In the United States today, political violence is no longer an unimaginable notion, it is becoming a background condition of democratic life. Threats against election workers, armed intimidation at state capitols, and assaults on public officials are increasingly treated as just another data point in an overheated political climate. But the danger is not only the violence itself. The deeper democratic threat is instead the normalization of political violence; a shift in what citizens and elites see as acceptable behavior. When intimidation becomes routine, the guardrails of mutual toleration and institutional forbearance erode, creating fertile ground for democratic backsliding even without a coordinated authoritarian regime.
This argument runs counter to two common narratives. One claims that the U.S. is on the brink of a civil war. The other insists that because institutions “held” in 2020 and 2021, panic is unwarranted. I would argue that both miss the point: the most consequential cases of democratic erosion often unfold gradually and socially, not through a single dramatic collapse. What matters is whether citizens begin to accept violence as part of political competition, and the evidence suggests they increasingly do.
The New Normal: Violence as a Routine Political Tool
In recent years, federal agencies and major news investigations have documented a sharp rise in threats directed at public officials. Election administrators in states such as Arizona, Pennsylvania, and Georgia have publicly described sustained harassment that has led many workers to leave their positions, a pattern widely reported from various outlets. School board members, local health officials, and city councilors have also become routine targets of intimidation. A 2022 UC Davis Violence Prevention Program study found that 20.5% of Americans believe political violence to be generally justifiable, and 18.7% believe violence or force is needed to “protect American democracy” when “elected leaders will not.” This represents a marked shift from the traditionally broad social consensus that violence has no place in electoral politics.
Political scientists Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt argue in their book, How Democracies Die, that democracy rests on two unwritten norms: mutual toleration (seeing political rivals as legitimate opponents) and institutional forbearance (refraining from using every legal power to win). Violence corrodes both. When members of one party threaten, intimidate, or physically assault the other, they signal that rivals are not merely wrong but rather dangerous enemies. Once opponents are viewed as existential threats, violence becomes more thinkable.
This shift in social norms is an early warning sign of democratic erosion. As Sheri Berman writes, democracies do not typically fall through sudden coups; they corrode from inside as citizens grow comfortable with undemocratic tactics. The normalization of political violence is precisely such a corrosion.
Polarization Creates a Fertile Environment for Intimidation
Why is political violence gaining acceptance? One answer is the severe affective polarization that defines contemporary American politics. Citizens increasingly dislike, distrust, and fear members of the opposing party. Political scientist Milan Svolik finds that in deeply polarized environments, many citizens are willing to tolerate undemocratic behavior, including violence, if it benefits their side. In experiments, voters regularly choose candidates who violate democratic norms when those candidates share their partisan identity.
Violence becomes normalized not because Americans suddenly prefer brutality, but because group identity trumps democratic rules. When political opponents are framed as threats to the nation, violence becomes a justified response. This mirrors patterns seen in other cases of democratic erosion, from Hungary to India, where extreme polarization reduces the political cost of threatening rivals.
The Danger Is Not Only the Violence We See, But the Deterrence We Don’t
Democratic erosion is often subtle. Dahl’s theory of polyarchy emphasizes conditions such as open contestation and widespread participation.When citizens or officials self-censor out of fear, the system is already becoming less democratic. This makes political intimidation especially corrosive.
Some consequences are visible:
- Dozens of county election administrators in swing states have resigned.
- Volunteers who once staffed polling sites now refuse.
- Members of Congress report altering their travel patterns or hiring private security.
But other effects are less visible: candidates who decide not to run, officials who hesitate to certify results, activists who avoid public demonstrations. Intimidation works not only when violence occurs, but when people reshape their behavior to prevent it.
Political violence creates a chilling effect, a form of institutional pressure that undermines free political competition. As legal scholar Ozan Varol notes in his work on stealth authoritarianism, democracies can erode not only through law but through fear. Even a small risk of violence shifts the balance of political participation toward those most willing to engage aggressively, leaving moderate voices quieter and democratic norms weaker.
Elites Are Lowering the Costs of Violence
While public attitudes matter, elite cues matter more. Research consistently shows that political leaders play a decisive role in signaling what is acceptable behavior. When elites condemn violence firmly and consistently, support for it declines. When elites justify or minimize violence, the opposite occurs.
Over the past several years, some political leaders have increasingly framed acts of aggression, including those of the January 6th attack, as legitimate protest. Others have echoed language that paints opponents as inhumane or existential threats to the nation. Such rhetoric lowers the perceived cost of violence by redefining who counts as a legitimate political actor.
This dynamic is especially dangerous in our current two-party system, where gatekeeping is crucial. Levitsky and Ziblatt warn that when parties fail to police their fringes, antidemocratic actors gain access to mainstream platforms. By refusing to unequivocally reject political violence, leaders signal to supporters that intimidation is not only tolerated but potentially beneficial.
Addressing the Objection: Isn’t Political Violence Still Low?
A tempting counterargument is that, historically speaking, the current level of political violence in the U.S. is low. The late 1960s and early 1970s saw hundreds of bombings, assassinations, and large-scale unrest. Compared to this era, today’s incidents may appear isolated.
But this objection misses the core point. The threat today is not widespread insurgent violence; it is the steady decline of the norm that violence is illegitimate in politics. A democracy can erode even with relatively few violent incidents if citizens and elites increasingly view those incidents as understandable or justified. The January 6th attack did not need to succeed in overturning the election to weaken democratic guardrails. The fact that some Americans openly view the event as a “peaceful protest” is itself evidence of norm decay.
Democratic erosion is about the weakening of norms long before institutions formally fail.
Why Normalization Matters
Political violence does not need to become widespread to undermine democracy. It only needs to become acceptable. Once intimidation becomes part of the political toolkit, democratic competition ceases to be free and fair. Officials fear retaliation. Citizens withdraw. Elections occur under the shadow of coercion.
The danger for American democracy is not imminent collapse but gradual habituation. Each new threat becomes less shocking, each incident less unacceptable, and the boundary between political disagreement and political warfare blurs.
Stopping this requires restoring the norm that violence is outside the bounds of democratic life; a norm that must be reinforced by citizens, institutions, and especially political elites.
If Americans become comfortable with political violence, democracy will not fall overnight. It will simply erode, quietly and steadily, as the unacceptable becomes routine.
This post is really good. It makes a compelling case that normalization, rather than the violence itself, poses the greater threat to democratic stability. I’d like to extend this argument by considering a rather under-explored mechanism. Normalization in terms of operating asymmetrically across the political spectrum.
Svolik’s finds that polarized citizens tolerate undemocratic behavior when it benefits their side. But this raises the dilemma that if one party unilaterally maintains democratic norms while the other abandons them, the norm-following party may find itself at a competitive disadvantage.
This dynamic complicates the post’s conclusion that elites must restore the norm that violence is outside the bounds of democratic life. The question becomes: which elites, and at what political cost?
Some research done on this subject suggests that norms are most effectively maintained when violations are punished consistently across groups. Yet in a polarized environment, condemning violence by one’s own side risks accusations of disloyalty, while condemning the other side appears partisan.
That said, I’m not entirely convinced we should dismiss the “institutions held” argument so quickly. Yes, institutional survival doesn’t mean erosion isn’t happening, but there’s a flip side worth considering. When institutions bend without breaking, they might actually be building precedent for future resilience. Election officials who certified results despite facing serious threats could end up reinforcing the norm against intimidation, not weakening it. The key factor is what happens next, are those officials protected and recognized for their courage, or are they left vulnerable and punished for doing their jobs?
Your focus on normalization rather than just the raw level of violence feels really important. The idea that the real damage happens when threats become “background noise” for election workers, school board members, and local officials helps explain why democracy can erode even if we’re not seeing a 1960s-style wave of bombings.
Reading this, I kept thinking about how much of this normalization happens in spaces that don’t look like traditional politics at all. A lot of the harassment you describe is coordinated or amplified online, in comment sections and group chats, where there is basically no cost to posting someone’s address or spreading conspiracy theories about them. That blurs the line between “private” speech and public intimidation. It might be worth asking whether our usual focus on parties and national elites misses how local Facebook groups, Telegram channels, or talk radio hosts quietly move the boundary of what feels acceptable.
I also appreciate that you flag elite responsibility, but I think there’s a tension there. In a highly polarized system, the party that tries to consistently condemn violence by its own side may end up looking “weak” or disloyal, especially to primary voters. That creates a kind of collective action problem: everyone knows the norm needs defending, but no one wants to be the first mover who pays the political price. It might be interesting to explore whether cross-partisan agreements (for example, local party chairs jointly pledging to denounce threats against each other’s candidates) could lower that cost and slowly rebuild the taboo against violence.
I have seen in my own interactions with others exactly what this post is calling to be cautious of: acceptance of political violence. Time and time again I hear others discuss extreme political events as “expected” or the “logical next step.” I have even noticed myself begin to shift my perspective so when I read a news article about political violence I hardly dwell on it. This post reminded me that I need to be more critical of political events, especially violent ones as I hope one day we can achieve a political climate averse to the employment of violence.
Political opponents being displayed as existential threats has become a common occurrence. I now expect that each time the President refers to an opponent, he will have a demeaning nickname and a slew of insults not far behind. It is true that the normalization of violent and obscene political behavior is a powerful threat to democracy. Thinking back, this post rings true as it was a slow start but led from name-calling to an attempted insurrection. While the events of January 6th, 2021 were described in the moment as a devastating blow to American democracy, it has become just another case cited in the evaluation of our democratic decline.
Your discussion of Levitsky and Ziblatt’s mutual toleration only seals the deal on our altered perspective of extreme political events as I found myself almost laughing at the idea. Not too long ago, politicians maintained at least a charade of respect for one another. Now the concept has been reduced to nothing but a dream. I truly appreciate your call to action in fighting this normative shift as condemning even the smallest of politically incorrect actions will lead to a unified strengthening of democracy.
Hi Kendall,
Your post does a great job showing how the normalization of political violence threatens democracy long before any full authoritarian collapse. One point worth expanding is how normalization reshapes the incentives of ordinary citizens. Dahl’s framework emphasizes participation as a core democratic condition, but when people begin quietly opting out of political life because they fear harassment or violence, the system becomes less representative even if the formal rules stay intact. That silent withdrawal can be even more consequential than the visible incidents themselves, because it gradually concentrates political power in the hands of those most willing to engage aggressively.
Another angle that strengthens your argument is how normalization creates a feedback loop with partisan identity. Research by Svolik and McCoy shows that once voters frame politics as an existential struggle, they become more willing to excuse intimidation by their own side. This means normalization is not simply a response to events but a social process shaped by elite rhetoric. When leaders reinterpret violence as patriotism, supporters recalibrate their sense of what is acceptable. Over time, that shift becomes self-reinforcing.
I also found your discussion of deterrence really compelling. The most dangerous effects of political violence often appear in the choices people never make, like deciding not to run for office or not to volunteer during elections. These invisible pressures undermine contestation in ways that are hard to measure but deeply damaging.
Overall, your post highlights a crucial reality: democracy weakens not only when institutions fail, but when citizens and leaders stop treating political violence as unthinkable. Normalization, not magnitude, is what makes today’s moment so alarming.