The road to democracy for Guatemala was rocky and has remained just as unpaved since. Guatemala has a unique political history, with civil wars, hope for peace, and relentless relapses. Through this blog post, we will review the historical foundations of Guatemala’s democracy, then analyze the events which eroded and promoted Guatemala’s democracy since, and lastly analyze the promises and challenges to Guatemala’s democracy moving forward.

            Guatemala’s first democratic government emerged in 1946 from a revolution but was cut short by a 1954 CIA-backed coup, sparking a civil war that lasted 36 years, killing over 200,000. Through the numerous coups and transitions of power endured during the war, a constitution was written in 1985, establishing their outline for democracy. Despite this, guerilla fighting continued until a 1996 peace agreement. This peace agreement would reinforce the ‘85 constitution and bring hope to the nation.

            The 1985 constitution established a 3-branch government with hope of establishing a balanced system to represent the people and end long-term conflict. The constitution laid out the structure of the government, with executive, legislative and judicial branches. While the foundations were outlined, the structure of this government has failed to actualize the checks and balances needed to uphold their democracy. 

Following the ‘96 peace agreement, President Arzú and his administration made widespread efforts to promote the rights of indigenous communities, expand education and improve infrastructure. Despite these efforts, a 1999 referendum would strike them down, meaning the majority of progressive efforts went unfinished. As Berman discusses in her 2017 article, this can lead to a sense that the government is, “out of touch and unresponsive,” and developing a desire to abandon it. The early inefficiencies of the bureaucracy are just one of the factors which created an environment prime for corruption and erosion. 

This would pave the way for the populist movement, headed by Ríos Montt. Montt, a military leader during the civil war in the 80’s, was a right-wing nationalist who garnered large support in his presidential campaign. Despite the support, Montt was barred from candidacy as the Constitution barred members of past coups from office. His supporters saw this as an erosion of their democracy, being politically motivated, and as Varol would put it, excluding, “new and emerging political parties and candidates.” It is the structure of their constitution which many perceived as undemocratic to begin with. 

In 2003 as a response to this ruling, Montt’s supporters rioted for over two days, vandalizing the city, burning vehicles, and attacking journalists, in what would be known as “Black Thursday.” This dramatically limited the power of the media, as journalists began to limit coverage of the protests and criticisms of Montt in the face of death threats, even resulting in the assault and death of a reporter. Mass fear of consequences led to the media being neither free nor fair, thereby losing its power to effectively both inform the public and hold political powers accountable. Put simply by Varol, the media, “play[s] a crucial role as public watchdogs in promoting government transparency,”​ but the political violence of Montt’s supporters limits this power. 

In 2004, then standing President Alfonso Portillo resigned when faced with large-scale corruption scandals which he later pleaded guilty to. Portillo admitted to accepting bribes of over $2.5 million before and during his presidency. This event would further perpetuate erosion, as faith in the government was diminished, but reflects the strengths civil society held to pressure Portillo’s resignation.

With the evident decline in trust of the government, in 2007 the UN-backed International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) was established to monitor corruption and organized crime throughout government. The CICIG was given legal authority to investigate and prosecute cases of corruption, thereby increasing the strength of the Guatemalan judicial system, and increasing checks and balances, and overall promoting the strength of the government. 

Despite the prospects of the CICIG, disinformation scandals would continue to erode trust of the Guatemalan government. It was of significant impact when, in 2009, prominent Guatemalan lawyer, Rodrigo Rosenberg, was assassinated, and a posthumous video of him was released where he accused the standing President, Alvaro Colom, of orchestrating his hit. A 2010 CICIG investigation would establish that Rosenberg had hired the hit on himself, but the damage to Colom’s reputation had been done. This event would hyperpolarize the nation and lead to more extreme rulers. Here is just one of the many examples in Guatemala demonstrating how disinformation can perpetuate “Hyperpolarization and a lack of trust in institutions,” further eroding their democracy.

In 2012, President Otto Perez Molina was elected, campaigning on a “law and order” promise, very much mimicking the words of authoritarians across the globe. Molina deployed 21,000 soldiers across the nation to combat crime, a move associated with large-scale suppression of civil society and the “undermining of human rights and compromising the accountability and transparency necessary for democratic governance.” The people of Guatemala spoke, and they chose a leader who strayed further from democracy.

Later, in 2015, CICIG uncovered President Molina’s “La Linea” tax bribery scandal, leading to the resignation of Molina and his vice president. This reflects a strengthening of civil society and the anti-corruption movement, while also demonstrating the efficacy of the accountability the CICIG plays in promoting government transparency. 

The resignation of Molina was followed by the election of Jimmy Morales, who campaigned on an anti-corruption platform. Despite this, like his predecessors, Morales faced accusations of corruption and, under investigation, refused to renew the CICIG’s mandate in 2019. This required Morales to intimidate the constitutional court to rule against the CICIG. This signified a large blow to Guatemala’s democracy, as a pivotal player in governmental accountability was removed through political intimidation.

The erosion of political accountability only increased from here. President Alejandro Giammattei assumed office in 2020 and ever since had taken efforts to limit media pluralism and control the courts, strongly limiting checks and balances. Giammattei was ineligible for re-election in 2023 but held control over both the Judiciary and Parliament. It is this control that influenced the Judiciary to “disqualif[y] numerous Presidential candidates,” and thereby, “countless critics have left the country.” It is this absolute control and mob-like intimidation which has seen over 30 judicial officials flee to the United States in recent years. 

Today, Guatemala has new hope to restore its democracy. Bernardo Arévalo, an opponent to Giammattei’s political coalition, won the 2023 election on an anti-corruption campaign. Giammattei’s allies attempted to block Arévalo’s inauguration, even delaying his oath of office by 10 hours on inauguration day, but democracy prevailed. Arévalo campaigned on a promise to restore social protections and cleanse government of actors who continued to consolidate power to attack opposition.

Guatemala’s democracy has faced relentless corruption, violence, and continuous failures to its people. Despite recent successes in the promotion of democracy, the concentration of political power which expelled the CICIG is the newest of challenges to its stability. Guatemala has continuously looked for a leader to represent the people’s needs, overcome the temptations of corruptions, and restore the transparency of their government, but been let down repeatedly. The next 4 years will show if Guatemala’s chain of corruption and democratic erosion will be broken.