Anti-Government Protests and Democratic Erosion in Slovakia
In its 2025 report, Transparency International highlighted Slovakia as a “country to watch”, noting that the reforms implemented by Prime Minister R. Fico’s government are directly associated with a higher perception of corruption. In the rankings, Slovakia dropped twelve places to 59th place out of 180 countries. The organization also criticized the actions of Fico’s government regarding political appointments, the circumvention of standard legislative procedures, and efforts that have undermined independent institutions, media, and civil society. These actions have increased threat perception and intimidation among NGOs and representatives of civil society operating in the country.
Yet, Slovakians have recently taken to the streets in large numbers for a series of ongoing anti-government protests. The most recent protests occurred on April 4th of 2025, with demonstrators marching in Bratislava and other cities throughout Slovakia, as well as in European capitals, such as London and Madrid. This time, the protesters are rallying against an amendment to the government’s draft NGO bill, which critics argue would discredit NGOs that receive foreign funding. The bill has drawn comparisons to Russia’s foreign agent law and has raised further concerns about democratic erosion in the country.
Anti-government protests have been taking place since December 2024, following Fico’s visit to Russia. One of the largest demonstrations occurred on January 24th. Over 60 000 protesters gathered in the capital Bratislava, describing the visit as an act of treason and calling for the resignation of Fico. Prior to the demonstration, Slovakia’s President, Peter Pellegrini, who is an ally of Fico and a member of the same political party, convened a meeting of the country’s Security Council, which is the advisory body of the government regarding military policy and security systems. Pellegrini expressed concerns that the nation’s constitutional establishment was being threatened amid the protests. Fico also alleged that groups unable to attain power through democratic means were plotting a coup—thus seeking to undermine the legitimacy of political opponents. Both the Prime Minister and the President portray the opposition as adversaries to the existing constitutional order, labeling them as existential threats to national security and unfoundedly suggesting their association with foreign entities. This is also illustrated by Fico’s statement about the protests during a parliamentary session: “We see a structure that wants to abuse these (protest) meetings mainly for a potential clash with the state security apparatus to further escalate tension, further foster aggression”. Furthermore, the government has indicated a willingness to restrict civil liberties of both opponents and the media. This is a significant cause for concern, as these actions indicate a substantial weakening of democratic institutions according to Freedom House.
The recent actions of Fico and his government display concerning signs of democratic erosion occurring in Slovakia and exhibit characteristics of “executive aggrandizement”. Unlike a coup, in which a change in leadership occurs suddenly, executive aggrandizement is a more gradual process, which occurs when there is a gradual increase of power by a leader and weakening checks on executive power through institutional reforms (Bermeo, 2016: 10–11).
Scholars have redefined the original concept of executive aggrandizement over time. For instance, Melis G. Laebens describes it as a situation, in which “the incumbent leader of government in a democracy implement or visibly try to implement practices and legal changes, which have an effect on weakening both horizontal accountability of the executive towards other branches of government and vertical accountability of the government towards voters and political opposition, without altogether suspending democratic institutions” (Laebens, 2023: 9). In this context, we can characterize the actions of the Slovak government as fitting the case of executive aggrandizement. Horizontal accountability is crucial in examining how Fico’s government is enacting institutional reforms, which undermine checks on power. In contrast, vertical accountability is applicable to Fico and his government’s response to protests and public dissent, characterized by suppression of media and the marginalization of opposition voices. These actions are an example of the phenomenon of executive aggrandizement in Slovakia, which erodes democratic checks and public accountability while attempting to preserve the appearance of democratic structures.
In October 2024, the European Commission and the European Parliament exerted pressure on Slovakia to comply with the rule of law by freezing the funds meant for the country. This pressure has so-far proven effective, as the Slovak government ultimately retracted controversial policies, such as amendments to corruption laws, which were meant to eliminate prosecution of crimes involving EU funds. This proactive effort to combat democratic backsliding stands in contrast to the EU’s more cautious approach with Hungary, where it took years to address similar concerns. As the protesters in Slovakia show efforts in holding Fico’s government accountable for its actions, the European Union must continue to pressure the country, which is showing clear signs of democratic erosion.
Used sources
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Prior to my reading this article, I had not been aware of recent national outcry in the form of public demonstrations in Slovakia. I had seen that Fico had secured a third term as Prime Minister two years gaining additional political solidification with the presidential victory of Pellegrini. The theories of executive aggrandizement then identified I find quite comparable to the most recent situation in Georgia last year. While the scale of Slovakia’s democratic erosion process may be considerably less than that of Georgia, the methods populist elites have implemented to secure power are apparent in both cases. Such a startling display of executive aggrandizement pairs then with strategic manipulation whereas pluralism is disposed of as parties in opposition are viewed as incompatible and a national threat
I do believe there is an element of foreign intervention that is inseparable from the measures used to mitigate anti-government protests. Although Slovakia has not completely severed its western ties with EU, its cordial relations that Fico has sought with Russia can most definitely be seen as a significant determinant of the nations’ democratic decline. Looking to authoritarian Russia, the policies implemented by Putin who has maintained over 20 years of power becomes a desirable system to replicate. Just as Putin achieved greater authoritarian powers through legal methods in the forms of referendums and amendments, the potential authoritarian future of Slovakia is not entirely out of reach. For leaders who may eventually prioritize their own national and moral ends over ideals of democratic governance, the targeting of the public sphere in these discrete methods is only a first step of many to completely dismantle democracy.