When Xi Jinping declared that China had achieved “a whole-process people’s democracy,” many outside observers saw the phrase as contradictory. How could an authoritarian, one-party state claim to be democratic? Yet this rhetoric is not mere propaganda, it represents a powerful example of discursive democratic erosion, where regimes redefine what democracy means rather than reject it outright.
Redefining Democracy from Within
Traditionally, democracy has been associated with free and fair elections, pluralism, and accountability (Dahl 1972; Schmitter & Karl 1991). By contrast, China’s “whole-process people’s democracy” centers on participation without competition. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) presents itself as the sole authority for realizing the people’s will. Citizens can voice opinions through local consultations and online suggestion platforms, but the Party retains completely control over outcomes.
This shift echoes what Nancy Bermeo (2016) calls “backsliding through democratic redefinition.” Instead of openly dismantling democratic institutions, authoritarian regimes increasingly appropriate democratic language to legitimize illiberal practices. In China’s case, democracy is reframed as a moral and developmental concept rather than a political one, which emphasizes harmony and efficiency over contestation and choice.
Xi Jinping’s speeches since 2019 emphasize that Western-style elections lead to “chaos” and “division,” while China’s model allegedly reflects the “true will of the people.” The CCP’s narrative reframes democracy not as a structure of competition, but as a process of governance guided by enlightened leadership. This rebranding enabled the regime to claim that it has the same moral legitimacy as free democratic countries, which was an important step for it to gain broader political legitimacy globally.
Stealth Authoritarianism in Rhetorical Form
Ozan Varol (2015) coined the term stealth authoritarianism to describe how leaders use legal and institutional tools of democracy to entrench power. In China, a similar stealth process was showed at the discursive level. By redefining democracy to fit authoritarian governance, the CCP not only shields itself from international criticism but also offers an ideological alternative to liberal democracy. As Levitsky and Way (2002) argued in their concept of competitive authoritarianism, regimes that maintain the façade of democracy often survive longer because they diffuse accountability while maintaining legitimacy. “Whole-process democracy” is the rhetorical culmination of this logic, it eliminates competition while preserving democratic symbolism.
Exporting the Discourse: Global Effects
The domestic rebranding of democracy would matter little if it remained confined within China’s borders. But Beijing has gone further, exporting its narrative internationally through diplomatic statements, development programs, and global media outlets. In speeches to the United Nations and the Belt and Road Forum, Chinese officials argue that “there are many forms of democracy” and that no single model fits all countries. This argument resonates strongly in parts of the Global South, where governments seeking to justify democratic backsliding have cited China’s model as a legitimate “alternative path.” For example, leaders in Cambodia, Venezuela, and several African states have echoed the language of “democracy with national characteristics” when curtailing opposition or restricting elections.
According to Alexander Cooley (2015), this trend exemplifies how authoritarian norms now diffuse globally, eroding the moral dominance of liberal democracy. The CCP’s discursive project thus contributes to a larger “authoritarian equilibrium” (Kelemen 2020), in which illiberal states support each other’s legitimacy through shared language and mutual recognition.
Moreover, China’s vast media and digital infrastructure investments, for example, the Belt and Road Initiative, further expand its influence over global information flows. State outlets such as CGTN and Xinhua publish multilingual content describing China’s democracy as “efficient,” “consensual,” and “responsive.” These narratives have been widely spread online, subtly challenging the Western framework that equates democracy with political freedom.
The Global Challenge
At first, “whole-process people’s democracy” might appear as harmless branding. Yet words shape perceptions, and perceptions shape power. When democracy’s meaning becomes changeable, it loses its capacity to constrain authoritarian behavior. By successfully redefining democracy, China undermines the normative foundation of global democratic accountability. The more countries accept that “every system is a democracy in its own way,” the harder it becomes for citizens, activists, and international organizations to call out repression. In this sense, China’s rhetorical strategy mirrors what Bermeo (2016) and Haggard & Kaufman (2021) describe as the new face of autocratization: a gradual, legalistic, and often linguistic erosion of democratic norms. Rather than overthrow democracy, regimes now reshape its meaning to fit authoritarian ends.
China’s redefinition of democracy poses a challenge not only to liberal democracies but also to the very conceptual clarity of democracy itself. As Beijing promotes “democracy with Chinese characteristics” on the world stage, it invites other regimes to follow suit, blurring the distinction between democracy and authoritarianism. To respond effectively, defenders of democracy must reclaim the language of democracy, grounding it once again in accountability, pluralism, and rights, rather than performance or stability. Otherwise, the world may soon find itself in a discursive landscape where everyone claims to be democratic, and the word no longer means anything at all.
References:
Bermeo, N. (2016). On Democratic Backsliding. Journal of Democracy, 27(1), 5–19.
Cooley, A. (2015). Authoritarianism Goes Global: Countering Democratic Norms. Journal of Democracy, 26(3), 49–63.
Dahl, R. A. (1972). Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. Yale University Press.
Haggard, S., & Kaufman, R. (2021). The Anatomy of Democratic Backsliding. Journal of Democracy, 32(4), 27–41.
Kelemen, R. D. (2020). The European Union’s Authoritarian Equilibrium. Journal of European Public Policy, 27(3), 481–499.
Levitsky, S., & Way, L. A. (2002). Elections Without Democracy: The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism. Journal of Democracy, 13(2), 51–65.
Varol, O. (2015). Stealth Authoritarianism. Iowa Law Review, 100(4), 1673–1742.
Xi Jinping. (2021, October 13). Full Text of Xi Jinping’s Keynote Speech at the CPC and World Political Parties Summit. Xinhua News Agency.

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