Ecuador has been going through a serious crisis for some years now. The homicide rate jumped from 6 per 100,000 people in 2018 to 47 per 100,000 in 2023, which makes it hard for democracy to survive. Criminal gangs have killed a presidential candidate, murdered mayors, taken correctional officers hostage, and set off car bombs outside government buildings. It makes me wonder what happens to democracy when emergencies stop being temporary and become the new normal?

What’s happening in Ecuador right now is more than just a news story. The security crisis is putting people’s lives at risk, but it’s also giving the president more power and weakening the rules that are supposed to protect democracy. Even so, people in Ecuador have pushed back by using direct democracy to defend the constitution, even when the president tried to change it. This shows that democracy can be fragile, but it can also be strong when people stand up for it.

In 2024, Freedom House downgraded Ecuador from “Free” to “Partly Free,” a change which happened primarily to the rise of organized crime in cities and corruption within the centralgovernment. The evidence is substantial: during the 2023 campaign season, a legislative candidate, a local mayor, a local party leader, and a presidential candidate were all murdered. OAS electoral observers reported that candidates curtailed campaigning due to security concerns. Criminal groups in coastal provinces illicitly financed campaigns, and judges were bribed or coerced into releasing trafficking suspects.

Some people call this ‘criminal veto power,’ where gangs and armed groups have enough force to scare or control politicians. In Ecuador, leaders have to deal with more than just political arguments they face real threats to their lives. The mayor of Durán had to leave the country after his convoy was attacked, and even the government couldn’t keep its own presidential candidate safe. All this violence has given politicians a chance to use the crisis for their own gain.

President Daniel Noboa, elected in the 2023 snap elections on a security-focused platform, has used the military to address the crisis. He sent soldiers into prisons, called the situation an ‘internal armed conflict,’ and labeled more than 20 gangs as terrorist groups. Some of these actions worked for a while, but they also brought up new problems for the future. One has  attempted to consolidate executive power, frequently bypassing a fragmented legislature through decrees and questionable legal mechanisms. This pattern corresponds with established literature on democratic erosion. The security crisis provided a veneer of legitimacy to Noboa’s consolidation of power. Emergency decrees appeared justified in the context of gangs taking guards hostage and bombing government buildings. However, emergency powers, once granted, are often difficult to rescind, and Noboa’s administration extended their use beyond security matters.

In November 2025, President Noboa submitted four major constitutional reform proposals to a nationwide referendum. These proposals included permitting foreign military bases on Ecuadorian territory, reducing the number of parliamentarians, curtailing political party funding, and, most notably, convening a constituent assembly to rewrite the constitution.

Ecuadorian voters rejected all four proposals, with 53-60% voting. The rejection of the constituent assembly proposal was particularly significant. Ecuador’s 2008 constitution includes globally recognized Rights of Nature provisions, which provide legal protections for ecosystems and have enabled civil society groups to challenge oil extraction and mining projects in court. Many voters feared that a new constitutional process would damage these already set provisions. These concerns were informed by recent experience such as what occurred in 2023 where a citizens’ initiative mandated an end to new oil exploration in Yasuní National Park, one of the world’s most biodiverse ecosystems, yet the government delayed implementation.

This whole situation shows a big problem in Ecuador’s democracy right now. The president asked people to trust him with more power, but he didn’t respect the results of earlier votes. Many people said, and I agree, that direct democracy was only used when it helped those in charge, and ignored when it didn’t. Still, the November 2025 referendum gave hope to a reconstruction of their democracy. More than 80 percent of Ecuadorians voted, and they clearly said no to the president’s power grab. People didn’t have to wait for a new election they used the tools in the constitution to push back against changes they didn’t want.

This development possesses significance for democratic theory. Scholars such as Tom Ginsburg and Aziz Huq have argued that constitutional retrogression, the gradual degradation of democratic norms, is particularly dangerous because it often occurs through legally sanctioned, technically legitimate processes. The primary safeguard lies in the ability of citizens, courts, and civil society to recognize and resist these processes before they become irreversible. Ecuador’s Constitutional Court also had a major role by blocking 11 of Noboa’s proposed referendum questions as unconstitutional before they reached voters. Though facing government crackdowns, including the freezing of bank accounts for at least 61 civil society leaders, organizations continued to mobilize. The YASunidos environmental movement, which initiated the 2023 Yasuní referendum, remained active in defending its democratic achievements.

Ecuador isn’t a simple example of democracy falling apart. Elections are still happening and most people trust them. Courts are still doing their job, and regular people have voted against what the president wanted. That matters. But Ecuador shows something that happens a lot in Latin America and other places. When there’s a security crisis, people want strong leaders, but that can be used as an excuse to weaken democracy. Emergency powers don’t always have to lead to abuse, but it takes constant attention from everyone courts, lawmakers, journalists, and regular people to stop that from happening. The November 2025 vote shows that people in Ecuador see these dangers. It’s not clear if the government really gets it. President Noboa said he would respect the results, but the real test is if he actually follows through, especially with the Yasuní decision that’s already been put off. 

And as an Ecuadorian myself, democracy in Ecuador is neither in decline nor flourishing, and I’ve had family members experience the constant degradation of their country’s democracy. The elections and the ongoing crime have prevented me from traveling to my ancestral lands. It is simultaneously contested, defended, pressured, and partially protected. This vagueness offers an important lesson: democratic erosion rarely occurs as a single dramatic event. Rather, it is a continuous negotiation between those in power and those who resist the relinquishment of democratic standards.