democracy Now!, April 14, 2025.
I think that this article was very informative and very interesting, the backsliding being supported and almost welcomed was something that you explained very well. I think my biggest take away is that Bukele is abusing power and also taking advantage of Salvadorans because they are vulnerable and put in a position where they have to comply to simply survive. The shift in democratic norms is happening slowly and with support from the public which is different than expected
I don’t agree with the idea that Nayib Bukele is just another authoritarian or that what’s happening in El Salvador is the same as Nicaragua. Bukele didn’t rise out of a functioning democracy—he rose out of a broken system. For decades, El Salvador was ruled by corrupt presidents who stole massive amounts of money while people lived in fear. Gangs weren’t just a problem—they were the system. You couldn’t report a crime because the police were often working with the criminals. There was no real justice, no safety, and definitely no democracy for regular people.
In that context, it makes sense why so many Salvadorans support Bukele. He represents something different. He’s young, confident, and unafraid to take on the gangs that terrorized the country for years. For the first time in a long time, people can walk the streets without fear.
So yes, maybe he’s consolidating power. But to say he’s undermining democracy assumes there was a real democracy to begin with. In reality, the gangs and corrupt officials had already destroyed it. Bukele’s critics in the international press often ignore that. They look at El Salvador through the lens of institutions that were never strong to begin with. That’s why comparing it to Nicaragua—or any other place—misses the deeper truth: El Salvador is dealing with its own history, and Bukele, for better or worse, is the result of that. You are not given the title as a country to be the #1 one murder capital of the world without a dismantled government. This is insensitive to those that have unmarked graves, have been missing for years of the families that had to flee and start in a new life with nothing.
Hi there, I think that this piece overall is very well written and informative. I really like the connections to Nicaragua. A question that I have is that Bukele constantly harps on a notion of El Salvador’s past full of Gangs, Corruption, Crime etc. With his governments results in terms of lowering those numbers overall (I wont get into the humanitarian aspect of it) is there a chance that the erosion of democracy is the price to pay for the common El Salvadorian to be able to live in a safe nation? I ask as prior to Bukele El Salvador was not as safe, though democracy was still in affect. All in all, I guess the cumulative question is that in specifically El Salvador’s case, is it a trade off of a safer nation for less democracy worth it? Thank you
Josephine, your analysis of the silent, legalistic decline of democracy under Bukele is very insightful. Your use of Cleary and Oztürk’s framework and comparison to Ortega successfully demonstrate how institutional breakdown can happen without resorting to violence, particularly in situations where public support is strong and opposition is dispersed. Your emphasis on the paradox of popularity really caught my attention; people find it more difficult to oppose Bukele’s undemocratic reforms because of his success in providing security.
This case, in my opinion, serves as an example of the peril of sacrificing long-term democratic health in favor of temporary stability. It might be worthwhile to briefly discuss whether this support will endure as long as executive overreach persists or whether international actors are partially to blame for Bukele’s legitimacy. Your post serves as a powerful reminder that democracy frequently erodes with popular consent rather than with a bang.