In January 2025, a 30-year-old man from Chiang Rai, Thailand, Mongkol Thirakot, was sentenced to 50 years in prison after being accused of posting 27 Facebook posts related to Thailand’s monarchy. It is the heaviest sentence recorded so far under the country’s lèse-majesté law, Section 112. According to the Thai Lawyers for Human Rights (TLHR), the court treated each post as a separate offense. When the penalties were calculated one by one and then added together, expressions that would normally fall under the realm of political speech were reclassified as criminal acts, resulting in a prison term that stretches across more than half a lifetime.

In Thailand, any expression that touches on the monarchy can quickly become a criminal matter. Section 112 states that “Whoever, defames, insults or threatens the King, the Queen, the Heir-apparent or the Regent, shall be punished with imprisonment of three to fifteen years.” The law does not define what counts as “insults.” It does not require evidence of actual harm. The intention of the speaker does not matter, and neither does the context. What ultimately matters is how prosecutors, police, and judges choose to interpret the words.

Mongkol’s sentence was not an anomaly. It reflects a broader pattern in how Thailand handles speech related to the monarchy. Political expression is often criminalized through extremely broad interpretations of Section 112. As documented by researchers and legal monitors, the law has been applied not only to explicit statements about the monarchy but also to a wide range of online activity, including sharing news articles, reposting content created by others, and even clicking “like” on a post. According to TLHR, at least 282 people have been charged under Section 112 since 2020, and over 200 people faced charges in only 18 months. They involve students and ordinary citizens using social media as a space for political expression.

These applications stretch the law far beyond its original intent and blur the line between political participation and criminal liability. Taken together, they show that Section 112 is applied far more often to suppress dissent toward royal authority than to address any identifiable security threat. As Schmitter and Karl emphasize, democracy relies on a structure of open debate and institutional accountability rather than on isolated rights. When an entire sphere of authority becomes insulated from scrutiny, the mechanisms that sustain democratic accountability begin to weaken.

A Sphere of Power Beyond Scrutiny

The monarchy maintains this untouchable sphere of power largely because it faces almost no meaningful questioning. Parliament can, in principle, discuss the royal budget, but real review is extremely limited and conducted with little transparency. The media cannot obtain or publish detailed information about cases involving the monarchy. Research on Thailand’s legal system indicates that courts often approach the monarchy as requiring heightened protection rather than as an institution open to ordinary judicial review. Administrative, judicial, and regulatory bodies have virtually no room to raise inquiries about royal affairs.

This removes the monarchy from the chain of horizontal accountability that would normally operate across branches of government. Without such accountability, matters involving the monarchy are blocked at the legal and administrative gates long before they can enter public debate. As Vaishnav observes, when horizontal accountability disappears, those in power begin to treat even ordinary disagreement as a threat and rely on administrative procedures to reinforce their insulation from scrutiny.

At the same time, information controls make accountability even harder to pursue. According to Freedom House’s 2024 report, Thailand scored 39 out of 100 on internet freedom. The Ministry of Digital Economy and regulatory agencies restrict online content, and social-media platforms remove posts at the government’s request. Several teenagers have been investigated, summoned, or charged for criticizing the monarchy online.

Because the media cannot access case details, the public often sees only vague labels such as “offending the monarchy” in court records. These gaps make it impossible to understand where legal boundaries lie or to evaluate whether a sentence is justified. As key facts disappear, vertical accountability can barely function. When information is blocked, distorted narratives rush to fill the vacuum. In Thailand, that vacuum is filled with political messages about protecting stability, preserving tradition, or preventing unrest. In such an information environment, democratic backsliding becomes easier to execute. When facts are obscured and scrutiny becomes impossible, institutions lose the capacity to enforce accountability, and authority faces fewer procedural constraints in expanding its reach.

How Culture Turns Into Legal Immunity: The Institutionalization of Symbolic Power

For decades, the Thai monarchy has been presented as an institution above politics. The king is frequently depicted as a father of the nation, a protector of Buddhism, and a symbol of national unity. These images are repeated in school portraits and giant street billboards, the royal anthem is played before films in cinemas, and citizens are expected to stand in respect when it is broadcast. Everyday life fuses the monarchy with national identity so tightly that many citizens cannot separate “protecting the monarchy” from “protecting the nation.”

When symbolic reverence becomes embedded in the machinery of governance, it stops functioning as mere social sentiment. It is institutionalized into a force that can expand the boundaries of political power. State agencies, courts, and regulatory bodies do not simply “follow cultural norms.” In practice, they draw on these cultural narratives to reinforce the monarchy’s immunity within the legal system and to bolster its authority through concrete instruments of law, such as Section 112, and through administrative action. This translation of cultural devotion into political privilege gradually removes matters involving the monarchy from public debate and grants them a near-automatic form of legal exemption.

Once a sphere of authority is framed as sacred, institutions use symbolic narratives to redraw political boundaries. Powers that should be open to democratic scrutiny become matters that cannot be discussed. Elections, parliament, and legal procedures continue to exist on paper, but they no longer perform their core function of checking power. Thailand is left with the outward form of democracy, but its substance has become increasingly hollow.

When Power Cannot Be Discussed, Democracy Cannot Be Defended

Mongkol’s fifty-year sentence draws a clear line between Thailand and the path of democracy. When discussing the monarchy is no longer a form of civic participation but an act that risks criminal punishment, democracy cannot survive.

Section 112 is no longer just a legal provision. It has become a symbol of how royal authority is fortified through law, how criticism is recast as a threat, and how citizens are transformed into subjects under surveillance. As long as this symbolic power endures, silence will replace public debate, and fear will replace political engagement.

Thailand’s democratic space is shrinking through every deleted post, every prosecution of online expression, and every voice labeled a “threat.” When citizens cannot raise questions, those in power face no obligation to justify their actions. As the space for public scrutiny shrinks, power expands without explanation or restraint. What Section 112 reveals is not a slow or invisible erosion, but a visible and accelerating democratic collapse.

References:

“112 in Depth.” 112Watch, 112watch.org/112-in-depth/.

“Criminal Code: Royal Family (Sections 107–112).” Siam Legal International, written by Thailand Lawyer, library.siam-legal.com/thai-law/criminal-code-royal-family-sections-107-112/.

“Man Jailed for Record 50 Years for Criticising Thai Monarchy.” The Guardian, 18 Jan. 2024, www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/18/man-jailed-for-record-50-years-for-criticising-thai-monarchy.

Marinov, Nikolay, and R. Popova. “Should We Fear Democratic Backsliding?” Perspectives on Politics, vol. 20, no. 4, 2021, doi:10.1017/S1537592721001973.

Leeds, Joe, and Chaninat Leeds. “Thailand.” NYU Globalex, Nov.–Dec. 2024, www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/thailand1.html.

“Number of Individuals Charged with Lèse-Majesté Passes 200.” FIDH – International Federation for Human Rights, 17 June 2022, www.fidh.org/en/region/asia/thailand/thailand-number-of-individuals-charged-with-lese-majeste-passes-200.

“Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl – What Democracy Is…and Is Not.” National Endowment for Democracy, www.ned.org/docs/Philippe-C-Schmitter-and-Terry-Lynn-Karl-What-Democracy-is-and-Is-Not.pdf.

“Thai Monarchy: Customs, Constitution, Symbols and Rituals.” Facts and Details, updated May 2014, factsanddetails.com/southeast-asia/Thailand/sub5_8b/entry-3204.html.

“Thailand Monarchy Budget Survives Rare Calls for Cuts in Parliament.” Reuters, 22 Aug. 2021, www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/thai-monarchy-budget-survives-rare-calls-cuts-parliament-2021-08-22/.

“TLHR Annual Report on Freedom of Expression.” Thai Lawyers for Human Rights, 29 Aug. 2025, tlhr2014.com/en/archives/77866.

“TLHR Case Report: Mongkol Thirakot.” Thai Lawyers for Human Rights, 28 May 2024, tlhr2014.com/en/archives/67335.

Vaishnav, Milan. When Crime Pays: Money and Muscle in Indian Politics. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2017, carnegieendowment.org/research/2017/01/when-crime-pays-money-and-muscle-in-indian-politics?lang=en.