The European Union recently froze 10 billion euros in payments to Hungary, over concern that the Prime Minister, Viktor Orbán, had failed to carry out promised judicial reforms. In 2022, the Commission suspended the funds due to corruption and threats to judicial independence, however, only a year later the money was released despite some doubts that still remained about Hungary’s compliance. The Advocate General of the European Court of Justice criticized this decision, stating that the Commission had “incorrectly applied the requirements on Hungary” and failed to adequately assess whether reforms were actually in place (The Guardian). Since returning to office in 2010, Orbán has strategically used his party’s parliamentary super-majority to weaken legislative and judicial limitations, leading to a process of executives undermining the institutions that challenge them, while maintaining the appearance of legal compliance. This strategy exposes the challenges the European Union faces in enforcing democratic norms within its own membership. Hungary demonstrates how hybrid regimes can strategically comply with international democratic norms while continuing executive aggrandizement, proving the limits of oversight in the European Union.

After decades as a liberal democracy following the fall of communism, Hungary’s political institutions began to deteriorate after Orbán’s return to power. Many scholars have observed that Fidesz, Orbán’s party, used its parliamentary dominance to initiate what has been described as a “constitutional coup,” systematically undermining judicial independence and limiting civil society oversight (The Loop). By 2019, the V-Dem Institute labeled Hungary as an “electoral autocracy,” reflecting the erosion of democratic norms despite the existence of formal elections.

Orbán’s growth in power has been aligned with significant corruption and weakening of public accountability. Transparency International’s 2023 Corruption Perceptions Index rated Hungary 42 out of 100, indicating persistent corruption and a judiciary that is unable to effectively check for government misconduct. Domestically, these structural weaknesses have intensified economic and corruption challenges, further destroying public trust in democratic institutions (The Loop).

The decision to release the funds despite unresolved concerns raised significant criticism within the EU. Some members argued that the timing was politically motivated, as the decision came out “just before a key EU summit that needed Orbán’s support for aid to Ukraine” (The Guardian). This situation depicts how political trade-offs can undermine the EU’s ability to enforce democratic standards, even when violations are well documented.

Hungary’s case is part of a broader pattern in which the EU has become increasingly reliant on the use of finances to discipline its member states. As Mert Kartal observes, “the European Commission has frozen billions of euros in funds bound for Hungary and Poland over rule-of-law violations,” signaling the EU’s willingness to use economic leverage in order to defend democratic norms (Good Authority). However, Hungary’s partial compliance and the eventual release of funds depicts the limits of this strategy. Orbán’s government shows how hybrid regimes often meet minimal procedural requirements while subtly consolidating executive power domestically, revealing gaps in the oversight systems of the EU.

This dynamic reflects a deeper erosion of democratic norms beyond formal legal structures. Levitsky and Ziblatt argue that there are two norms which “stand out as fundamental to a functioning democracy: mutual toleration and forbearance” (Levitsky and Ziblatt, 102). Mutual toleration refers to political actors recognizing their opponents as legitimate rivals, while forbearance signifies restraining from using legal powers in a way that undermines democratic competition. In Hungary, these norms have deteriorated as the Fidesz party has used legal tools for the purpose of executive aggrandizement as well as to dominate media institutions. Elections still occur in Hungary, but without these democratic norms, political competition becomes increasingly weakened, enabling Orbán to maintain electoral legitimacy while consolidating more and more power.

Bibliography:

“Can the E.U. Slow the Corruption Wave in Europe?” Good Authority, 26 Nov. 2025, goodauthority.org/news/can-the-eu-slow-the-corruption-wave-in-europe/. Accessed 12 Feb. 2026.

Chin, John. “Hungary and the Future of Europe.” The Loop, 3 Mar. 2025, theloop.ecpr.eu/hungary-and-the-future-of-europe/.

Henley, Jon. “Billions in Funding Wrongly Released to Hungary, Says EU Court’s Top Adviser.” The Guardian, The Guardian, 12 Feb. 2026, www.theguardian.com/world/2026/feb/12/billions-funding-wrongly-released-hungary-eu-court-adviser. Accessed 12 Feb. 2026.

Kirby, Paul, and Nick Thorpe. “Who Is Viktor Orban, Hungary’s PM Halting Funds for Ukraine?” Www.bbc.com, 31 Jan. 2024, www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-67832416.

Kukutschka, Roberto Martinez B. “CPI 2023: Corruption and (In)Justice – News.” Transparency.org, 30 Jan. 2024, www.transparency.org/en/news/cpi-2023-corruption-and-injustice.

Levitsky, Steven, and Daniel Ziblatt. How Democracies Die. London, Penguin, 16 Jan. 2018.