Judicial Reform in Mexico
June 1, 2025, marked a landmark institutional shift in Mexico. For the first time in the country’s history, it held elections to select all aspects of its judiciary by popular vote. Critics, including scholars and analysts, have described this as a dangerous step toward an authoritarian controlled judiciary, especially given the low turnout rates. This political move, along with others perceived as weakening Western defined democratic systems of checks and balances, calls for reflection when compared to global trends of democratic backsliding outlined in the latest V Dem reports. Although one could argue that this judicial reform alone is not cause for concern, it paints a stark picture when we consider that the ruling party Morena moved in 2024 to eliminate the INAI, an institution that had been a staple of vertical accountability since the collapse of PRI imposed autocratic rule in the early 2000s.
How did Mexico get here, and why now?
Grappling with three decades of systemic institutional corruption, widening economic inequality, and increasing drug related violence, Mexicans elected Andrés Manuel López Obrador (commonly referred to as AMLO) as the country’s 58th president. Throughout his presidency, AMLO promoted a vision of significant national change in politics, economics, and social values. This vision, referred to as the Fourth Transformation (4T), was outlined in AMLO’s Plan Nacional de Desarrollo (PND). The primary themes encapsulated in this vision included an institutional “calibration” to combat corruption and end impunity, often referenced in his morning press conferences (mañaneras). AMLO frequently stated that elite manipulation and bribery of the judicial system had contributed to Mexico’s deeply rooted corruption. Both he and his successor, President Claudia Sheinbaum, see this reform as a necessary step to tackle the long history of normalized corruption and impunity that Mexicans encounter daily in their institutions.
What does the future of democracy look like in Mexico?
Is this reform a symptom of a much larger trend that some scholars have labeled the “Pink Tide” sweeping across Latin America? Mexico’s judicial reform, although sweeping in scope, is not novel. Bolivia, which has often been characterized as authoritarian, implemented a similar judicial reform in 2011, introducing popular elections for judges. Those elections, however, were marked by low turnout and widespread ballot nullification, raising concerns about politicization and weak legitimacy. Still, recent V Dem reports categorize Bolivia as part of a group of Latin American nations that appear to be moving back toward democratization. Perhaps Mexico could follow a similar trajectory, though Bolivia’s experience also highlights the risks of judicial elections failing to deliver accountability.
Final Thoughts
Democratic backsliding as a field of study is still maturing. As Waldner and Lust (2018) argue, the topic still lacks a strong theoretical foundation for empirical measurement. Considering the longitudinal nature of such analysis, time may be better spent measuring the outcomes of democracy in terms of freedoms rather than the dynamic intricacies of its institutional structure. Governance, in this sense, is a term of art that requires ongoing normative feedback from actors across the system. Perhaps this is why the field of global development has shifted toward the UN’s 2030 SDGs, after reconciling that the Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) associated with the Washington Consensus failed to deliver on their promise of improving the lives of historically marginalized groups constrained by entrenched power structures. Mexico’s path forward, whether it strengthens democracy through greater inclusion as argued by its leaders in the election of its judiciary or weakens it through institutional erosion as suggested by the dismantling of INAI, will ultimately point to whether its trajectory resembles that of Bolivia or a deeper slide into democratic backsliding.
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Great read, thanks for sharing. Your post shares that Mexico’s judicial elections will ultimately weaken its ability to hold other branches in check. This position appears valid at face value, but ultimately is disingenuous. If we look at the history of Mexico, it was a democracy in name only for 71 years, with the outgoing administration selecting the new one. While electing the judiciary will not immediately solve all the problems, and realistically, it will present new ones, this is a valid response in reallocating power and vesting it in the will of the people. It is rooted in the more fundamental social contract of sovereignty. The uncomfortable truth is that the two steps forward, one step back dynamic of democratic nation-building can take this form as it strives to find a balance between order, justice, and democracy.
I appreciate you sharing your thoughts on this topic: judicial reform in Mexico is of great interest to me, and I would like to add context. AMLO’s frustration with the judicial branch, specifically the Supreme Court, derives from its continuous efforts of striking down important features of his legislative agenda. AMLO found it necessary to create constitutional changes for his Fourth Transformation project to come to fruition.
As a result, Mexico’s Senate approved an extensive constitutional reform, which would require all judges in the country to be popularly elected to their positions. Though electing judges can have significant benefits, such as further independence from political branches and enhanced public participation, there are some issues in regards to judicial independence (a core element of judicial accountability).
I want to contribute to this discussion by highlighting and examining the importance of judicial independence and the ways in which it is secured.
Judicial independence is recognized as the capacity of courts and judges to carry out their responsibilities without interference or control from external parties, whether governmental or private. Judicial independence guarantees that the judiciary remains neutral when resolving different types of disputes, such as conflicts among government entities and cases that involve private individuals and the government.
The judiciary concentrates exclusively on interpreting the law, and, in the best systems, it is free from any external influences or pressures that could undermine its dedication to fully enforcing the law. One key mechanism for maintaining judicial independence is the establishment of tenure for judges. This tenure is significant because it gives the judicial branch the ability to efficiently oversee the activities of the legislative and executive branches. Judges with secure tenure have the stability needed to make decisions that are exclusively guided by the law, as opposed to giving in to political pressure or the interests of the public.
However, such is not the case when judges are elected: their rulings, even if in line with the country’s constitution, have the potential for the public to view such holdings poorly, and, in turn, vote out the judge. Public opinion may not always be democratic and may be influenced by the ruling party’s questionable acts. If judges are not free to make decisions without fear of public backlash, as is potentially the case now in Mexico, this diminishes an essential pillar of an effective democracy.