Kuwait’s Emir has recently dissolved the country’s parliament citing corruption and the parliament’s poor performance as his reasoning. While this is not unprecedented in Kuwaiti politics, the circumstances surrounding the decision, specifically the extended timeline and calls from the Emir to restructure the current democratic system are very concerning for the future of democracy in Kuwait. At this point and time, it’s unclear whether the Emir will seize the opportunity to shift Kuwait into a full autocracy or allow it to revert to its old system under this new framework. To better draw a conclusion we must look at the history.

Kuwait’s politics is defined by a tug-of-war for power between the ruling sheiks and the merchant class. Back when Kuwait was still a tribal sheikdom the sheik had very little ability to rule unilaterally and thus would often be at the mercy of the affluent merchants. Recognizing the power imbalance the Sheik turned outward for external support and alternative revenue streams. Once free from this financial dependence the sheik was able to place Kuwait under authoritarian rule until the end of WW1. This period led to a movement amongst citizens and merchants for greater political representation and democratic reform. After many failed attempts at legislative councils Kuwait would finally draft their constitution in 1962 which still is in place to this day and has never been officially amended.

The constitution created 3 branches of government: an executive branch headed by the Emir (hereditary monarch), as well as a Prime minister, and a Cabinet both of which He appoints. The legislative branch comprises 50 elected members making up the country’s parliament and the judicial branch is run by Emir-appointed judges many of whom are non-Kuwaiti. The parliament is often seen as inefficient; the tension between the elected members and appointed cabinet members leads to frequent deadlocks making legislation slow. These inefficiencies are exacerbated by the emir’s ability to dissolve parliament which is what is currently happening in Kuwait today. This power is restricted by the need for an election within 60 days.

So how has the country recovered from these past dissolutions and what makes this most recent one stand apart? Kuwait’s Parliament has been dissolved 11 times since 1976, the majority of these came off the back of vague and generally weak reasoning however they resolved fairly quickly with little incident and most importantly within the 60-day timeframe that the constitution outlines. The reason this recent dissolution is so important is due to the fact that the government not only neglected to hold elections within the two month timeframe, the deadline for doing so has been extended by up to 4 years. This blatant disregard for the country’s constitution has not been seen since 1986 and only one time before that in 1976. Looking back at these dissolutions should help to contextualize the current dilemma and help to give a framework for how Kuwait’s democracy can recover in the future.

In 1976 Amir Sabah al-Salim al-Sabah became the first monarch to dissolve parliament in this fashion justifying it by citing a lack of cohesion and cooperation amongst the legislative and executive branches. He went on to suspend constitutional rights and restricted the press to quell dissent. During this period the Emir made attempts to revise the constitution which failed however they managed to change electoral districts to further manipulate legislative processes. The large civil response was the means by which the public was able to regain their right to political participation. The suspension drew the ire of the local press who alongside civil society organizations publicly disavowed the Emir’s Decision. Other movements influenced by the Iranian revolution and the mounting public pressure were finally enough for the Emir to reinstate parliament in 1980.

The 1986 parliament dissolution came during a time of heightened internal turmoil over a mishandled stock market crash and a series of violent terrorist attacks on oil pipelines. There was also external chaos from the Lebanese Civil War and the Iran-Iraq War. After a failed assassination attempt on the Emir, he disbanded parliament attributing it to an ‘abuse of democratic life,’ accusations of certain lawmakers of ‘exploiting the constitution for personal gain,’ fostering division, and hindering cooperation between the legislative and executive branches.”. The Emir was able to postpone the required 60-day elections by declaring a state of emergency. The extensive controls placed by the government made a civil response extremely difficult as opposed to 1976. There was little evidence of mass protests or meetings during the immediate aftermath of the 1986 dissolution. It wouldn’t be until 1990 that parliament was reinstated. The reason for the reinstatement was based on external factors such as the Iraqi invasion and annexation of Kuwait. With added pressure from the US, the ruling family of Kuwait agreed to reinstate parliamentary procedures after the withdrawal of Iraqi troops from the territory.

Mirroring the situation in 1986, currently, the reaction from Kuwait’s civil society over the 2024 dissolution has been very limited. At the time of writing, there have been no reported mass gatherings, protests over the suspension, or other demonstrations. This may very well stem from the repressive laws currently enacted within Kuwait. Laws against unauthorized gatherings, online criticism of the Emir or the government, and tight government control over NGOs make it very difficult to gain momentum for any sort of mass mobilization against the government. Amnesty International has reports of arbitrary detainment of at least 7 individuals for expressing their discontent with the government publicly, stripping the citizenship of 9 individuals, and charging a parliamentary candidate for criticizing the government system. These reports no doubt only act to instill fear amongst the population. The harsh nature of the punishments sends a stern warning out to opposition supporters and party members.

As of right now, Kuwait is on a collision course towards complete autocratic rule. There is no evidence of any sort of enforcement mechanism will make the Emir honor his 4 year suspension timeline and the extensive societal repression sends a clear message he does not intend to. Through the suspension of constitutional freedoms, the Emir eliminated the main tool utilized by the public to regain political freedoms in 1976. This situation, while similar to that of the 1986 dissolution, isn’t facing the massive external pressure or intervention that led to parliament’s reinstatement and continuation of elections in 1990. Even if the Emir does honor the 4-year time frame and reinstates parliament, this will likely be under a reworked constitutional system that tips the already unbalanced governmental powers entirely in the favor of the executive branch. Without external intervention, the most likely scenario is a continual removal of constitutional freedoms until the Emir rules unilaterally with little room for domestic response.