Political scientists Matthew Cleary and Aykut Öztürk, in their article When Does Backsliding Lead to Breakdown? Uncertainty and Opposition Strategies in Democracies at Risk, explain how democratic erosion scenarios are shaped not only not by the autocrats who initiate them, but equally by the actions of said autocrats’ political opposition. Specifically, they argue that the nature of opposition to executive aggrandisement – where an executive expands their power to be unconstrained by checks and balances – is key in determining democratic outcomes: while ‘moderate’ opposition, which functions through legal, institutional, and democratic means, has historically proven an effective constraint on executive power, ‘radical’ and extra-institutional forms of opposition (e.g. coups) often backfire, in fact accelerating democratic breakdown.
Cleary and Öztürk’s work represents a departure from much of the existing executive-focused literature on democratic erosion, and a compelling, insightful one at that. That being said, examining their article, I noticed something: there was no mention of universities.
Anybody reading this will have noticed the recent tension between Donald Trump and American universities. Consistent with his larger crackdown on free speech, the President has attempted to use his powers to coerce universities to conform with his platform’s ideological leanings, with an intent to punish and suppress those institutions which don’t do as demanded. This has presented itself in public ultimatums, the withholding of funds, threats of ‘international student bans’, and – most shockingly – the Trump administration’s use of ICE to harass, abduct and deport academic dissidents in Gestapo-like fashion. And this is all without mentioning the broader agenda of the New Right to delegitimise the academic subjects and departments they find most threatening – the humanities in particular – in the eyes of the public.
Trump is not unique in his behaviour here; a quick Google search reveals that attacking the independence and integrity of academic institutions is authoritarianism-101, and the methods by which Trump’s administration has gone about doing this are nothing new, either. In Brazil, Bolsonaro attempted to slash federal funding for universities deemed guilty of ‘leftist indoctrination’. In Hungary, Orban attacked gender studies departments as part of a campaign to centralise academic control under the state. In Türkiye, Erdogan declared a phony state of emergency to legally ‘justify’ a purge of 6,000 academics, similarly to how Trump recently cited the infamous Alien and Sedition Acts to defend plainly unconstitutional and politically-motivated deportations.
From this historic pattern, we see that universities are, to autocrats, feared sources of potential opposition; otherwise, they wouldn’t be so often (and so quickly and fiercely) targeted by executives aiming to consolidate political power. Combined with a key takeaway from Cleary and Öztürk’s paper – that the actions of opposition are integral in determining democratic outcomes in cases of executive aggrandisement – my inference here led me to question: since it’s clear that universities play some significant role in resisting democratic backslides, what exactly is the nature of this role – both in general and in today’s United States?
My subsequent research consisted of a dive into instances of conflict between universities and elected autocrats in the 21st century. I came to focus on 4 case studies: Russia under Putin, Türkiye under Erdogan, Hungary under Orban, and Brazil under Bolsonaro. Within them, I noticed some common themes:
1) Conflict Between Academics and Authoritarians Occurs Necessarily The existence of an independent academic sector is necessarily incompatible with authoritarian governance. As producers of secular, liberal, and internationalist discourse, universities inherently undermine autocratic rhetoric, which typically relies on populist, nationalist, and religious appeals. This makes conflict not incidental but inevitable whenever strong academic institutions and authoritarian ambitions coexist.
2) Autocrats Target Different Universities for Different Reasons Public universities are often attacked by autocrats for their capacity to mobilise protest and shape mass political consciousness. Elite universities, however, pose a greater threat: their output is widely perceived as carrying great credibility, giving them unparalleled power in parrying autocrats’ attempts to control public narratives and dominate civil society. In this way, elite institutions wield a rare weapon I term legitimised dissent – public critique backed by widely-respected intellectual authority.
3) Autocratic Responses to Academic Opposition Are Predictable Autocrats, who wield substantial political power but lack such levels of intellectual legitimacy, struggle to directly combat the threat of legitimised dissent from elite universities. Resultantly, they instead seek to undermine it, and do so by folding anti-academic sentiment into broader populist messaging, rhetorically framing universities as being contaminated with elitist, insincere, and morally-corrupt indoctrinators, rendering them invalid contributors to political discourse. When these rhetorical attacks fail to neutralise academic opposition, more aggressive strategies follow: legal harassment, funding cuts, and the like – the sorts of tactics we’ve seen employed by Trump in recent weeks.
I also observed in these cases that the outcome of university-autocrat conflict seems to be a predictor for the overall outcome of attempts at executive aggrandisement: in Brazil, where the academic sector successfully fought to remain independent, Bolsonaro’s attempt to consolidate power failed, and democratic governance eventually returned. However, in the other three countries, where the state was able to establish more considerable control over the academic sector, outcomes proved more bleak.
Bringing things back to the content of today’s headlines, this, above all, tells us that we should pay great attention to the political conflict between Trump and American universities. This is especially the case now, considering – as if this didn’t already seem urgent enough – we currently find ourselves in what Cleary and Öztürk call the ‘critical period’ of executive aggrandisement: the time between the executive’s initial challenge to the democratic status quo and the point when the regime’s final trajectory – either executive consolidation, democratic breakdown through extra-institutional conflict, or democratic survival – is set. It’s during this window that the fate of the regime is still alterable, and opposition choices prove most consequential in determining whether democracy survives.
So, if this is all true – what should our universities do?
Luckily, America’s most important academic institution is already setting the right example. Harvard, despite increasing pressure from the federal government, has defiantly refused to allow political actors to dictate how it operates, thereby cementing itself as a widely visible, independent, and immovable obstacle to any attempt by the Trump administration to dominate political discourse. This not only preserves the university’s ability to produce legitimised dissent, but also exemplifies the kind of principled, ‘moderate’ resistance Cleary and Öztürk’s identify as being so effective in helping halt democratic backslides. If this approach holds, Harvard, and the many institutions which follow its lead, may well prove instrumental in preventing Trump from successfully consolidating executive power before the next election cycle.
In the meantime, it’s up to us – students, professors, administrators, and all involved in academic life – to do everything we can to support universities’ efforts to stay independent; not because it’s a matter of partisan politics, but because the survival of American democracy depends on it.
I really enjoyed your piece about how universities help protect democracy. Your idea of “legitimized dissent” where universities can criticize power with respected authority explains why authoritarian leaders often target them first. I think it also explains why populism is often very anti-intellectualist, and particularly right-wing populism tries to delegitimize educational institutions as left-wing propaganda and not real education.
I would be curious to see how university resistance measures up to other institutions, such as the media or courts. I would wonder if there is any quantifiable comparison addressing whether universities are more effective in resisting authoritarianism than other, more entrenched institutions, since they cannot be as easily compromised by the government.