In November 2024, Mexico’s government dismantled one of its most important democratic transparency institutions. Through a constitutional reform, the government dissolved the respective powers of the National Institute for Transparency, Access to Information, and Personal Data Protection (INAI). The INAI was an independent national agency that was essentially responsible for guaranteeing to the Mexican citizens, accessibility to their government’s information. Although this reform was introduced as an effort by congress to reduce government spending and to simplify bureaucratic structures, eliminating the INAI raises serious concerns regarding democratic accountability. It is because of institutional agencies, like the INAI, existing with the purpose of monitoring government behavior to ensure transparency regardless of which political party holds power. By transferring their respective responsibilities to the executive branch, Mexico ultimately weakened an institutional safeguard, that was specifically created with the intention of constraining political authority.

The INAI was originally created in 2002 as the Federal Institute of Transparency for Access to Information (IFAI). Its creation happened during a critical political shift in Mexico. Amidst Mexico’s democratic transition, it was recognized as an important part to increase transparency in the country. For most of the twentieth century, a single-political party governed the citizens, the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), for more than 70 years. It is then during this period, that federal government transparency was limited and citizens held little to no ability to access official information. The creation of IFAI highlights a broader wave of democratic reforms that followed the end of PRI dominance and the election of opposition candidates to national office. Reformers hoped to strengthen democratic institutions and rebuild public trust in government by creating mechanisms that would allow citizens to monitor the state more closely. The new transparency institute established a formal process through which citizens could request government documents and challenge agencies that refuse to cooperate. This marked an important change in how the Mexican government interacted with their constituents. Instead of information being treated as something controlled in its entirety by the state, transparency laws established the principle that public information ultimately belongs to citizens.

In 2014, the autonomous institution, was strengthened through a constitutional reform that granted it full autonomy and expanded its authority. This reform transformed the IFAI into the INAI and allowed it to enforce transparency requirements across federal institutions. Its independence was critical to its design. Because the institute was operating outside of powers of the executive branch, it could review government decisions about information disclosure without the hassle and disclosure without direct political pressure or interference. This autonomy made it possible for journalists, researchers, civil society organizations, and ordinary people to access records that otherwise might have remained hidden.

However, in November 2024, through a constitutional reform, Congress approved to dissolve not only the INAI but several other autonomous institutions. This included federal agencies such as the Federal Telecommunications Institute, and the Federal Economic Competition Commission, ultimately transferring their respective powers to the government to be in effect March 2025. What remains of the INAI has now been transferred to the Secretariat of Anticorruption and Good Governance, an executive branch entity.

Supporters of this reform argue that dissolving autonomous agencies reduces the government spending cost and eliminates institutional duplications. According to this perspective, transparency responsibilities can continue to operate within executive entities without harming democracy. However, a key point that the argument overlooks is the importance of institutional independence. Oversight/watchdog institutions are designed to function as a separate entity from the government actors that they monitor. When institutions like these are absorbed into the executive branch, the branch being monitored gains influence over the oversight process itself. This creates a clear conflict of interest and weakens government accountability.

The INAI played a real and practical role in ensuring transparency within in Mexican government. For example, in 2019, the institution ordered the federal government to release documents related to the controversial cancellation of the Mexico City airport project. Journalist requested the information to better understand the financial and policy decisions behind the cancelation. The INAI ruled that the government had to disclose the federal records because they were in the publics interest. It is through cases like this that highlight how the institution allowed citizens and journalists to scrutinize government decisions. Without an independent body capable of enforcing these requests, access to public information becomes far more dependent on whether the executive branch chooses to disclose public information voluntarily.

The elimination of important institutions, such as the INAI, highlights the democratic backsliding occurring in Mexico. By eliminating autonomous oversight bodies and centralizing their functions within the executive branch, the government weakened horizontal accountability and reduced institutional constraints on the country’s political power. For this reason, Mexico should reestablish the INAI again as an independent constitutional agency. The removal of these independent agencies concentrates the oversight power within the very branch that it was intended to monitor and overall undermines Mexico’s most significant independent guardrails. To begin to restore institutional balance and preserve accountability within the Mexican government, an autonomous agency must be in place as a safeguard.

The core issue at hand is not bureaucratic efficiency but institutional design. INAI was an institution created with the intention of being a safeguard for the citizens of Mexico. Its work supported civil society organizations, investigative journalists, and ordinary citizens seeking access to government records. Autonomy was central to its legitimacy. Because it operated independently of the executive branch, it could hold that branch accountable without direct political influence.

The elimination of INAI also aligns with broader patterns identified in the political science literature on democratic erosion. Michael Albertus and Guy Grossman argue that modern democratic backsliding rarely occurs through abrupt coups or authoritarian declarations. Instead, it unfolds gradually as elected leaders weaken institutional checks from within the system. Their research shows that incumbents frequently target horizontal accountability institutions, such as courts, civil service bodies, and even watchdog agencies, while following formal democratic procedures. Instead, it unfolds gradually, as elected leaders weaken institutional checks from within the system.

By dissolving autonomous oversight agencies through constitutional reform rather than executive decree, Mexico preserved the appearance of democratic continuity while altering the balance of power. It was enacted through constitutional amendment rather than executive decree, elections remain competitive and opposition parties continue to operate. Yet one of the country’s principal independent oversight institutions no longer exists in autonomous form. What changed was not the existence of democracy, but the strength of its guardrails.

Mexico remains an electoral democracy and is currently views as partially free according to Freedom House. But democracy is not defined solely by elections. It also depends on the strength of institutions that constrain power between elections. By dissolving INAI and centralizing its authority within the executive branch, Mexico reduced one of those constraints. Reestablishing the INAI would restore a critical layer of horizontal accountability and reinforce the structural foundations of democratic governance. Democratic backsliding rarely begins with dramatic rupture. It begins with institutional redesign. Restoring INAI would be a deliberate step towards strengthening, rather than thinning, Mexico’s democratic guardrails.