On July 31, 2025, the El Salvadoran congress passed significant changes to the El Salvadoran constitution. By a vote of 57 to 3, they passed notable changes including the removal of presidential term limits and extension of presidential term limits to 6 years. The changes also eliminate the second round of voting in which the top two candidates from the first-round advance to the run-off. Proponents of the constitutional change say that removing term limits brings the presidency in line with federal lawmakers and mayors who can seek reelection as much as they want. Incremental policy changes like these provide for the consolidation of power and continued rule of President Nayib Bukele.
Since Nayib Bukele was elected President of El Salvador in 2019, he has enjoyed immense popularity and has consolidated a significant amount of executive power. In addition to not being term limited anymore, Bukele’s current term was meant to end in 2029 but with these changes it will end on June 1, 2027, two years earlier than originally intended. This allows Bukele to seek reelection sooner, while political tides are still in his favor. Removing the runoff requirement for presidential elections makes election by plurality rather than majority possible. All of these combined effectively guarantee Bukele to be in power until at least 2033 – limiting possible competition and opportunities for vertical accountability.
These changes have been touted as something meant to give power back the El Salvadoran people. Suecy Callejas, the assembly’s vice president and member of the New Ideas party said, “power has returned to the only place that it truly belongs… to the Salvadoran people.” Populist rhetoric like this pushes the notion that the government is acting in a way that gives more power back to the people, when global context tells us that it almost certainly does not give power back to the people. Changing electoral laws to create systematic advantages are a common tactic of stealth authoritarianism to weaken horizontal accountability on the executive. Bukele and the New Ideas party have been able to frame these policy changes as incremental and something that improves conditions of democracy, rather than what it really is.
Supporters of Bukele turned a blind eye to these constitutional changes after they appeared on the front pages of newspapers. From the time that the bill had been introduced by Ana Figueroa to the time it was made law, less than three hours had passed, thanks to the New Ideas party super majority. The next day, the legislature adjourned for a week-long recess. While the Salvadoran electorate is not necessarily hypersensitive to stealth authoritarian tactics, Bukele loyalists in the legislature still find it necessary to rush anti-democratic bills through without proper debate. Even more concerning is how easily they can achieve these policy changes. Term limits were previously a cornerstone of the Salvadoran constitution, a “clausula petrea” or “stone clause”. Meaning prohibition of a president seeking a second consecutive term is one of several unamenable foundations of the Salvadoran system of government. May 1, 2021, the day of first seating of the New Ideas party new two-thirds majority, Bukele’s allies ousted and replaced all of the judges on the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court. This change in the composition of the Supreme court opened the door for the decision to ignore the constitutionally stipulated term limits and Bukele won a second term. This decision represents a significant shift in respect for democratic institutions and rule of law.
Despite the institutional changes significantly eroding the quality of democracy, Salvadorans have good reason to continue supporting the self-described “world’s coolest dictator”. Democracy in the country is fairly new and is associated with the rise of gang violence and for that reason, only about 2/3 of Salvadorans support democracy.
Following El Salvador’s civil war, Salvadoran immigrants facing marginalization and discrimination in Los Angeles formed well-known gangs like MS-13 and Barrio 18. Many members of these gang members were forcibly returned to El Salvador amid mass deportations occurring in the 1990s. Since then, the absence of strong democratic institutions gave rise to extortion, homicides, and femicides by gangs. Without a sufficient justice system or rule of law in place, gang violence continued through the 2010s and became associated with weak democratic institutions.
El Salvador is now three years into a state of emergency that Bukele declared on March 27, 2022 following a spike in gang violence. The state of emergency was only meant to last 30 days but was extended more than 40 times by the National Assembly. The state of emergency curtails constitutional rights related to due process allowing for mass incarcerations to curb gang violence. About 100,000 people are either incarcerated or detained in El Salvador at this time. Consequently, homicides dropped by over 50% in 2022 and extortion has dropped to the point where 92% of Salvadorans support the state of emergency.
When Bukele first sought office, the weak democratic institutions, ineffective previous governments, and prominence of gang violence created favorable conditions for a candidate that would be tough on crime above anything else. Scholars like Levitsky point to political and civil unrest creating opportunities for charismatic actors to move through ranks. Bukele is a prime example of this – he was able to frame his candidacy in contrast to the years of public frustration that Salvadorans faced and he presented himself as a relatable figure that was not afraid to rule with an iron fist. At this point, Bukele has successfully cultivated a reputation for being a strong and effective leader and has the potential to continue to consolidate and remain in power for the foreseeable future.
BBC. (2024, February 5). https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-68196826
Chorro de Trigueros, Marjorie. (2021, September 21).https://constitutionnet.org/news/highly-risky-proposal-reform-salvadoran-constitution
Green, Emily. (2025, August 2). Leader for life? El Salvador’s Bukele headed that way, critics say. https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/leader-life-el-salvadors-bukele-headed-that-way-critics-say-2025-08-02/
Levitsky, Steven and Daniel Ziblatt. (2018). How Democracies Die. New York: Crown. Chapter 1.
Pappier, Juan. (2021, May 21). https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/05/21/us-can-stop-el-salvadors-slide-authoritarianism-time-act
Regalado, F., & Correal, A., & Yuhas, A. (2025, August 5). El Salvador Ends Term Limits, Letting Bukele Seek Re-Election Indefinitely. https://www.nytimes.com/2025/08/01/world/americas/el-salvador-bukele-term-limits.html
Renteria, N., & Kinosian, S. (2023, February 15). El Salvador vows gang crackdown will go on as citizens cheer safer streets. https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/el-salvador-vows-gang-crackdown-will-go-citizens-cheer-safer-streets-2023-02-15/
Roy, Diana. (2022, May 4). Why Has Gang Violence Spiked in El Salvador? https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/why-has-gang-violence-spiked-el-salvador-bukele
Varol, Ozan. (2015). Stealth Authoritarianism. Iowa Law Review 100(4).
One of the most prominent signs that indicates a country is experiencing a process of democratic backsliding is through changing the constitution in ways that advantage the individuals and parties in power. As you rightly mentioned in your post, El Salvador has fallen victim to this tactic. It is clear that the country is showing signs of stealth authoritarianism, mainly through methods that erode horizontal accountability on the executive branch, which only started with constitutional changes but did not stop there. The replacement of judges on the Supreme Court also presents a significant danger to the country’s future, as these replacements allowed Bukele to win a second term. Additionally, considering the country’s fragile history with democracy is essential. The historical context that you provided as to why only ⅔ of Salvadorans support democracy is needed in order to understand how Bukele was able to consolidate his power within the executive. From an outside perspective, it is easy to criticize the many Salvadoran individuals who still support Bukele even after these constitutional changes were passed. However, when considering the fact that for Salvadorans, democracy is a term that carries a negative connotation associated with the increase in gang violence, it becomes much more clear why Salvadorans would prefer to have a dictator in power.
In order to further enhance this post, I would love to see more of a discussion regarding Bukele’s populist rhetoric. Although it was briefly mentioned, I believe that diving more into populism as one of the main root causes of democratic backsliding in El Salvador could provide a greater analysis as to how Bukele was able to further consolidate his power. How does Bukele appeal to the people? How often does he use such rhetoric? Are people actually persuaded by what he says? Has populism possibly opened up a door for polarization or has it actually helped eliminate opposition parties and leaders?
I think El Salvador is a really great example of stealth authoritarianism taking place, and as you talk about, it’s understandable that when the conditions are right, it can be really easy for someone like Bukele to consolidate power. I thought it was interesting how you point out that only two-thirds of El Salvadorians are in support of democracy. The United States is obviously a country where democracy and the values of freedom and independence are held dearly so sometimes understanding why people might not have those same values isn’t always the easiest to understand; but I think you did a nice job explaining that there can be factors present that can cause people to shift their ways of thinking such as El Salvador’s really high crime rate.
As you discuss, the consolidation of power in the form of stealth authoritarianism can be something the public supports – it’s not always this thing where an evil dictator stages a coup and goes against the will of the people. We especially see this in countries where elected officials take a populist stance, especially where there are big societal problems like gang violence. The creation of El Salvador’s Terrorism Confinement Center and the subsequent crackdown on gangs is something that the public really supports; when people feel the brunt of gang violence and don’t feel safe, there tends to be greater support for ruling with an iron fist, which then in turn makes stealth authoritarianism easier to implement. You mentioned Levitsky, whom along with Ziblatt talk about the idea of forbearance being a critical guardrail of democracy. By emphasizing messaging regarding “giving power back to the people” and gaining widespread support, it allows leaders to ignore the concept of forbearance and legally skirt around the checks and balances that keep democracies in place.
It also has to be noted that Bukele is extremely popular. He is an example of a “good” outsider. The political parties that ran El Salvador’s democracy were remnants of the civil war, with the FMLN and ARENA keeping their same names from when both were terroristic, death-squad affiliated organizations. These parties were notoriously corrupt, siphoning funds from the country, failing at containing gang violence (or even cooperating with them), and giving abhorrent attention to the country. These parties were very, very, very unpopular when Bukele came into the scene. Bukele is young, not a veteran or associated with the war, and constantly hounded on them for not doing anything about the gangs. El Salvador was a country whose main money maker was remittances, and where some of the most dangerous cities in the world were located. When Bukele came into power, he not only crushed gang violence, he also began to build high quality, and if not high quality, aesthetically pleasing schools, hospitals, and housing developments. Even if it is shoddy in the long-term, it looks much nicer than anything the previous governments have ever done. This is a populist tactic that not only has worked, but also meaningfully improved the lives of the Salvadoran people. In the lens of stealth-authoritarianism, these acts can be viewed as a tactic. The economic boom stemming from actually being able to not be extorted or killed on the streets shot Bukele’s popularity through the roof. He makes the country safer, richer, and begins developments that look modern and high quality. Keeping the people focused on developing their lives, he takes advantage of their political history.
Before Napoleón and the Civil War, El Salvador had a democracy in the 1930s that lasted 9 days. That was it. Ever since, its popular revolutions that end in rigged elections and autocrats, and for a period of time, an eccentric dictator that was equated as the “Hitler of Central America”, Maximiliano Hernández. This causes the population of El Salvador to grow apolitical over the years, which allows for Bukele to do his not-so-slight authoritarian agenda without anyone noticing, and if not that then not caring. He has taken advantage of the boom he fostered to cement himself as a popular ruler, and although he seems like a change of pace from the bleak history of the country, he may cement himself as just another of the many autocratic, popular strongmen that have long dotted the nation’s history.