Thirty years after independence from the Soviet Union, the political landscape in Georgia is more polarized than ever. Currently, the major rift takes place between the ruling Georgian Dream Party (GD) and the main opposition party, United National Movement (UNM). The most famous faces of both parties, Bidzina Ivanishvili from GD and Mikhail Saakashvili from UNM are among the most disliked politicians in Georgia. Yet, the two parties still occupy the center of Georgian politics, as the general elections in October 2020 demonstrated. This is the result of a peculiar characteristic of polarization in Georgia: There are no clear ideological distinctions between political parties.^[1] Instead, party cleavages based on charismatic leaders explain the political divisions in Georgia. One of the most severe consequences of this polarization around personalities is delegitimization, which has gone so far that eight opposition parties have recently decided to not recognize the results of the October 2020 parliamentary elections. 

On December 11, Georgia’s opposition boycotted the opening session of the Georgian Parliament, on the grounds that the parliamentary elections held on October 31, 2020 were fraudulent.^[2] After a week of street protests condemning the election results, the winning Georgian Dream (GD) party and the opposition parties had agreed to attend negotiation talks with the assistance of EU and US representatives. Several rounds of crisis talks were held without success,^[3] and all 60 opposition MPs were absent in the first plenary session. An agreement seems even more unlikely as of December 17, leader of the parliamentary majority Irakli Kobakhidze announced a bill that would terminate state funding for parties that do not take up their parliamentary mandates and would abolish the election registration of political parties with candidates that do not meet the constitutional candidacy criteria.^[4] The latter proposal is directed towards Mikhail Saakashvili, former Georgian president and candidate of the largest opposition party United National Movement (UNM) in the 2020 elections, who had his Georgian citizenship abolished in 2015 and now lives in Ukraine. ^[5]

Since its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, Georgia had trouble consolidating its democracy. Although with the Rose Revolution in 2003, Mikhail Saakashvili took Eduard Shevardnadze’s place by promising to create strong democratic institutions, his term saw increasing consolidation of power in the hands of the executive. The growing dissatisfaction with UNM’s power grab led to its replacement in 2012 with the Georgian Dream, a self-identified left-wing party. However, Georgia continued to remain a hybrid regime under the GD rule, and the executive branch has assumed even more autocratic tendencies.^[6] The October elections were thus seen as a chance to replace this system with a more pluralistic one that could potentially give rise to a coalition government and greater executive accountability. ^[7]The ruling GD had promised the citizens passage from a mixed electoral system to fully proportional representation amidst pressures during the protests that erupted in June 2019. ^[8] Starting as a reaction to political reconciliation with Russia, which currently occupies 20 percent of Georgia’s territory,^[9] the protests soon brought into light demands for changes in the electoral system. However, the government failed to deliver on its promise, resulting in renewed protests in November 2019. ^[10] This time the government made a compromise to increase the number of seats determined by proportional representation from 77 to 120 of a total of 150 seats in the unicameral parliament, and to reduce the threshold from 5 to 1 percent. ^[11] These developments sparked hopes that GD would fail to obtain a majority in the 2020 elections, evidenced by a pre-election poll in which 70 percent of respondents said they would rather have a coalition government than a one-party government. ^[12]

Georgian Dream defied expectations by winning 48 percent of the votes, enough to make it eligible to form a government by itself. ^[13] Soon after, opposition parties rejected the results declaring that the elections witnessed bribery, abuse of state resources and intimidation of voters; and that the electorate surely did not want Georgian Dream to rule for a third term.^[14] Analysts claim that even though official results significantly differed from the parallel vote tabulation results, boycotting might have been a grave mistake for the opposition because this is the first time in Georgian politics that so many parties could find representation in the parliament, meaning that they could have been better off working within the parliament to keep the executive under check. In fact, GD has already formed a new government^[15] and has no intention to renew the elections. Opposition parties may be missing a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to prove themselves to the electorate because the threshold will rise to 4 percent in the 2024 elections, and smaller parties that managed to win seats in the parliament in 2020 may be left out next time. Also, Georgian Dream passed its closest rival UNM by a wide margin of 21 percent, meaning that it would still win if there were no irregularities.^[16] This effectively discredits the opposition’s statement that people did not want Georgian Dream to rule for a third term. 

Whether or not the opposition acted sensibly in boycotting the GD victory, it is certain that the electorate could not find a viable alternative among the opposition parties despite having every reason to dislike GD’s policies. To begin with, GD is responsible for the recent democratic backsliding in Georgia, a country once saluted as a model for democracy in the Southern Caucasus. GD took the chronic autocratic tendencies of Georgian governments to new heights as key democratic institutions like the judiciary have been filled with high-ranking officials with links to the rich party chairman Bidzina Ivanishvili, ^[17] the former prime minister who is said to control elected officials from behind the curtains despite having resigned from office in 2013. ^[18]Government officials are exerting more and more pressure on the media, civil society organizations and opposition politicians by blocking the formation of alternative routes for opposing voices. For example, ownership transfers and dismissals of dissenters in opposition channels like Rustavi 2, TV Pirveli and Adjara TV in 2019 raised questions about freedom of speech. Similarly, a money laundering case was opened in July 2019 against Mamuka Khazaradze, the founder of TBC Bank, right after he announced his intention to form a new party. ^[19] Also, police forces violently responded to the June and November 2019 protests, as well as the November 2020 protests that took place after the announcement of election results. To give an estimation of the damage, 240 protesters were injured and 342 were arrested by police during the June protests.^[20] As such, a December 2019 poll by NDI revealed that 59 percent of Georgians say Georgia is not a democracy.^[21] Georgians are not so satisfied with GD’s socioeconomic policies, either. 60 percent of respondents claimed that the government was performing poorly overall, in a July 2019 poll. Unemployment, rising inflation, inequality, and poverty haunted Georgians during the eight years of Georgian Dream rule. ^[22] Although fortunes seemed to turn in GD’s favor thanks to its successful management of the first Covid-19 wave, Georgia became a hotbed for infections during the second wave, resulting in a plummeting of the national currency against the US dollar. ^[23]

Ironically, GD and UNM continued to dominate the political sphere with 48 and 27 percent of the votes, respectively, while at the same time their leaders Ivanishvili and Saakashvili were among the most disliked politicians in Georgia.^[24] Why, then, do Georgian politics remain so polarized despite GD’s bad economic record and the lowered threshold? The answer may lie in the strategies of the opposition parties, and the broader political landscape in Georgia. Party cleavages in Georgia are based on charismatic leaders, rather than programmatic differences. This was reflected in the run-up to elections as the GD and UNM made the elections a fierce rivalry between their leaders. Opposition parties do not offer their unique ideologies in order to differentiate themselves from GD and UNM. For example, most parties agree on deregulation of the economy, lower taxes, and attracting foreign investment to the country. ^[25] Even the newly formed Girchi and Lelo for Georgia share the same neoliberal tendencies as the older parties. ^[26] This causes the main divide among parties to be on foreign policy issues, relating to Russia and the EU, even though public opinion on matters with Russia seems to be fairly united. ^[27]  Opposition parties could have offered a better alternative to the already disliked GD by bringing the right matters to the table; yet, opposition politicians like Saakashvili preferred to make the elections about “him versus Russia”, which did not resonate with the electorate.^[28] Hence, despite being seen as the role model for its region, Georgia continues to be influenced by the antidemocratic historical legacy it inherited from the Soviet Union. If Georgia does not strictly commit itself to the path of democratization, such challenges are unlikely to be resolved in the near future.

Works Cited

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“Civil.Ge: Saakashvili Loses Georgian Citizenship.” Wayback Machine, December 4, 2015. https://web.archive.org/web/20160813233634/http://civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=28829&search=.

Ellyatt, Holly. “Russia Is Still Occupying 20% of Our Country, Georgia’s Prime Minister Says.” CNBC. CNBC, January 22, 2019. https://www.cnbc.com/2019/01/22/russia-is-still-occupying-20percent-of-our-country-georgias-leader-says.html.

“Freedom in the World 2020-Georgia.” Freedom House. Accessed December 18, 2020. https://freedomhouse.org/country/georgia/freedom-world/2020.

“GD Tables Bill to Strip Parties Boycotting Parliament of State Funding.” Civil.ge, December 17, 2020. https://civil.ge/archives/387662.

 “Georgia at Risk of Democratic Backsliding?” Democracy Digest, September 25, 2019. https://www.demdigest.org/georgia-at-risk-of-democratic-backsliding/.

“Georgia Opposition Calls for Protests after ‘Far from Flawless’ Election.” Democracy Digest, November 2, 2020. https://www.demdigest.org/georgia-opposition-calls-for-protests-after-far-from-flawless-election/.

“Georgian Civil Society Organization’s Address to the International Community.” Transparency International Georgia, September 9, 2019. https://www.transparency.ge/en/post/georgian-civil-society-organizations-address-international-community.

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“Georgia’s Status as Post-Soviet Democratic Leader Challenged.” Democracy Digest, December 11, 2019. https://www.demdigest.org/georgias-status-as-post-soviet-democratic-leader-challenged/.

“Lelo for Georgia.” Wikipedia. Wikimedia Foundation, December 1, 2020. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lelo_for_Georgia.

Lortkipanidze, Levan. “Parliamentary Elections in Georgia: Heinrich Böll Stiftung: Tbilisi – South Caucasus Region.” Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung, October 13, 2016. https://ge.boell.org/en/2016/10/13/parliamentary-elections-georgia#_ftn2.

Menabde, Giorgi. “West Calls on Georgian Opposition Not to Boycott New Parliament.” The Jamestown Foundation, December 2, 2020. https://jamestown.org/program/west-calls-on-georgian-opposition-not-to-boycott-new-parliament/.

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“New Political Center – Girchi.” Wikipedia. Wikimedia Foundation, January 6, 2021. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New_Political_Center_%E2%80%94_Girchi.

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“Tbilisi Tallies: Georgia’s Post-Election Outlook.” YouTube. AtlanticCouncil, November 2, 2020. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q2CrXisYldE.

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Sherwin, Emily. “Georgia: Thousands Protest Ruling Party’s Broken Promises.” Deutsche Welle, November 21, 2019. https://www.dw.com/en/georgia-thousands-protest-ruling-partys-broken-promises/a-51359314.

Varshalomidze, Tamila. “Georgia Vote: What You Need to Know about the October 31 Election.” Georgia News | Al Jazeera. Al Jazeera, October 30, 2020. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/10/30/georgia-to-hold-first-election-under-mixed-party-system.

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^[1] “The High Price of Extreme Political Polarisation in Georgia (Report),” August 15, 2018, https://democracy-reporting.org/dri_publications/the-high-price-of-extreme-political-polarisation-in-georgia-report/.

^[2] “Georgian Parliament Opens Amid Opposition Boycott,” December 11, 2020, https://civil.ge/archives/386534.

^[3] Giorgi Menabde, “West Calls on Georgian Opposition Not to Boycott New Parliament,” The Jamestown Foundation, December 2, 2020, https://jamestown.org/program/west-calls-on-georgian-opposition-not-to-boycott-new-parliament/.

^[4] “GD Tables Bill to Strip Parties Boycotting Parliament of State Funding,” Civil.ge, December 17, 2020, https://civil.ge/archives/387662.

^[5] “Civil.Ge: Saakashvili Loses Georgian Citizenship,” Wayback Machine, December 4, 2015, https://web.archive.org/web/20160813233634/http://civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=28829&search=.

^[6] Tamila Varshalomidze, “Georgia Vote: What You Need to Know about the October 31 Election,” Georgia News | Al Jazeera (Al Jazeera, October 30, 2020), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/10/30/georgia-to-hold-first-election-under-mixed-party-system.

^[7] “Tbilisi Tallies: Georgia’s Elections ‘a Litmus Test of Legitimacy’,” Democracy Digest, October 30, 2020, https://www.demdigest.org/tbilisi-tallies-georgias-elections-a-litmus-test-of-legitimacy/.

^[8] “Georgia’s Status as Post-Soviet Democratic Leader Challenged,” Democracy Digest, December 11, 2019, https://www.demdigest.org/georgias-status-as-post-soviet-democratic-leader-challenged/.

^[9] Holly Ellyatt, “Russia Is Still Occupying 20% of Our Country, Georgia’s Prime Minister Says,” CNBC (CNBC, January 22, 2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/01/22/russia-is-still-occupying-20percent-of-our-country-georgias-leader-says.html.

^[10] Emily Sherwin, “Georgia: Thousands Protest Ruling Party’s Broken Promises,” Deutsche Welle, November 21, 2019, https://www.dw.com/en/georgia-thousands-protest-ruling-partys-broken-promises/a-51359314.

^[11] “2020 Georgian Parliamentary Election,” Wikipedia (Wikimedia Foundation, November 28, 2020), https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2020_Georgian_parliamentary_election.

^[12] Tamila Varshalomidze, “Georgia Vote: What You Need to Know about the October 31 Election,” Georgia News | Al Jazeera (Al Jazeera, October 30, 2020), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/10/30/georgia-to-hold-first-election-under-mixed-party-system.

^[13] “Georgia Opposition Calls for Protests after ‘Far from Flawless’ Election,” Democracy Digest, November 2, 2020, https://www.demdigest.org/georgia-opposition-calls-for-protests-after-far-from-flawless-election/.

^[14] “Opposition Parties in Georgia Sign Joint Statement Renouncing Their Seats in Parliament,” Jam News, November 3, 2020, https://jam-news.net/georgia-document-nika-melia-opposition-parliament-boycott-national-movement-lelo/.

^[15]  Government of Georgia, “Giorgi Gakharia Confirmed as Prime Minister of Georgia; Parliament Approves New Cabinet,” December 24, 2020, https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/giorgi-gakharia-confirmed-as-prime-minister-of-georgia-parliament-approves-new-cabinet-301198434.html.

^[16] “Tbilisi Tallies: Georgia’s Post-Election Outlook,” YouTube (AtlanticCouncil, November 2, 2020), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q2CrXisYldE.

^[17] “Georgian Civil Society Organization’s Address to the International Community,” Transparency International Georgia, September 9, 2019, https://www.transparency.ge/en/post/georgian-civil-society-organizations-address-international-community.

^[18] “Freedom in the World 2020-Georgia,” Freedom House, accessed December 17, 2020, https://freedomhouse.org/country/georgia/freedom-world/2020.

^[19]“Freedom in the World 2020-Georgia”.

^[20] “Nations in Transit 2020-Georgia,” Freedom House, accessed December 17, 2020, https://freedomhouse.org/country/georgia/nations-transit/2020.

^[21] “Georgia’s Status as Post-Soviet Democratic Leader Challenged”.

^[22] “Georgia at Risk of Democratic Backsliding?,” Democracy Digest, September 25, 2019, https://www.demdigest.org/georgia-at-risk-of-democratic-backsliding/.

^[23] “2020 In Georgia: Year in Review,” Civil.ge, December 31, 2020, https://civil.ge/archives/389430.

^[24] “Ivanishvili ‘Most Negatively Viewed’ Politician in Georgia,” OC Media, May 21, 2019, https://oc-media.org/ivanishvili-most-negatively-viewed-politician-in-georgia/.

^[25] Levan Lortkipanidze, “Parliamentary Elections in Georgia: Heinrich Böll Stiftung: Tbilisi – South Caucasus Region,” Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung, October 13, 2016, https://ge.boell.org/en/2016/10/13/parliamentary-elections-georgia#_ftn2.

^[26] “New Political Center – Girchi,” Wikipedia (Wikimedia Foundation, January 6, 2021), https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New_Political_Center_%E2%80%94_Girchi.

“Lelo for Georgia,” Wikipedia (Wikimedia Foundation, December 1, 2020), https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lelo_for_Georgia.

^[27] Levan Lortkipanidze, “Parliamentary Elections in Georgia: Heinrich Böll Stiftung: Tbilisi – South Caucasus Region,” Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung, October 13, 2016, https://ge.boell.org/en/2016/10/13/parliamentary-elections-georgia#_ftn2.

^[28] “Tbilisi Tallies: Georgia’s Post-Election Outlook,” YouTube (AtlanticCouncil, November 2, 2020), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q2CrXisYldE.