In the May 2023 Turkish presidential election, the world watched closely to see if voters would finally have the power to put an end to President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s 20 year rule. However, the voters’ choice was an illusion. Erdogan secured his re-election in a runoff, which extended his rule into another decade. From the public eye, the election outcome looked competitive, with high turnout of voters, multiple parties for selection, and a clear runoff between the candidates. However, beneath the surface, the election was anything but fair.
The election clearly connects to a central theme of democratic erosion in which the elections are increasingly being perceived as legitimate, but the results are systematically tilted long before the voting even begins.
Fraud vs. Manipulation
As Nancy Bermeo explains in her article, On Democratic Backsliding, modern autocrats rarely engage in election fraud such as falsifying vote counts or ballot-stuffing, which were common tactics used in the Cold War era. Nowadays, such blatant fraud violations are quickly exposed by the media, international watchdogs, and civil society as a whole. Erdogan has shifted towards using strategic manipulation to skew the competition long before the citizens ever cast a vote.
In the upcoming time before the actual election, Erdogan’s government had perfected their strategic manipulation for takeover:
Media Control
Pro-government outlets took over renowned TV and newspapers, while the few and far between independent journalists were threatened, censored, and even jailed on miniscule accounts. For instance, in 2016, an Istanbul court seized Zaman, which was Turkey’s largest daily newspaper at the time, and transferred control to government officials. In addition, the AKP government used the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund to be able to confiscate media outlets, such as Sabah newspaper and ATV television, which would later be transferred to Erdogan loyalists. According to Freedom House statistics, over 90% of Turkish media operates and is certified by both direct and indirect government influence.
Opposition Harassment
In early 2022, Ekrem Imamoglu was Istanbul’s mayor and a rising opposition challenger in the upcoming election. He was detained and sentenced by Erdogan’s regime to over 2 years in jail for “insulting public officials”. Soon after his sentencing, Imamoglu’s university diploma was annulled, his lawyer was arrested on more false charges, and he was given a political ban according to Article 53 of the Criminal Code. All actions against Imamoglu reflected how Erdogan used strategic harassment, presented as legal actions, yet truly pursued ways to strip his rivals of any type of competition or credibility against his rule. Imamoglu is only one example of Erdogan taking away political opponents’ power and disguising it as lawful. Erdogan continues to come for opposition parties and politicians that even slightly differ from his regime’s path forward.
Institutional Changes
A common theme that demonstrates a shift from democracy to autocracy is when leaders gradually dismantle the checks and balances through legal reforms. Unlike the 2016 coup attempt, this type of democratic erosion is subtle, often designed and presented to the public as a “reform”. However, these actions have not come about overnight. After the coup attempt, Erdogan initiated mass purges across the judiciary branch, dismissing and detaining thousands of people. Within days, a loyalist packed board called The Supreme Court of Judges and Prosecutors suspended 2,745 judges. Over the next few months, more than 4,300 judges and prosecutors were permanently removed from their positions. In turn, this left the judiciary to be packed with Erdogan’s political loyalists and marked his success of stripping away checks and balances between the branches of government. Clearly representing usage of executive aggrandizement given his actions to enact “legal” reforms to gain and centralize power for himself.
In addition, his coalition passed Law No. 7393 in April of 2022, which lowered the national threshold from 10% to 7%, appearing to democratize elections, however it fragmented opposition alliances. most importantly altered how electoral boards are built by replacing seniority judges with lottery-selection based. This action clearly allowed Erdogan’s regime to influence who oversees vote count right before the upcoming election. By the time of the 2023 election, Erdogan was not only just a candidate, he was the constructor and controller of the government, the media, and the electoral system as a whole. Linz and Stephan argue that democracy is more often than not consolidated when it is “the only game in town”. For Turkey’s case this no longer is true. Erdogan’s repeated attacks on the media, judicial branch, and society as a whole represents a system where democratic themes exist, but only as long as they do not threaten or disrupt what the ruling party or person wants to do.
Usage of Resources
Following the devastating Earthquake in February 2023, Erdogan used the aftermath to his advantage by announcing huge reconstruction promises, higher wages, and lowering the cost of energy for citizens. None of which he truly acted on, but the empty promises gave leeway for him to blur the line between government aid and campaigning for popularity. Behind the scenes, he shut down Twitter for over 12 hours after the disaster, which successfully limited immediate public backlash. He framed his outreach aid programs to be favored by vulnerable populations just before the election.
Erdogan does not enact obvious ways of corruption, instead he systematically erodes and biases the outcome of any opposition to his power. According to Freedom House and V-Dem, Turkey must hold multiparty elections, but at the same time lack the real freedom of expression, association, or a level playing field to qualify as a democracy. After the 2023 election, it is safe to classify Turkey as an electoral autocracy. This classification becomes clear when measured by Dahl’s concept of polyarchy, which requires both contestation and inclusiveness. Turkey fails on both counts.
To fit Turkey into this category, the country must and does exhibit the following:
- The existence of multiparty elections with competitive opposition
- At the same time, opposition candidates are harassed or disqualified on false charges
- Civil liberties, like freedom of assembly and expression, are severely monitored and restricted
- Courts, government branches, and media are systematically undermined
Why This Matters
Many will dismiss Turkey as another flawed system in a troubled region of the world. However, Turkey’s election gives a prime example of how a democracy can be eroded from within, while maintaining the appearance of a legitimate, fair system.
Turkey’s shift into autocracy also affects their stance globally. Turkey is not a marginal state. They are part of NATO, EU candidate, and a major power in the middle-east region. Its transformation into an electoral autocracy normalizes and justifies non-democrartic policies and practices in a global organization that continues to treat them as a democracy. Turkey is now sending the message to other countries that it is possible to consolidate authoritarian power while presenting itself through democratic frameworks. Left unchecked or ignored, Turkey’s demonstration could inspire others to use similar tactics all over the world.
Looking Forward
The 2023 election did not see fraud or stealing of ballots and such. The manipulation of the electoral system began long before, through years of executive aggrandizement and strategic manipulation by Erdogan and his political loyalists. By the actual time for people to go vote, the results were indefinitely tilted beyond redemption.
One lesson to take away from Turkey is that modern democracy does not die with coups, yet often with a “free” ballot. Leaders like Erdogan will exploit democratic institutions and undermine them right under the citizens’ noses. Unless citizens are willing to ask the question of if an election is truly fair and competitive, democratic backsliding will continue to wear away at the system. Turkey’s case specifically must serve as a lesson on how the survival and existence of elections does not equal the survival of a true democracy.
Sources:
Linz, Juan J., and Alfred Stepan. Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe. Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996.
Levitsky, Steven, and Daniel Ziblatt. How Democracies Die. Crown Publishing Group, 2018.
Bermeo, Nancy. “On Democratic Backsliding.” Journal of Democracy, vol. 27, no. 1, 2016, pp. 5–19. Johns Hopkins University Press.
Dahl, Robert A. Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. Yale University Press, 1971.
It cannot be underscored more than understanding that promissory coups aren’t the only form of democratic backsliding, and are extremely rare in this day and age. In order to mobilize an opposition and stop democratic erosion, there must be a greater understanding in the gradual way that erosion occurs, and often through legal mechanisms. The Turkey case, in which Erdogan maintains the facade of democratic elections while underlying manipulation occurs, is incredibly valuable to study to understand erosion in other states. Democratic erosion now comes through pseudo-democracies, where democratic valued institutions are employed as a ruse, but not actionably used in accordance with democratic standards of freedom, fairness, competition, and inclusivity.
When studying countries that are at the precipice of erosion, citizens need to be empowered that these covert tactics are in fact eroding democratic institutions and rule of law. As the world shifts in a more autocratic direction, we cannot wait for glaring coups that will never come. Rather, one needs to study beyond shell democratic institutions. It brings up the argument that democratic institutions themselves are not a good way to measure democracy anymore due to the covert manipulations that executives employ to consolidate power. What is the value of elections if they are unjust?
There are many examples of manipulation you include in this post that are prevalent currently in the United States that I thought might be an interesting comparison; Media control (Twitter being bought by Elon Musk, a leading voice of the MAGA movement during Trump’s 2024 presidential campaign), opposition harassment (Trump calling Democrats who urged military personnel to not obey unlawful orders traitors), institutional changes (Trump appointing conservative Amy Coney Barrett to the Supreme Court knowing and purposefully to skew the court towards a conservative majority), and a change in resource use (The One Big Beautiful Bill Act proposing slashes to federally funded institutions including education, Medicaid and environmental services). You point out that Turkey is a global actor. As a member of NATO and candidate for the EU, Turkey should be respected as a well-developed and functioning country. Its quiet slide into autocracy should affect its standing in these international organizations, but since it hasn’t (at least, not enough so) there is precedent for the Trump Administration to follow, and a lack of international pressure preventing the administration from consolidating power and delegitimizing democratic institutions wherever it can.
In recent federal elections, there has been an increase in questioning the legitimacy of results. Most notably with the violent Capitol Attack on January 6th 2021 carried out by mob Trump supporters after Trump lost the 2020 election. There have been rumors surrounding foreign interference in the 2020 election results, and more recently, rumors surrounding voting discrepancies in Rockland county, New York in the 2024 presidential election. All of these instances sow distrust in the democratic institution of free and fair elections. Even with great voter turnout, we are seeing a parallel in the United States to what Turkey has been experiencing in a manipulated electoral system that paves the way for authoritarianism to rise.
I think Turkey is a really good example of a theme we’re witnessing that you discuss in that modern examples of democratic backsliding aren’t as blatant and visible as they once were. This ties in with Varol’s idea of stealth authoritarianism. This is essentially the idea that as opposed to autocracy resulting from a revolution or coup, it’s instead achieved incrementally through small and often under the radar actions that usually are done through the confines of the law or at the very least are in some legally grey area. This is a common element of competitive authoritarianism where while visibly on the surface there appears to be elements of a pluralistic democracy (multiple political parties, competitive elections, a degree of freedom of expression), but in reality the autocrat in power holds ultimate control and has no real chance to be unseated in an election.
We see similarities to what’s taking place in Turkey with Erdoğan in Russia with Putin and what took place in Peru with Alberto Fujimori. Putin also amended Russia’s constitution that expanded presidential term limits allowing him to stay in power. And while Russia still holds elections, there’s virtually no chance that a challenger would unseat him in an election. Similar to Erdoğan challenger Imamoglu who as you noted was jailed, we saw the same thing with Putin challenger Alexei Navalny who was imprisoned and ultimately died while in custody. Fujimori in Peru displayed similarities to Turkey and Russia as well with control of the media. Under his rule, he essentially took control of the biggest news outlets and monitored what they put out about him in an effort to control the media and his public image. The question is that in today’s age of stealth authoritarianism where voices are silenced and actions to suppress the checks and balances of democracy are taken through the guise of legality, what can be done to combat the shift? Does the responsibility lie on the public, or does change only come from diplomatic pressure from outside actors?
I thought your post did a great job pulling together all the pieces of how Erdogan tilted the playing field long before election day – media capture, legal harassment of opponents like İmamogu, and judicial purges that hollowed out checks and balances while still keeping the “democratic” facade. It really drives home Bermeo’s point that manipulation now matters more than old-school ballot stuffing.
One thing your discussion made me wonder about is what options are realistically available to the opposition in a system like this. If they continue to participate in elections they know are stacked, do they risk legitimizing the process as “competitive” for international audiences and domestic moderates? But if they boycott, they basically hand Erdogan uncontested victories and may disappear from view. Neither strategy seems satisfying. It might be interesting to think about whether opposition parties can use campaigns less as a way to “win” the presidency and more as opportunities to document abuses, build long-term networks, and coordinate with civil society for whenever the regime eventually weakens.
I also liked your point about Turkey’s status in NATO and as an EU candidate. It feels like external actors have quietly accepted this slide into electoral autocracy because Turkey is “too important” to confront. That sends a dangerous signal that if you’re geopolitically useful, you can get away with severe democratic erosion as long as you keep holding formal elections. I’d be curious what kinds of targeted pressure – visa bans on officials, conditionality on arms sales, etc. – might actually create incentives for small reforms without pushing Turkey fully out of the Western orbit.