At the start of this calendar year, rumors started circulating in the White House that President Trump aims to withdraw the U.S. from 66 International Organizations. Many of these organizations protect and uphold humanitarian rights, and address ongoing climate issues. President Trump has threatened to withdraw the United States from dozens of international organizations, conventions, and treaties, including many related to human rights, international law, and global governance. Some of the organizations the U.S. is said to back out of include: the UNFCCC (UN Framework Convention on Climate Change), the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, and potentially the Paris Agreement, too. This plan is supported by a recent White House statement essentially claiming that the executive can pull out of international pacts that are “contrary to the interests of the United States” (White House, 2026). But importantly, none of this is illegal; it just will come with great costs. The President’s foreign policy has wide latitude, including treaty withdrawal. This legality makes the move both analytically interesting and confusing, as well as democratically dangerous. 

The so-called reasoning for this withdrawal, as articulated by Marko Rubio, is, “-it is no longer acceptable to be sending these institutions the blood, sweat, and treasure of the American people with little to nothing to show for it” (Good Authority, 2026). There is no doubt about the fact that this constitutes a particular kind of stealth authoritarianism. This approach relies on a legal, slow-burning strategy that undermines democratic accountability by taking advantage of eroded democratic norms rather than tearing down institutions wholesale. The norm in this case being the commitment to all of these international organizations, as a world power this is an expected responsibility. Looking at this issue through the lens of Ozan Varol’s idea of stealth authoritarianism and Levitsky and Ziblatt’s concept of democratic “guardrails”, it is not hard to illustrate that this retreat is indeed not just a foreign policy maneuver. This move is a clear symptom of a broader trend of democratic corrosion, facilitated by the breakdown of the loose chains of command surrounding the executive. While the primary IOs, like the IMF, NATO, OECD, and the World Bank, are not on the list, this move is still concerning to both foreign and domestic politicians and actors who fear that this is just the start of something much worse. 

Ozan Varol describes stealth authoritarianism as the, ‘using legal, democratic-looking tools to entrench power and weaken opposition’, while remaining ideologically defensible (Stealth Authoritarianism). Unlike classic authoritarianism, which is based on overt repression, modern authoritarian tactics run through courts, elections, and executive power. Where their effectiveness comes from, however, is their subtlety: each act seems lawful, isolated, and justified. And, almost perfectly fitting: The proposed mass withdrawal from international institutions. Many international organizations serve as global accountability tools. The withdrawal of the U.S. from these institutions decreases transparency and oversight, while consolidating power in the executive branch, without changing domestic institutions. As Varol notes, stealth authoritarianism works because it permits leaders to claim legitimacy while at the same time hollowing out democracy from the inside. Withdrawal can be couched in nationalism, sovereignty, or efficiency, not democratic descent (Stealth Authoritarianism). This framing makes both domestic and international condemnation more difficult, therefore erosion can continue to occur gradually. In some ways, President Trump could be doing this because he wants to conduct further action on certain issues that the U.S.’s involvement in these organizations might prevent. This kind of plausible deniability is a very slippery slope and will eventually make it harder for domestic and international actors to condemn President Trump’s decisions. Withdrawing from these organizations creates legitimacy, while hollowing out democracy from within (Good Authority).  

Furthermore, Levitsky and Ziblatt help to show why such strategies are now politically credible in the U.S. In How Democracies Die, they contend that democracy relies on informal norms more than formal rules, most importantly, mutual toleration and forbearance. Forbearance, “means ‘patient self.. control; restraint and tolerance,’ or ‘the action of restraining from exercising a legal right-’” (Levitsky and Ziblatt, 106). Mass withdrawal from international organizations is a clear abandonment of forbearance. Although legal, it is the symptom of a maximalist view of executive authority that overlooks the stabilizing role of international obligations in binding international commitments. Levitsky and Ziblatt caution that when restraint disappears, institutions turn into weapons rather than constraints (Ibid, 107). The executive is no longer asking whether it should be acting, only whether it can. The erosion of norms here is not incidental. It is driven by the polarization and conceptualization of political confrontation as existential. And Trump has always described international organizations as hostile, corrupt or anti-American, an explanation that parallels Levitsky and Ziblatt’s caution that democracy implodes when adversaries are characterized as enemies rather than real participants. In this case, an “opponent” (indeed, an even stronger one) is not merely the domestic rivals but international institutions.  

Furthermore, one of Levitsky and Ziblatt’s most important insights is that democratic breakdown often begins before institutions are formally revised (Ibid, 114). The United States still has courts, elections, and a constitution to run things. But when norms crumble, such institutions can be used to manipulate rather than dismantle. This is part of why the withdrawal plan is so dangerous. Every exit might appear small and technical. But taken collectively, they represent a wholesale rejection of external constraint and normalization of executive unilateralism. From the context of the readings material, Trump’s withdrawal intentions have not only to do with geopolitical position or international sovereignty. They are about power: Who is restrained, who is held responsible, and how legality can be invoked to cover up democratic decay. This is stealth authoritarianism, not so much because it violates the law, but because it capitalizes on a lack of constraint. Withdrawing from international organizations on the pretext that it is all legal gives the executive less accountability while safeguarding democratic pretense. 

Maya Popper