Intro
In the last two years, Hungary has seen an influx of worker-led protests, even as Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán maintained tight control over politics and the media. From 2023 to 2024, teachers and union members took to the streets of Hungary to oppose new labor laws, and the June 2024 European Parliament elections were Orbán’s worst electoral performance in decades. Yet Orbán spun this as a vindication of his rule over Hungary. He has used nationalist-populist, pro-worker language to justify his attacks on labor power and rights, cementing an elitist–oligarchic system in Hungary. This pattern of Orbán’s confirms a deeper weakness in democracies, without strong checks and social voices, even popular-sounding appeals to voters can hollow out democracy.
Worker Protests and Police Repression
In May 2023, a large campaign of demonstrations and strikes broke out when Orbán’s government pushed through an “education status” law that many teachers saw as a punishment. Thousands of teachers and students stood up and marched in Budapest against the new law they coined a “revenge law” that removed tenure protection and increased the workload of teachers. As Reuters reported, “Thousands of Hungarians rallied… to protest against new legislation eliminating (tenure) status of teachers”. The crowd came after a year of teacher strikes for better pay, and amidst around 17% inflation. Those protests were almost always peaceful, except for when police started breaking up rallies with tear gas.
In any case, the government’s response to dissent, especially labor or student-led dissent, has been heavy-handed. Police arrested dozens and beat down protestors, and Orbán’s media propaganda machine painted demonstrators as foreign-backed troublemakers. By early 2025, Orbán had explicitly and publicly vowed to squash what he labeled a “shadow army” of NGOs and Journalists funded from abroad. In March 2025 (on a national holiday), Orbán vowed to “eliminate the whole shadow army” of NGOs and foreign-influenced media. Only a few months later, his party submitted a bill to publicly list and restrict organizations that receive any foreign funding at all, a clear attack on independent labor unions and civil society. A clear move to crush dissent in Hungary.
Orbán’s Rhetoric and the 2024 Elections
Throughout these crises in Hungary, Orbán has maintained a truly relentless populist narrative. He portrays himself as the defender of everyday Hungarians against elites or foreigners, even while empowering his own inner circle: friends, family, and corporate oligarchs. For example, after the June 2024 European Parliament elections, Orbán claimed the vote was a “victory” and that “Hungarian democracy was alive and well”. In a speech to supporters, he even framed Hungarian politics as a war against outside enemies, saying “in a war situation, we have scored important victories.” Yet, in reality, his party’s support has collapsed; Fidesz won only around 44% of the vote, the weakest EU election result for Orbán’s party in decades. A new opposition list (the Tisza party) ran first, taking nearly 30% of the vote and sweeping 7 of 21 Hungarian seats. Voter turnout hit a record 59%, showing the Hungarian people’s eagerness to challenge the regime. Unfazed by this outcome, Orbán declared that this only reaffirmed the path he was moving the nation towards. By contrast, the opposition leader Péter Magyar promised to “root out corruption and revive democratic checks and balances, which critics say have been eroded under Orbán.”.
Orbán’s style mirrors Guillermo O’Donnell’s notion of delegative democracy, he governs as if voters gave him a personal mandate to do as he pleases, downplaying the legitimacy of institutions and crushing dissenting voices. O’Donnell warned that delegative leaders govern “as THEY see fit,” while sidelining horizontal checks on their power. Orbán also plays the classic populist games, even as he touts nationalist, anti–immigrant, anti–worker themes, he throws occasional bones to workers. For example, his government announced large raises in public-sector wages and minimum wages, an estimated 40% increase to wages by 2027, which he touted as helping the common Hungarian. But these gestures masked the larger reality that independent unions were being crushed and business was being handed to loyalists: though these workers were being paid more, the job protection, better benefits, and hours that are common in labor unions were being gutted by the attack on unions. Juan Linz’s analysis of authoritarian corporatism is evident here, the state co–opts favored social groups like regime–compliant labor groups and family-linked businesses in order to protect and support the regime. As one account put it, Orbán set out “goals like forming a layer of domestic businessmen, building pillars of a strong Hungary”. In other words, the elite class are enriched by public projects, siphoning money from the pockets of everyday citizens to the wealthy. In practice, some of Orbán’s closest friends and relatives have become amongst Hungary’s richest people amid widespread cronyism and nepotism, even as he spoke as if he were “fighting for our (the common Hungarians) lifestyle…against liberal elites.”
Theory and Hungary’s Case
These events can be understood through democratic theory. As Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) emphasize, a healthy democracy requires inclusive institutions that allow for broad participation in democracy and fair implementation of the rule of law, rather than allowing elites to monopolize power. But in Hungary, those institutions have been hollowed out. Nancy Bermeo’s work on Democratic erosion is a reminder that autocratizing leaders often use legal reforms to hide their real aims, exactly as Orbán did with the labor laws and court reforms. At the same time, Bermeo also notes how citizens can resist through elections and protests, the high turnout and street mobilization in 2024 may be seen as Hungary’s democratic resistance. O’Donnell’s delegative democracy concept fits Orbán’s people–centered, majoritarian rhetoric, and Linz’s work on authoritarianism explains the regime’s corporate–state networks. A concise way to tie the theory to evidence is that when unions and labor rights are strong, democracy is vibrant; when those vanish, democracy is endangered. Independent labor institutions are truly the core foundation of life in a democracy, and when labor unions or rights are undermined, populist strongmen and oligarch elitists fill that void with ‘pro-worker’ rhetoric and policies that… are the opposite of what they claim––ANTI–WORKER. In Hungary, the recent attack on labor rights was a warning sign for any sense of liberty, freedom, or democracy left in Hungary. The case of the Orbán regime reminds us that defending democracy and labor goes hand and hand. A society that cannot protect its workers CANNOT protect its freedom.
In short, Orbán’s Hungary shows how a leader can weaponize social–democratic sounding messages to camouflage an extractive––authoritarian agenda. He mobilizes working–class voters with nationalist-social policy, all while building a corporatist network of allies and crushing dissent. In terms of theory, this underscores a structural weakness: when democratic institutions are hollow, populist rhetoric can legitimize oligarchy from within a nation-state. Hungary’s 2023–24 uproars show both the promise of resistance and the perils of complacency. Without robust labor rights and institutional checks, even a popularist champion can slip into one–party dominance, a lesson with urgent relevance for democracy everywhere.
I have spent a lot of time this past semester talking about the case study of Orbán and Hungary as a prime example of democratic backsliding. By tying in the 2023 protests in your post, this highlights how the mobilization of Hungary’s people is a glimmer of democratic resistance in a country, with a government that is trying so hard to diminish democracy. In the 2024 election, even after the heavy backlash after the protests in 2023, the voter turnout was at a historic high level of 59%. This is hopeful for democratic resilience because even after attempts to be silenced by the government, the people are resisting these attempts, and trying to use the institutions of democracy to try and restore it. While Orbán is falsely claiming continued prosperity after the 2024 election, the people are staying motivated, and continuing to put pressure on Orbán and his party, despite the known consequences they will impose on the opposition.
While reading your post, it is hard to not notice the comparisons between the case study of Hungary and what is currently unfolding here in the United States. Since Trump’s second inauguration in January 2025, his approval rate has fallen from 49% at the start of his second term to 36%, as of the end of November. There have also been two major ‘No Kings’ protests where millions of people mobilized against the government. Regardless of this approval rating, though, President Trump is continuing to ignore/deny this decline in support.
Links to Approval Ratings:
https://emersoncollegepolling.com/january-2025-national-poll-trump-starts-term-with-49-approval-41-disapproval-rating/
https://news.gallup.com/poll/699221/trump-approval-rating-drops-new-second-term-low.aspx
Hi Austin,
I am very interested in how you highlighted his pro-worker rhetoric, and even some actions such as raising the wage of the workers. To me, one of the reasons that Orban has been able to maintain relative control over his deteriorating situation is the history of Hungary. Hungary under its communist regime and before that in the interwar period was very impoverished and stricken with political violence. The government was typically antagonistic towards its own people to some degree. Orban’s statements of the “shadow army” is something that is not out of the ordinary and is likely something that every generation of Hungarians have heard throughout their lives. However, when Orban gives a “carrot” to his political sticks, it tides over the population for at least a while. His public sector wage increases and projects create something of a silent “majority” or an apathetic group of workers who are content with the little bit of welfare given to them, as opposed to the professionals (such as the professors) who are the first to see through it (not just professionals, but anyone of the bad side of the stick). If it was not for the history of Hungary, and their recent introduction to liberal democracy and political freedoms, I do not believe Orban would have the control of Hungary that he has now.
Your post effectively captures how Orbán blends populist rhetoric with oligarchic consolidation, and one area worth expanding is how labor repression functions as an institutional strategy rather than just a political stance. In many democracies, labor unions are not only economic actors but also key sites of civic organization. When Orbán strips tenure protections, restricts strikes, and labels unions or NGOs as foreign agents, he is not simply weakening worker bargaining power; he is dismantling one of the few remaining counterweights capable of mobilizing against executive overreach. This pattern aligns closely with Bermeo’s concept of executive aggrandizement, where legal changes erode checks without abrupt regime collapse.
Another important dynamic is how Orbán reframes electoral losses as political victories. His reaction to the 2024 EU elections illustrates O’Donnell’s delegative democracy: the leader claims a personalized mandate that overrides institutional signals. Even when voters deliver a clear rebuke, he reinterprets the outcome as validation, allowing him to continue consolidating control while dismissing opposition gains as irrelevant or foreign influenced. This strategic reinterpretation of public sentiment is a tool that helps transform competitive elections into performative rituals rather than genuine accountability mechanisms.
Your discussion of corporatism could also connect more explicitly to Hungary’s broader political economy. Orbán’s cultivation of loyal business elites is not just cronyism but a method of locking key sectors into dependence on the regime. When capital, media, and weakened unions all become tied to the governing party, the informational and organizational foundations of democracy erode simultaneously.
Overall, your post highlights how Hungary illustrates a recurring theme in autocratic action: populist narratives can coexist with, and even justify, deepening oligarchic control, especially when labor rights and institutional checks collapse.
Hi Austin! Hungary exhibits textbook practices of democratic erosion at its most prominent level. It’s a frightening example that we have discussed throughout the course, but as you mention, Orbán’s rise to power also highlights the deeper weaknesses in democratic systems that we can learn from and build off of.
Despite public protests against Orbán’s undemocratic actions, he has refused to give way to the dissent he has faced. Orbán’s inner circle comprises wealthy elites. Perhaps most concerning of all, he employs populist narratives to gain traction amongst everyday citizens. In at least a couple of ways, this story sounds familiar. But could such an erosion of democratic norms and values take place in our own country? What level of detachment does our country feel from Orban’s authoritarian rule, even as we begin to exhibit the same patterns seen in his early regime?
Though we might be able to recognize Hungary’s decline into an authoritarian regime from our outside perspective, it is widely debated whether we, in the United States, are experiencing a similar decline in democratic values and ideals. Divided bipartisan nations such as ours may chalk up “disagreements” in presidential actions to polarized behaviors. Those dedicated to the presidential powers are more prone to believe that the leader is acting in the best interest of the people, thus missing crucial signs that our state is engaging in democratic backsliding.
Are we well-versed enough on the patterns of democratic erosion to know when it will be affecting our country, or are the methods from a close range largely inconspicuous? If a bipartisan system routinely divides citizens enough that major disagreements on the executive’s aggrandizement of power occur, how can we revise the bipartisan system to unite our country or encourage more independent thought? Can this issue be left up to governments and their accountability alone, or could we begin by revising how citizens have the opportunity to engage with their government?
Hi Austin, you post does a great job laying out how Orbán is using “pro-worker” language to actively undermine the people he claims to defend. One suggestion I might add to have another layer to this idea is talk about how these tactics don’t just weaken these unions, but instead reshapes how people think about political participation. When wage increases or specific benefits are being framed as these gifts from the in power as opposes to being the result of organized labor or bargaining, it quietly turns these workers into being reliant on those in power instead of being empowered and active citizens. This shift is what I find makes it easier for the state to keep people politically indifferent even if economic pressures increase.
It’s also interesting to see how Hungary fits into this broader regional trend. Leaders in Turkey for example, use a similar mix of nationalism and specific social benefits to win over working-class voters while keeping the power at the top. Orbán is part of this wider model of “managed democracy” where elections may still be happening, but the playing field is fixed with media control, loyalist business leaders, and a demobilized society. This helps to explain why even with a strong opposition in the 2024 elections, there wasn’t an immediate shift politically.
I also really liked you point about labor rights being central to democracy. I find we often forget that they are one of the few institutions that can organize people on a large scale while being outside of state control. When governments begin to weaken or discredit the, the are essentially removing of the last, strong remaining checks on executive power. Hungary has become a prime example of how dangerous this can be.