Hungary’s erosion of democracy is occurring in courts, parliament and the wording of new laws, not in protests and demonstrations. Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz party has been creating institutions in Hungary since more than ten years ago, and currently, Fidesz has created a large number of new laws which appear to be normal governmental actions but provide authorities with the opportunity to silence critics and eliminate accountability. Independent journalists, non-governmental organizations and opposition parties are not being banned but instead they are being audited, investigated and gradually starved of funds. The type of authoritarianism that uses legality to hide behind legitimate actions. Fidesz’s strategy is an example of a “rule by law” model of democratic erosion, using legal mechanisms and procedures to remove democratic protections from inside institutions. Unlike a coup, this is a long-term strategy. Before citizens know what is happening, the underlying ground of democracy has already been altered.
Why would an authoritarian regime choose to use law instead of force? Laws provide legitimacy. A bill called “anti-foreign interference” or “transparency” may seem reasonable or even protective. However, ambiguous language and broad application of enforcement authority enable the state to label any organization as a threat to “sovereignty,” and then freeze their funds, cancel their license to operate, etc. Laws that appear to be neutral on paper, are, in practice, used to prosecute dissidents. Hungary’s Sovereignty Protection Office (SPO), is the primary mechanism for enforcing laws and regulations that allow the Hungarian government to investigate and audit journalists, watch dog groups, and civil society organizations. The SPO creates a constant climate of uncertainty for these types of organizations and when everyone is being watched, there is a natural tendency towards self-censorship. As a result, the amount of scrutiny applied to those in positions of authority decreases, and the ability of the public to hold those in authority accountable also decreases.
Political scientist Steven Levitsky and his colleague Lucan Way, have described “Competitive Authoritarianism,” as a form of regime, in which elections continue to occur, however, the playing field is rigged. Hungary demonstrates competitive authoritarianism. Elections occur, votes are tallied, and official institutions continue to function; however, the environment around them — free media, an independent judicial system, and active civil society — has been systematically reduced. Gradual strangulation of competition is the characteristic of modern autocracies. It does not require tanks on the street. Tanks on the street are no longer necessary; simply a continuous stream of laws that chip away at the oversight mechanisms of the government, while continuing to present a democratic facade. These effects go well beyond partisanship. Once independent watchdogs run out of money and journalists begin to fear repercussions, corruption flourishes. Government contracts go to friends, courts favor the executive branch, and public monies are used to demonstrate loyalty. Eventually, citizens lose faith in the impartiality of the system and withdraw.
The EU has attempted to push back against this. Infringement procedures, rule of law reports, and conditional funding are all mechanisms to keep Member States accountable. However, these mechanisms develop slowly. Legal processes can take years, whereas Orbán’s government develops new laws weekly. By the time the EU takes action, the domestic situation is already entrenched. This process illustrates the broader challenge facing international democracy support systems. Supranational institutions can identify and signal violations, but they often cannot reverse such violations once domestic institutions have been co-opted. Hungary has turned the time difference between identifying and reversing violations into a political shield.
What occurs in Budapest does not remain in Budapest. Other authoritarian regimes are observing closely. Hungary has demonstrated how to solidify power through legislation rather than violence, while preserving international legitimacy. This “learning” by other governments with authoritarian intentions is spreading. Similar approaches have been taken by ruling parties in countries from Poland to Turkey. They have followed Hungary’s example: control the courts, reform election commissions, attack independent media, and claim to be protecting national sovereignty. The contagion is not merely ideological, but rather in demonstrating how to erode democracy without ever terminating it.
It is tempting to view the slow decline of democracy as less critical than a sudden coup. That is precisely its danger. Repression in the name of legality does not prompt mass protests or foreign intervention. Citizens adjust to small changes one at a time, until the democratic infrastructure collapses quietly. A society without independent watchdogs is susceptible to corruption, inequality and disinformation. If citizens lose confidence in elections and the press, the divide between citizens grows, and democratic norms lose meaning. Hungary has demonstrated that democracy can die not with a bang, but with the quiet passage of amendments and decrees.
External sanctions alone will not end Hungary’s slow-motion autocratic slide. For the EU to take a meaningful stand against the decline of democracy in Hungary, it needs to tie funding to the country’s level of democratic functioning and consistently enforce rule of law mechanisms. Independent media outlets and opposition political parties need to establish a framework for cooperation inside Hungary on preserving basic institutions that govern fair competition (and elections), as well as providing support to each other through transnational civil society organizations that protect the financial and legal interests of its members, should domestic laws or regulations become an impediment. Smaller acts of institutional defense, such as investigative journalism, international partnership development, and public education initiatives, can build long-term resilience within a country, regardless of how much pressure is applied from outside. Global democracies must also understand that the Hungarian model has become a template for other countries to follow; thus, strengthening transparency and funding local media as well as supporting and protecting civil society organizations will not be “side” issues but rather will be at the forefront of efforts to preserve democracy.
Democracies rarely fail overnight. Rather, they slowly erode in the light of day, with the erosion being facilitated by the use of the very laws that were designed to promote fairness and equality. Most citizens continue to believe that the system still functions, despite the fact that it no longer does. Hungary’s transition from democracy to authoritarianism serves as a cautionary tale; where laws are used to further the interests of those in power, the ability of the government to utilize the law to restrict individual freedoms grows exponentially. Ultimately, the issue is not whether Hungary can still be considered a democracy; the issue is whether other countries will recognize the pattern before it spreads.
Your central argument explains a now normalized tactic used by leaders to approach and ultimately achieve democratic erosion within their countries. By focusing on the Hungarian model, you thoroughly argue that a slow decline of democracy is ultimately more effective to achieve long-term democratic backsliding than a blatant coup d’etat. As you rightly mention in your post, most of these ‘slow decline of democracy’ methods are mainly done through legal means. As much as we like to believe that an independent judicial system can successfully combat democratic backsliding and executive aggrandizement, there is also a danger in overburdening those systems and having them actually contribute to further democratic backsliding. I believe this could’ve happened in Hungary. I also believe that your mention of the names of the bills, such as “anti-foreign interference” or “transparency” is incredibly relevant, given that these names are meant to deceive not only civil society, but even the courts themselves. The courts become significantly more controlled by the executive, which ultimately erodes other aspects of society.
One of my main concerns with the Hungarian model is also how it is being perceived by other countries that have such authoritarian tendencies. You mention Poland and Turkey, two countries that are, without a doubt, experiencing democratic backsliding in numerous ways. I wonder if other countries that are not authoritarian but have leaders in power that display such tendencies are also observing and implementing the same methods used by the Hungarian model. The United States, for example, is a country that can potentially fall victim to this, given that Trump has been increasingly attempting to change laws in a way that advances his agenda. The Hungarian model poses a serious threat not only to countries that are already more authoritarian, but also to nations that proudly call themselves democracies.
Your main argument is that Hungarian democratic backsliding is occurring through a slow, steady process in which Fidesz is eroding the independence of institutions through legal channels, rather than by violence or sudden upheaval. By emphasizing the faux neutrality of the laws being enacted by Orbán’s government, you correctly identify executive aggrandizement as one of their main strategies. The frightening part about this is that, though technically legal, Fidesz’s grip on the courts makes these “neutral” reforms impossible to challenge. Your post helped me understand that, while we are taught that law can be a mechanism for protecting democratic values, it can also become a vehicle for backsliding.
In the context of the United States, seeing how much admiration Trump has for Orbán is particularly frustrating. Given how clearly we have seen how destructive Fidesz’s tactics have been for Hungarian democracy, it is worrying that Trump would want to employ similar strategies here in the United States.
You introduce Turkey and Poland as other prime contemporary examples of backsliding, and I am concerned that more and more nations will employ this ‘slow-motion’ erosion that constituents ultimately become desensitized to. When the decline happens one legal reform or judicial appointment at a time, it shows that democracy can be hollowed out before citizens even understand how much has been lost. The Hungarian example is a massive threat to other democracies that are slowly slipping into authoritarianism.