For the first time since Democracy’s Third Wave in the late 20th century, the number of countries transitioning into democracies has been recently met with the same amount of countries backsliding, a trend that has been occurring gradually and observed over several years (Gandhi, 2019). Institutions are a vital piece to keep democracies thriving and lead to higher economic growth, better welfare for citizens, and fewer wars, but unfortunately, democratic erosion is most likely to occur through institutions. In such cases, elites will “hand over the keys” for this to occur. Turkey is a recent example of this process coming to fruition. To understand how this came to be, we can look back to the growing threat of polarization within the region that began taking shape over two decades ago. 

In the early 2000s, political Islamists (i.e. The National Outlook Movement, Necmettin Erbakan, and Fethullah Gülen and the Gülen Movement) began to speak out on feeling marginalized despite making up what they believed to be the majority of people, an issue spurred by a recent historical background of secular and religious ideas clashing (Somer, 2019). Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who would later go on to become Turkey’s Prime Minister in 2003 and Turkey’s 12th (and current) president in 2014, was viewed as the personification of this polarization after he established the Justice and Development Party (AKP) alongside Abdullah Gül in 2001. The Justice and Development Party came to power after winning the general election in 2002, running on the claim that it was a democratic party with aims to achieve gradual reform and that it was not an inherently Islamist or exclusionary party. At this time, democracy within Turkey seemed hopeful and Erdoğan stated his confidence in the ability of democratic principles to coexist with Muslim principles (Kirişci and Sloat, 2019). However, Erdoğan and the AKP have since undermined democracy through the corruption of Turkey’s institutions. Some prominent examples of this phenomenon include jailing opposition, controlling the courts and legislature, and silencing credible journalists and media outlets by threatening legal action on grounds of libel, terrorism, and tax evasion charges (Gandhi, 2019).

Despite growing threats of polarization and institutional corruption in the first six years in power, Turkey was viewed as successfully able to exercise “peaceful and lawful revolution” despite polarization as late as 2008 (Somer, 2019). Quality of representation, rights, rule of law, and participation over the span of several decades are graphed by International Idea and illustrate a promising shift in all four categories between 1998 and 2002. However, opposition fell short in that they used alarmist rhetoric and increased levels of polarization without taking measures to strengthen institutions in preliminary defense. This could potentially be attributed to the tendency of individuals to overlook undemocratic behavior during periods of extreme polarization and to withdraw from electoral processes altogether when they feel the rich and elite control democracies (Gandhi, 2019). Consequently, the next five years would be defined by the AKP assuming power through the infiltration of Turkey’s institutions while becoming much more transparent about its aims to impose an Islamist way of life on citizens of Turkey while strategically using polarization to its benefit (Somer, 2019). 

Since 2014, the AKP has remained the dominant party and President Erdoğan still holds executive power with opposition facing such intense institutional threats and barriers. In 2023, Erdoğan declared himself the winner after counting results that many citizens are critical of. Later that year, the European Commission’s annual report on Turkey’s EU “long-stalled” membership bid criticized the country on its standard of democracy and cited rule of law, human rights, and judicial independence as areas that exhibit “serious backsliding” (Reuters, 2023). Additionally, Turkey has been critiqued by Human Rights Watch for regressive policies regarding LGBT+ rights and gender equality in particular, as well as repeating similar sentiments as the rest of the world on abuses of power, persecution of journalists, corruption of institutions, and anti-democratic practices.

Through this case study, we can begin to understand not only the vital role institutions play in maintaining democracy, but the importance of protecting them; especially in the face of growing polarization. Furthermore, we can conclude that it is imperative that we react swiftly in proposing democratic solutions when facing threats of corruption and democratic erosion. Examples of this could include rallying around specific and measurable legislative goals to protect the freedom of expression by political dissidents, opposing political parties, and independent journalists, or measures to ensure separation of powers within the courts to prevent executive power from being abused. Turkey’s case of democratic decline showcases just how quickly democracy can crumble and how difficult it can be to restore if not attended to effectively when a window of opportunity still exists. Though it is in our nature to react to polarization by resorting to undemocratic means or withdrawing completely, doing so is to invest in a future in which reform is no longer accessible.

References: 

Amnesty International. (2023, September 18). We’ve been defending the right to freedom of expression since 1961. https://www.amnesty.org/en/what-we-do/freedom-of-expression/

Encyclopædia Britannica. (2024a, January 19). Justice and Development Party. https://www.britannica.com/topic/Justice-and-Development-Party-political-party-Turkey

Encyclopædia Britannica. (2024b, February 14). Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. https://www.britannica.com/biography/Recep-Tayyip-Erdogan

Gandhi, J. (2019). The Institutional Roots of Democratic Backsliding. Emory University.

Human Rights Watch. (2021, March 24). Turkey: Erdoğan’s onslaught on rights and democracy. https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/03/24/turkey-erdogans-onslaught-rights-and-democracy

Huntington, S. P. (1991). Democracy’s Third Wave. Journal of Democracy: Vol. 2, No. 2. https://www.ned.org/docs/Samuel-P-Huntington-Democracy-Third-Wave.pdf

International Idea. (n.d.). Türkiye. The Global State of Democracy. https://www.idea.int/democracytracker/country/turkiye

Kirişci, K., & Sloat, A. (2019). The Rise and Fall of Liberal Democracy in Turkey. Foreign Policy at Brookings. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/FP_20190226_turkey_kirisci_sloat.pdf

Liu, J. (2010, September 15). Gülen Movement. Pew Research Center’s Religion & Public Life Project. https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2010/09/15/muslim-networks-and-movements-in-western-europe-gulen-movement/

Oxford University Press. (n.d.). Separation of Powers. Oxford Reference. https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803100455185

Reuters. (2023, November 8). European Commission says Turkey backsliding on democracy, rule of law. https://www.reuters.com/world/european-commission-says-turkey-backsliding-democracy-rule-law-2023-11-08/

Somer, M. (2019). Turkey: The Slippery Slope from Reformist to Revolutionary Polarization and Democratic Breakdown. The Annals of the American Academy. 

Uzer, U. (2019, March 14). The identity transformation of Turkey’s Islamist movement. Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies. https://dayan.org/content/identity-transformation-turkeys-islamist-movement

Werz, M. (2024, February 21). Erdoğan’s reelection illustrates the bleak future of Turkish democracy. Center for American Progress. https://www.americanprogress.org/article/erdogans-reelection-illustrates-the-bleak-future-of-turkish-democracy/