Cyrus Sadr

Democratic Erosion

Professor Steven Rosenzweig 

4/9/25

Populism and Authoritarianism in Venezuela

The 2024 election of Nicolas Maduro is widely viewed as being fraudulent (“Maduro Declared Victor”). The election highlights the continuing erosion of Venezuelan democracy that began in the 1990s under Hugo Chavez. Despite facing severe economic sanctions, protests and diplomatic pressure, Maduro holds on to power due to the development of authoritarian institutions that can be traced back to Chavez. Maduro’s prolonged control of Venezuela stems from the populist strategies that Chavez initiated. Chavez’s rise in 1998 was due to his ability to capitalize on economic discontent, political polarization and anti-elite sentiment among Venezuelans. However, once in office, Chavez quickly began to erode democratic norms through constitution changes, militarization and media suppression and control. Maduro has since continued Chavez’s actions to centralize power and breakdown democratic checks and norms in Venezuela. As Charles Larratt-Smith writes “Maduro inherited a highly polarized political system [from Chavez]… Instead of implementing any meaningful reforms, Maduro doubled down on [Chavez era] policies that would maintain his ruling coalition’s loyalty” (“Here’s why Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro is still in power”). This paper aims to examine the political conditions that facilitated Chavez’s rise and how both him and Maduro maintained power through eroding Venezuela’s democratic institutions. 

Venezuela’s Neoliberal Crisis and the Rise of Populism

In the 1980s and 1990s, many Latin American countries experienced a debt crisis. Venezuela, among these countries, took loans given out by the World Bank and IMF under the conditions that the state adopt neoliberal policies. These included privatization, austerity and trade liberalization which shift power towards business and away from workers. Such policies lead to mass economic inequality and alienate the working class, making them ripe for anti-establishment populist appeal. Gabriel Heltland writes that, “By 1995 poverty had reached 66 percent, and by 1999 53 percent of employment was in the informal sector… This catastrophic economic situation was mirrored in the political sphere. Support for Acción Democrática (Democratic Action) and COPEI (Social Christian Party), the two parties that had dominated Venezuelan politics since the Pact of Punto Fijo, fell throughout the 1990s, setting the stage for Chávez’s 1998 election as president” (Hetland 19)​. The failure of Venezuela’s traditional parties, AD and COPEI, to address the needs of an economically abandoned working class generated widespread disillusionment, creating a fertile political environment for Chavez to consolidate power. 

Chavez positioned himself as a savior of the disenfranchised, outside of the political establishment and determined to put an end to a corrupt elite. This messaging exploited the frustrations of the working class. As Jan Werner Muller writes in What is Populism?, “Populists claim that they, and they alone, represent the people…”​ and Chavez is no exception (Muller 8). Chavez mobilized mass support by promising to dismantle the old corrupt elites and broken political system that no longer served the interest of ordinary people. Chavez capitalized on widespread economic frustration and marginalization to inspire mass support, focusing on anti-establishment rhetoric and promising radical change. “Chávez’s initial appeal centered on his distance from and stinging critique of Venezuela’s political establishment, which was responsible for the implementation of neoliberalism in the 1990s” (Hetland 18)​. This allowed him to position himself as the sole representative of the oppressed against an illegitimate political establishment.

Chavez and Maduro in Power: Erosion of Democratic Norms

Once Chavez came to power, he immediately set about restructuring the political system. Chavez’s 1999 constitutions exemplified this and gave the president unprecedented powers, effectively diminishing the role of the judiciary and the legislature, ensuring that Chávez could govern without significant checks or balances. Müller highlights that populists often rewrite constitutions to consolidate power in the executive, a strategy that Chávez and later Maduro used to control Venezuela’s political landscape. “Chávez … controlled the way ‘his’ constituent assembly was elected and ensured that a majority of 60 percent for his party at the polls translated into more than 90 percent of the seats in the constituent assembly” (Muller 48). 

Furthermore, Chavez used populist rhetoric to justify his suppression of media and political opposition. Chávez’s control over media outlets set the precedent for Maduro’s ongoing crackdowns on independent journalism and civil society. As explained by Michael McCarthy, “Maduro’s government [quashes] dissent, including jailing some of the country’s most important political leaders” (“6 things you need to know about Venezuela’s political and economic crisis”).

One key authoritarian strategy that Maduro has inherited and expanded from Chavez is the politicization of the military. The Venezuelan military has been deeply integrated into the country’s political system, not just as a tool of governance but as a stakeholder in maintaining the regime’s power. As Larratt-Smith explains, “Maduro has even further politicized the Venezuelan military. The Directorate General of Military Counterintelligence (DGCIM), a feared internal surveillance organization, has agents infiltrated in every branch of the armed forces” (“Here’s why Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro is still in power”). By embedding the military in key economic sectors and diversifying security services, Maduro ensured its loyalty and use as a tool for political suppression. The military works to extend Maduro’s control over Venezuela society and is a key tool for authoritarian stability of populist regimes bypassing democratic norms. 

In 2017, Maduro used the Constituent Assembly as a means to invalidate the opposition controlled National Assembly. As Kirk Semple explains, “The National Assembly’s demise was perhaps foretold when the opposition took control of the body after elections in December 2015. It was the first time in many years that the opposition had a legislative majority, ensuring a power struggle with Mr. Maduro and his United Socialist Party. The president and his allies started chipping away at congressional powers.” (“In a Venezuela Ravaged by Inflation, ‘a Race for Survival’”). This was done to ensure that only Chavista approved policies would pass. Maduro’s regime weakened the National Assembly by using the Supreme Court and Constituent Assembly to override its decisions. “The Supreme Court, stacked with judges loyal to Mr. Maduro, nullified nearly all pieces of legislation that the Assembly passed in 2016 and stripped it of its budgetary oversight powers… The Supreme Court even transferred legislative powers from the Assembly to itself.” (In a Venezuela Ravaged by Inflation, ‘a Race for Survival’) This highlights how populist regimes can dismantle democratic checks to undermine their opposition. Populist regimes often manipulate the judicial system to suppress opposition and bypass legislative processes. Maduro’s regime has followed this pattern by stacking the judiciary with loyalists, ensuring that any opposition efforts are blocked by the legal system.

The Link between Neoliberalism and Populism in Venezuela

Venezuela’s democratic erosion is a direct result of the failures of neoliberal policies which marginalize the working class and create a political environment ripe for the rise of an anti-establishment populist, like Hugo Chavez. Maduro’s continuation of Chavez’s strategies demonstrates how populist regimes can take advantage of economic instability in large sectors of the public and erode democratic institutions to maintain a strong grip on power. Both leaders utilized authoritarian tactics like constitutional reforms, military politicization and economic control to undermine Venezuelan democracy. Despite external pressures, Venezuela’s future remains uncertain. The former democratic state’s descent into authoritarianism demonstrates the fragility of democracy when traditional parties fail to support the working class. 

Works Cited

Maduro Declared Victor of Venezuela’s Disputed Presidential Election.” Al Jazeera, 29 July 2024, www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/7/29/venezuela-election-results-live-maduro-gonzalez-presidential-race

“Here’s Why Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro Is Still in Power.” Good Authority, 21 Sept. 2023, goodauthority.org/news/heres-why-venezuelan-president-nicolas-maduro-is-still-in-power/. Accessed 15 Apr. 2025.

“6 Things You Need to Know about Venezuela’s Political and Economic Crisis.” Good Authority, 31 Jan. 2024, goodauthority.org/news/6-things-you-need-to-know-about-venezuelas-political-and-economic-crisis/. Accessed 15 Apr. 2025.

Müller, Jan-Werner. What Is Populism? London, Penguin Books, 2016.

Semple, Kirk. “Venezuela’s Two Legislatures Duel, but Only One Has Ammunition.” The New York Times, 3 Nov. 2017, www.nytimes.com/2017/11/03/world/americas/venezuela-national-assembly-maduro.html.

Hetland, Gabriel. “From System Collapse to Chavista Hegemony.” Latin American Perspectives, vol. 44, no. 1, Jan. 2017, pp. 17–36. doi:10.1177/0094582X16666018.