Since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, information warfare has become as crucial as military strategy on the ground. Government officials, state-backed media outlets, and online propagandists have pushed divergent claims about events ranging from alleged atrocities to battlefield gains. Meanwhile, independent journalists and open-source intelligence (OSINT) groups have used public data—like satellite imagery and social media geolocation—to challenge misleading statements. Although Russia’s official narrative has often relied on contradictory “explanations,” that very tactic may be undermining Russia’s credibility.
Despite Moscow’s aggressive disinformation campaign intended to justify its actions and weaken global support for Ukraine, open-source debunking and the rapid circulation of verifiable on-the-ground evidence have started to erode the campaign’s influence, revealing that brazen contradictions can backfire in the age of OSINT and high public scrutiny.
Russia has a long history of using disinformation—what some have called “active measures”—to shape domestic and international perceptions. As detailed in our course readings, such as Peter Pomerantsev’s analysis (“The Disinformation Age: a Revolution in Propaganda”) and Renée DiResta’s New York Times piece (“What We Now Know About Russian Disinformation”), the Kremlin historically pushes multiple, often mutually exclusive, versions of events. This practice sows confusion and undermines the credibility of any single account.
In the context of the Ukraine invasion, these strategies have manifested in state-aligned media outlets (e.g., RT, Sputnik) claiming at various points that: 1.There is no war, only a “special military operation.” 2. Ukraine provoked the invasion through alleged genocide in the Donbas. 3.Western narratives of civilian harm are “staged” or fabricated.

Disinformation and its prominent place in The Russian Ukraine war

These seemingly contradictory claims saturate the information space, aiming to confuse foreign audiences and maintain domestic support. By ensuring no single “truth” emerges, Russia hopes to lessen the impact of any one piece of contrary evidence. However, the global proliferation of open-source investigation has begun to poke holes in this approach, directly challenging Kremlin-backed stories in near real time.
OSINT refers to the practice of gathering and analyzing publicly available information—such as satellite imagery, social media posts, flight data, and video geolocation. Over the past decade, investigative groups like Bellingcat have pioneered methods that anyone with an internet connection can replicate. With the war in Ukraine, OSINT researchers quickly began documenting Russian troop build-ups, geolocating destroyed vehicles, and fact-checking official statements from both Russia and Ukraine.
For example, when the Russian government claimed it had not targeted civilian infrastructure, analysts overlaid satellite photos of missile impact sites with user-generated videos to show that residential areas and hospitals were indeed being struck. These findings circulated widely on platforms like Twitter, Reddit, and Telegram. International media picked up these analyses, in some cases contradicting Russian state television broadcasts almost immediately.

In this sense, OSINT acts as a counterweight to disinformation. It challenges the Kremlin’s narratives with concrete visual and data-driven proof. Because the methods are transparent—anyone can verify that a certain video matches a precise location or timestamp—these fact checks carry significant weight. Russian officials have responded to these counter-claims by issuing more elaborate justifications or simply denying the evidence altogether, but the core contradiction remains.
Crucially, this dynamic suggests that while massive amounts of propaganda can flood the information environment, coordinated, verifiable counter-evidence can undermine even the largest disinformation campaigns, provided it reaches the right audiences in time.
One of the key insights from our readings is that disinformation campaigns often rest on contradictory messages: they do not need all consumers to believe one single falsehood; rather, they want people to doubt the existence of any stable truth. By continuously shape-shifting the narrative—first denying an event, then claiming it was a “false flag,” and finally suggesting it is irrelevant—Russian propaganda attempts to create a climate of general uncertainty and apathy.

Yet this approach can backfire. As more verifiable data emerges, segments of the population become aware of the pattern of deception and lose trust in the source. Indeed, polls from various countries show that the Kremlin’s approval rating has remained low in many parts of Europe, partly due to the swift rebuttal of its claims by OSINT investigators, independent journalists, and local Ukrainian sources.
In other words, while disinformation is certainly powerful, blatant contradictions can trigger skepticism among observers. When faced with time-stamped satellite photos that clearly contradict official statements, even neutral or previously uninformed audiences can become more inclined to disbelieve the Kremlin’s messages—especially if these corrections are widely reported and circulated.
Despite some success in countering falsehoods, numerous challenges remain. Not all audiences have access to these OSINT findings, nor do they always trust them. Algorithms on social media can isolate users into echo chambers, where they may encounter only official Russian narratives or conspiracy-based claims. Moreover, even when confronted with evidence, some individuals default to entrenched beliefs.

This underscores the importance of media literacy campaigns, platform regulation, and continued investigative efforts. No single solution will completely neutralize disinformation, but collectively, they can lessen its impact.
The war in Ukraine underscores the resilience and adaptability of Russia’s long-standing disinformation strategy. However, the ubiquity of OSINT investigations reveals a crucial shift: verifiable data can puncture official propaganda in near real time. Though the Kremlin’s contradictory messaging aims to confuse and sow doubt, robust fact-checking networks increasingly expose these narratives, thereby diminishing their credibility. The heightened role of digital tools and citizen-led intelligence networks shows that disinformation does not go unchallenged, and it suggests a path forward for other contexts: empower independent verifiers, spread transparent data, and equip the public to discern fact from fiction.

Works Cited 
Bellingcat. (2022, February 25). Using OSINT to verify events in Ukraine.  https://www.bellingcat.com/
DiResta, R. (2018, December 17). What we now know about Russian disinformation. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/17/opinion/russia-disinformation-fake-news.html
Pomerantsev, P. (2018, July 17). The disinformation age: a revolution in propaganda. The Guardian. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/jul/17/the-disinformation-age-a-revolution-in-propaganda
U.S. Department of State. (2022). Fact vs. fiction: Russian disinformation on Ukraine. Retrieved from https://www.state.gov/