In recent years, each 9^th of May, Moscow’s Sheremetyevo Airport welcomes very specific types of guests. Not tourists—but presidents, prime ministers and other notable guests from across the post-Soviet space and beyond. They plan to wholeheartedly join the celebration of memory, which they did not organise but are quite eager to be part of. These are not just routine diplomatic visits but ritual arrivals. Leaders of hybrid and authoritarian regimes take their place on the Red Square not only to remember but to belong. The occasion is Victory Day, which is modern Russia’s most significant sacred civic holiday commemorating the Soviet Union’s triumph against Nazi Germany and its European allies. The event remembered on the stage is not just 1945 but a particular version of the past, which is meticulously curated and ritualised by the Russian state. Guests participate in a public memory performance where roles are assigned, meaning is centralised, and presence is political.

Why do all these leaders come? This might seem counterintuitive, especially for leaders who otherwise claim that national sovereignty and distancing from Russia is in their national interest. Their appearances are not accidental or sentimental but strategic. As Anne Applebaum describes in her book Autocracy, Inc., modern authoritarian regimes collaborate through shared methods, collective support and coordinated action. Victory Day is an embodied example of that—a ritual of borrowed memory and transnational loyalty, where leaders lacking stability and legitimacy can stage strength through someone else’s story. They arrive there to present a shared present, which is defined by control.

Autocracy Inc. and the Art of Borrowing Memory

While the May gathering is seemingly based on shared values and ideology, the reality is quite different. As argued by Applebaum, many of these countries belong to a decentralised, ideology-optional network of authoritarian regimes, which operates like a transnational business franchise (Applebaum, 2024).

What connects the members are shared interests like staying in power, and avoiding imprisonment and accountability. Here, different regimes act as individual contributors and cooperate and assist each other when needed, mostly in 1. propaganda systems—troll farms, misinformation and state media; 2. Security assistance—riot police gear, training programs and surveillance tech; 3. Financial systems—opaque bank transactions, offshore havens, etc. 4. Legal repression tools—banning parties, closing funds to independent media and labelling civil society organizations as foreign agents (Applebaum, 2024). All of these are part of a shared toolkit, and events like the Victory Day parade can be seen as an annual team-building retreat, another way of saying, “Yes, we are still part of this system. We are still committed to the shared project of democratic erosion”. This happens because when one is isolated, sanctions hurt, but when together, all the members get a chance to survive (Applebaum, 2024).

But surviving in this system requires more than gear and messaging. It also demands a memory, a collective performance that signals meaning to an audience. As Halbwachs argued in On Collective Memory (1992), it is not just about what happened but what we choose to remember and praise now. Paul Connerton added that political messages stick best when dressed up in ritual: flags, uniforms, speeches and salutes—all serving a comforting loop of symbolic repetition (Connerton, 1989). Lastly, by standing on the Red Square beside Putin, leaders are not just recalling 1945 but borrowing authority and posing under the shadow of Soviet monuments.

Red Square’s Guest List: Who Needs What

Not every leader who arrives in Moscow comes for the same reason, but clearly, they are coming for something. In that sense, the guestlist is composed of four types of countries.

First and foremost, core members are host and anchor Russia, as well as its close ally Belarus. Russia is the architect and stage owner of Victory Day. Lukashenko, on the other hand, reliant on Moscow, uses the parade as a reaffirmation of dependency, and together, they both rely on the performance to mask their isolation as resistance.

Secondly, are the “Borrowers” who show up because they need it. Leaders of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan could be united here since they are regimes with weak ideological foundations and shaky legitimacy domestically. In Kazakhstan for example, people seem to be increasingly disconnecting from decision-making processes and domestic legitimacy challenges; in Uzbekistan, a recently attempted assassination of former presidential press secretary showed how fragile the regime foundations might be. Standing beside Putin could be a way to echo their strength.

Next are the “Opportunist countries,” including Serbia, Slovakia, India, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. This is a very eclectic group. By visiting, leaders are not posing for Russia but for domestic sympathies, and the reasons might differ. For example, Serbian President Vučić underscores that despite potential problems regarding EU accession prospects, Russian ties are still important, and the main driver is high-risk but carefully managed nationalistic sentiments. On the other hand, in the Slovakian case, Fico attending the parade is a direct act of defiance to reinforce an anti-Western and “sovereignty-first” image, and an attempt to emulate the Hungarian nationalist, illiberal and Russia-tolerant model. Armenian and Azerbaijani Presidents’ visits have been driven by diplomacy goals as well, as recent statements made by country officials claim. In addition, Azerbaijan already had its own Victory Day in November; they arguably do not need to rely on other victory days and celebrations. So, it is less about Victory Day than a demonstration of the Azerbaijani multifaced approach to foreign policy. Lastly, Indian President Modi’s appearance is interesting. India did not have any close ties with defeating Nazi Germany in 1945. Still, its contemporary defence, economic and diplomatic partnership with Russia is significant, and by visiting Moscow, Modi underlines that Western pressure is not working on India and that they can balance their relationship with major global powers like the United States and China.

Last but not least, China and Brazil do not need the parade but still find it useful to amplify their narratives. For China, showing up is a chance to signal civilisational alignment: a subtle but clear nod that it, too, remembers history on its terms. Brazil’s president Lula da Silva, known for playing all sides, uses appearances like these to underline his commitment to a multipolar world—where no one power, especially not the U.S., dominates the script.

The Real Meaning of May 9

Leaders from barely democratic to proudly authoritarian countries gather on May 9 not out of nostalgia; it is networking, and Applebaum’s theory strengthens that idea. Since they operate less like ideologues and more like board members, they seek shared tactics, mutual protection and, from time to time, a place to perform the unity, which is the Red Square for now.

These regimes reaffirm the system with memory rituals, coordinated narratives, and choreography that keep them from being excluded from democratic pressure. In a world where sanctions bite, and protest movements spread, nothing says “we’ve still got this”, like a parade of tanks and authoritarian handshakes. In short, they don’t come to remember.  They are looking for relevance, recognition, and a renewed seat in a system where power is ritual, and presence is policy.

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