In November 2023, self-proclaimed anarcho-capitalist Javier Milei won the Argentinian presidency. His campaign ran on the promise of dismantling the existing political establishment that many Argentinians had grown dissatisfied with. Yet, rather than departing from Argentina’s past, Milei offers a repackaged form of populism that could continue to hurt regular people more than it actually solves any crises.

Javier Milei’s Rise

In the early 2000s, Argentina’s economy went from a relatively stable economy to a textbook example of inflation. The country witnessed unbridled corruption in high politics, as leaders campaigning under leftist promises to uplift the average citizen were instead involved in bribery and money laundering involving state funds, most notably former presidents Cristina and Néstor Kirchner. By the beginning of 2024, inflation exceeded 200%, among the highest in the world behind only Zimbabwe, Sudan, and Venezuela. As prices continued to rise each day while wages plateaued, people grew desperate and frustrated.

Javier Milei appeared during this crisis by appealing to the hope that he could reverse the systemic poverty and corruption of the past couple decades through radical reform. Milei won the presidency by advocating for massive budget cuts to public spending and speaking out against Kirchnerism, the dominant political movement from 2003 to 2015. 

Decree 70/2023

Shortly after taking office, President Javier Milei issued the Decreto de Necesidad y Urgencia (DNU), nicknamed the “mega-decree” owing to its repeal and modification of 366 laws and regulations. This decree, or legal order, declared that the state of emergency in Argentina warranted an executive order that is effective immediately and required review by Congress only after its enactment.

Worker’s protections were significantly weakened through limits on the right to strike, a reduction in severance pay, and allowing provisions that could extend the workday by up to 12 hours. Additionally, rent laws protecting tenants during times of extreme economic instability were reversed. Prior to the reversal, a minimum lease was 3 years long, rent could only increase once in a year, and rent had to be paid in the local currency of pesos. Now, a landlord could immediately evict a tenant for failing to pay rent that could increase an unlimited amount of times in a given year or for failing to pay in dollars, a completely foreign and unestablished currency. With no minimum lease requirements, the speed of eviction can be instant. These reforms may sound fair on paper, but when enacted in one of the most inflation-ridden countries in the world with a poverty rate of 43%, it forces regular people out of their homes for failing to keep up with an ever-increasing cost of living. The entire foundation of political life seemingly changed overnight, before Congress or the Senate could vote in favor or against.

Observed Theories of Democratic Backsliding

Argentina’s “mega-decree” was established in a time of crisis and through executive overreach reserved for emergencies. In combination, this suggests that Argentina’s current economic crisis has the necessary conditions for democratic norms to continue being weakened.

Political scientist Kurt Weyland argues that populist leaders often emerge in times of economic and social turmoil, as the public’s frustration with existing institutions is fertile grounds for the rise of anti-establishment leaders that citizens would otherwise reject. As voters grow desperate for a change, they become more likely to support rapid reform, even if it comes at the cost of bypassing institutional constraints. The rapid implementation of hundreds of policy changes without congressional or Senate approval is a classic example of a leader engaging in executive aggrandizement to undermine democratic checks, a pattern that Weyland observes in modern populist leaders. While this sweeping reform was later revised by Congress, it’s worth considering the influence such a leader has over voters who are eager for a change.

According to political scientists Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, populism’s defining characteristic is its division of society into two separate groups: the “pure people” and the “corrupt elite.” It attempts to promote the idea that a country’s conflict stems from deceitful elites working against hard-working, regular people. Milei credited the country’s economic collapse to an elite, in this case the Kirchners, while presenting himself as the only politician capable of honest and decisive action. More specifically, economic collapse was equated with labor unions, government relief, political parties, and institutions. By portraying institutions meant to check executive power as obstacles to the people’s will, it becomes feasible to garner public support for reform that weakens the very mechanisms that check presidential power. This becomes especially easy during times of crisis when citizens look towards a savior-like leader who will repair a country by any means necessary. 

Populism as a Threat to Argentinian Democracy 

Prior to Milei, Kirchnerism promoted strong nationalist rhetoric that framed international financial institutions as a threat to Argentina’s sovereignty. Significant restrictions were placed on imports, massive subsidies were implemented to keep utility and transportation costs low, and social programs were expanded, all in the name of saving citizens from private interests. The use of heavy state intervention only worked to deliver short-term benefits, as funds meant for social programs were largely siphoned off and politically favored businesses were the ones to thrive. A weakening of checks and balances and discretionary state spending was justified as a means to protect “the people” until the executive began to lack transparency and regulation altogether.

Although Javier Milei represents a complete shift from the progressive economics Argentinians grew wary of to laissez-faire capitalism, his anti-establishment rhetoric risks keeping Argentina in the very predicament it’s been trying to escape. Supporters of this reform might argue that in the face of extreme necessity, radical reform and executive overreach doesn’t represent a threat to democracy. Not to mention, Argentina was already a country being led by leaders who were significantly weakening democratic norms long before Milei took office. However, this justification overlooks the fact that the decree significantly disadvantages ordinary Argentinians by slashing protections and benefits with no gradual progression or forethought. Additionally, decades-long poverty and inflation are deeply ingrained structural issues that stem from a wide range of sources, not state actors or social benefits alone.

Simplifying these issues as being caused by institutions or government spending fails to acknowledge that one leader can’t solve cyclical crises, political patronage, and powerful interests abroad that shape domestic policy. As Argentina’s past has shown us, urgency and low trust in government invite quick fixes that are effective at garnering support at the cost of democratic resilience.