Nepal’s Madhesi community lives in the Tarai plains along the southern border, a region
culturally intertwined with northern India. Madhesis speak Maithili, Bhojpuri, Awadhi, and
Hindi, maintain dense cross-border kinship networks, and make up nearly one-third of Nepal’s
population. Yet for decades, they have been treated as politically suspect, socially inferior, and
insufficiently “Nepali.” Scholars describe this dynamic as a form of internal colonization, where
the state privileges hill-origin elites and casts Madhesis as outsiders within their own country
(Karki 2022).
The 2015 Madhesi Movement is often reduced to a border blockade or an India–Nepal dispute.
But that framing misses the real issue. The Madhesi Movement reveals how Nepal’s leaders
exclude Madhesis to maintain power, and the state’s response shows democracy weakening. This
argument is falsifiable: if Madhesis had equal political representation, equal treatment by the
state, and constitutional fairness, the movement would not have unfolded the way it did.
This became clearer during a phone interview I conducted with Nepali journalist Shiv Adhikari
Yadubanshi, who has covered Madhesi issues for years. When I asked him about current
conditions in the Tarai, he was direct. “Economically, Madhesi communities are suffering far
more than other parts of Nepal,” he said. “And discrimination is still everywhere.” He also
explained that Nepal’s economy relies heavily on remittances and tourism, and noted that
“COVID hit Madhesi migrant families the hardest” (Interview, Feb. 10, 2025). His comments
match what scholars and data consistently show.
Recent economic research reinforces how structurally disadvantaged the Madhesi region is. A
2023 CESLAM study on Nepal’s remittance economy found sharp provincial differences in
income sent home. Wealthier provinces like Bagmati, Gandaki, and Koshi receive significantly
higher average remittances per worker. In contrast, Madhesh Province, despite sending one of the
largest numbers of migrant workers, receives lower average remittance per remitter because
Madhesi workers are concentrated in low-wage, high-risk labor abroad. The same study notes
that Madhesi migrants often work in the lowest-paid sectors in the Gulf and Malaysia, trapping
the region in a cycle of economic stagnation despite its massive labor contribution.
Economic disadvantage interacts with political exclusion. Madhesis remain deeply
underrepresented across Nepali institutions. Their presence in Parliament trails behind their
population share. They make up only a small fraction of the civil service, police, and military.
This institutional imbalance helps explain why Madhesi grievances are rarely prioritized in
national politics. If representation were proportional, their concerns would carry more weight in
policy debates.
Social discrimination also shapes Madhesi life. Because Madhesis tend to have darker skin, they
face pervasive colorism and racism. Many report being labeled “Indian” or “not truly Nepali,”
which undermines their legitimacy in public spaces and reinforces stereotypes that they are less
loyal to the nation. Pherali (2021) and Karki (2022) both document how this racialized framing
makes it easier for elites to cast Madhesi protests as foreign-influenced rather than democratic
demands.
When the constitution was passed in 2015, these inequalities hardened into law. Federal
boundaries were drawn to split Madhesi-majority districts across multiple provinces, limiting
their ability to form provincial majorities. Citizenship provisions disproportionately harmed
Madhesi women, particularly those married to Indian men (Deysarkar 2015). And Madhesi
leaders were largely excluded from meaningful roles in drafting the constitution.
Political science theories help explain why. Steven Wilkinson’s electoral incentives theory argues
that governments protect minority groups only when they rely on their votes. Nepal’s ruling
coalitions dominated by hill-origin elites do not depend on Madhesi voters for their political
survival. This gives them little incentive to protect Madhesi interests or restrain state force
during protests (Wilkinson 2004).
Dhattiwala and Biggs show that ethnic violence is rarely spontaneous. It follows political
calculations and elite framing (Dhattiwala & Biggs 2012).
In Nepal, Madhesi protesters were framed as “anti-national.” They were accused of serving
India’s interests. This language allowed the government to justify violent suppression. More than
fifty Madhesi civilians were killed. No senior official was held accountable.
That lack of accountability is a hallmark of democratic backsliding. Waldner and Lust define
backsliding as the decline of participation, competition, and accountability. Nepal’s treatment of
Madhesi protesters shows all three. Participation narrowed as protests were met with force and
Madhesi voices were excluded from constitution writing. Competition was distorted through
manipulated federal boundaries that diluted Madhesi voting power. Accountability disappeared
as security forces escaped consequences for civilian deaths.(Waldner & Lust 2018)
These patterns echo broader illiberal trends. Krekó and Enyedi (2018) show how governments
facing dissent often centralize power and dismiss minority grievances under the guise of national
unity.
Nepal’s rhetoric during the Madhesi Movement followed this script closely. Dissent was treated
not as a constitutional demand but as a threat. Border militarization intensified. Protest leaders
were surveilled or criminalized. These developments mirror illiberal tactics used in hybrid
regimes across the world.
Some argue that Nepal faced extraordinary pressures in 2015, including tense relations with
India and earthquake recovery. But crises do not justify democratic decline—they expose it.
Leaders always retain agency. They can escalate or negotiate. Include or exclude. Nepal’s elites
chose exclusion.
Others argue that Madhesi party fragmentation made negotiations difficult. But fragmentation is
often the result of long-term exclusion. When electoral boundaries dilute your power and your
identity is constantly questioned, political unity becomes harder to sustain. Fragmentation is an
outcome not the causeof Madhesi marginalization.
The Madhesi Movement shows how democratic erosion begins at the margins. Nepal relies
heavily on Madhesi labor, remittances, and trade, yet political power remains centered in
Kathmandu’s hill-elite networks. This imbalance between economic dependence and political
exclusion poses serious risks for Nepal’s democratic future.
If Nepal wants to sustain democratic progress, it must confront the issues the Madhesi
Movement exposed. Federal boundaries must align with demographic realities. Citizenship laws
must reflect fairness. The civil service, police, and military must diversify. And above all,
Madhesis must be recognized as full political actors, not peripheral subjects.
Democracy cannot function if millions of citizens are treated as outsiders. The Madhesi
Movement is a warning. Whether Nepal listens will determine the strength of its democracy in
the years ahead.
Works Cited
Dhattiwala, Raheel, and Michael Biggs. “The Political Logic of Ethnic Violence: The
Anti-Muslim Pogrom in Gujarat, 2002.” Politics & Society, 40(4), 2012.
Deysarkar, S. “The Madhesi Citizenship and the New Constitution.” Economic & Political
Weekly, 2015.
Interview with Shiv Adhikari Yadubanshi. Dec. 10, 2025.
Karki, Darshan. “The Case of the Madhesi in Nepal: Internal Colonisation and Identity.”
HIMALAYA, 41(2), 2022.
Krekó, Péter, and Zsolt Enyedi. “Orbán’s Laboratory of Illiberalism.” Journal of Democracy,
2018.
Pherali, Tej. Knowledge Production and Learning in Nepal’s Madhes Movement. UCL Institute
of Education, 2021.
Waldner, David, and Ellen Lust. “Unwelcome Change: Coming to Terms with Democratic
Backsliding.” Annual Review of Political Science, 2018.
Wilkinson, Steven I. Votes and Violence: Electoral Competition and Ethnic Riots in India.
Cambridge University Press, 2004.