“Democracy can collapse in silence, but in Israel it spilled into the streets.”
On July 24, 2023, the Knesset passed what became known as the “reasonableness law,” eliminating the Supreme Court’s ability to strike down government actions on the grounds of unreasonableness. Critics warned this would clear the way for arbitrary executive action. Within hours, tens of thousands of Israelis poured into Tel Aviv’s Kaplan Street, blocked highways, and set up encampments outside the Knesset. The protests spread to airports, army bases, and business districts.
This was not a mere legal matter—it was a test of Israel’s democracy. It revealed how populist rhetoric can legitimize attacks on democratic institutions, and how civil society can mobilize to defend them.
Populism and Institutional Erosion
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his coalition argued that Israel’s Supreme Court had become an unelected elite blocking majority rule. This framing reflects Jan-Werner Müller’s definition of populism as inherently anti-pluralist, claiming to represent “the people” while delegitimizing opposition.
In January 2023, Netanyahu claimed the reform would restore balance between the branches of government and ensure that the people’s choice is not overruled by unelected judges, framing the overhaul as a democratic correction, rather than a power grab. Supporters argued that Israel’s judiciary had long overstepped its unelected authority, striking down government decisions without a formal constitution to guide it.
Yet, framing reform as a defense of democracy ultimately served to justify its erosion. Political scientist Brett Bessen explains why this discourse is so corrosive. Populist leaders often present society as a struggle between virtuous people and corrupt elites, portraying institutions like courts or legislatures as obstacles to democracy rather than safeguards to it. This framing makes executive aggrandizement appear democratic, since removing checks looks like empowering “the people.” Bessen’s experiments show that such discourse increases citizen support for closing legislatures or expanding executive power, even among opposition voters. Netanyahu’s rhetoric—that judges were conspiring against the public will—mirrored this and helped to normalize efforts to strip the Court’s authority. The problem, however, went beyond just rhetoric. The reforms targeted horizontal accountability by curbing judicial review and altering judicial appointments. Scholars describe this as a form of populist constitutionalism: weakening checks and balances through legal means rather than open coups.
Nancy Bermeo, in her essay On Democratic Backsliding, calls this executive aggrandizement—leaders expanding their own power step by step through legal reforms. Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt, in How Democracies Die, add that institutions like an independent judiciary are “guardrails” that prevent majority dominance from tipping into authoritarianism. By way of eroding judicial independence, Netanyahu’s coalition struck directly at those guardrails.
Civil Society Pushback
What occurred next was extraordinary. Israel’s protests became the largest sustained demonstrations in the country’s history. On some nights, more than 200,000 people filled Tel Aviv’s streets. Pilots and cybersecurity officers joined reservists in threatening not to serve. Doctors, lawyers, and tech workers walked off the job. Protesters shut down Ben Gurion Airport, Israel’s main international hub, halting flights.
The protests also struck at Israel’s core institutions: its military. More than 300 military doctors and 750 special operations reservists signed letters pledging not to serve if the reforms went ahead. Over 100 Israeli Air Force reservists publicly announced they would stop reporting for duty. These moves were symbolically powerful in a country where reservists form the backbone of national security.
A 2025 Frontiers in Political Science study found these protests not only delayed reforms but also reshaped public perceptions of democracy. In January 2024, Israel’s Supreme Court convened an unprecedented 15-justice panel and, by an 8-7 vote, struck down the reasonableness law—the first time it had ever overturned a Basic Law. Without public mobilization, this ruling may not have carried the same political weight.
The Fog of War
But all civil resistance has its limits. On October 7, 2023, Hamas launched an attack that shifted Israel into wartime emergency. National attention turned to security. According to the Times of Israel, scholars warned that this “fog of war” masked continuing democratic backsliding. In March 2025, the Knesset passed another law restructuring the Judges Selection Committee, giving politicians greater influence over judicial appointments.
This dynamic reflects a broader pattern: authoritarian-leaning leaders often use crises to advance agendas under reduced scrutiny. As War on the Rocks notes, populists worldwide delegitimize institutions—courts, media, even security agencies—especially in times of war. Israel followed this playbook, with national security concerns providing cover for reforms that might have faced fierce opposition in peacetime.
Populism, War, and Curbed Authoritarianism
Yet the war did not erase resistance entirely. A 2024 analysis from the European Center for Populism Studies argued that war initially strengthened authoritarian instincts but also heightened democratic mobilization, sharpening debates about legitimacy. In other words, the crisis both empowered the executive and deepened civic awareness of democratic fragility. For example, civil groups like the Brothers in Arms, seen as a main driving force behind mass anti-government protests, often blocked highways and intersections across the country to harass politicians and their families. They kept public pressure on the Knesset. These efforts helped sustain momentum even as security concerns dominated headlines.
This dual effect suggests that backsliding is not inevitable, even under stress; civic actors and institutions can generate friction that slows authoritarian consolidation. But it also highlights how fragile such resistance can be when emergencies dominate political life.
Why Israel Matters
Israel illustrates three lessons for the study of democratic erosion:
- Backsliding is legalistic. It happens through judicial amendments and committee restructuring, not coups.
- Civil society matters. Protests from professionals, reservists, and ordinary citizens forced pauses and gave courts space to act.
- Resistance is fragile. Emergencies like war can redirect attention, giving leaders cover to push reforms.
As Bermeo warned, backsliding rarely happens overnight. It unfolds in slow motion, disguised as legal reform. Israel shows that democracy’s survival depends not only on strong institutions but on citizens willing to defend them—week after week, even when the price is high.
Works Cited
AJC. “What is Israel’s “reasonableness” legislation and why is it so contentious?” American Jewish Committee, 23 July 2023, https://www.ajc.org/news/what-is-israels-reasonableness-legislation-and-why-is-it-so-contentious. Accessed 2 October 2025.
Ben-Porat, Guy, and Dani Filc. “Authoritarianism Curbed? Populism, Democracy and War in Israel.” Journal of Populism Studies, 2025, pp. 1-27. jus.populismstudies.org, https://jps.populismstudies.org/articles/authoritarianism-curbed-populism-democracy-and-war-in-israel.
Bermeo, Nancy. “On Democratic Backsliding.” Journal of Democracy, vol. 27, no. 1, 2016, pp. 5-19. https://muse.jhu.edu/article/607612.
Bessen, Brett R. “Populist Discourse and Public Support for Executive Aggrandizement in Latin America.” Comparative Political Studies, vol. 0, no. 0, 2024, pp. 1-34. Sage.
Botbol, Amelie. “‘Brothers in Arms’ spearheads protests calling for early elections.” Jewish News Syndicate, 20 March 2024, https://www.jns.org/brothers-in-arms-spearheads-protests-calling-for-early-elections/. Accessed 16 10 2025.
Fabian, Emanuel. “Over 100 Air Force reservists say they will refuse to serve if overhaul advances.” timesofisrael.com, 2023, https://www.timesofisrael.com/over-100-air-force-reservists-say-they-will-refuse-to-serve-if-overhaul-advances/. Accessed 1 October 2025.
Federman, Joseff. “Israeli parliament takes first major step in Netanyahu’s contentious overhaul, deepening divisions.” apnews.com, 24 July 2023, https://apnews.com/article/netanyahu-israel-hospital-judicial-overhaul-protests-closures-fb595629e7033ee34d246ee9a367c4d4. Accessed 1 October 2025.
Freedman, Eliyahu. “Two scholars warn of Israel’s democratic backsliding, hidden by Oct. 7’s fog of war.” timesofisrael.com, 14 July 2025, https://www.timesofisrael.com/two-scholars-warn-of-israels-democratic-backsliding-hidden-by-oct-7s-fog-of-war/. Accessed 1 October 2025.
Müller, Jan-Werner. “Jan-Werner Müller, What is Populism?” Lectures, 2021. Lectures (OpenEdition Journals), https://journals.openedition.org/lectures/47461#:~:text=Right%20from%20the%20start%2C%20in,relative%20to%20other%20political%20parties.
Rabinovitch, Ari. “Protests rock Israel as it passes curbs on some Supreme Court powers.” Reuters, 25 July 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israels-netanyahu-discharged-hospital-reuters-witness-says-2023-07-24/. Accessed 1 October 2025.
Reuters. “Thousands rally as Israel’s parliament passes judicial bill.” reuters.com, 24 July 2023, https://www.reuters.com/pictures/thousands-rally-israels-parliament-passes-judicial-bill-2023-07-24/4NKYT56YAJILDF7O3M7WMMDSX4/. Accessed 1 October 2025.
Riemer, Ofek, et al. “Populists vs. Spies in Israel and Beyond.” War on the Rocks, 5 June 2025, https://warontherocks.com/2025/06/populists-vs-spies-in-israel-and-beyond/. Accessed 1 October 2025.
Rose, Emily. “Hundreds of Israeli reservists vow to refuse service if judicial overhaul passes.” reuters.com, 20 July 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hundreds-israeli-reservists-vow-refuse-service-if-judicial-overhaul-passes-2023-07-19/. Accessed 1 October 2025.
Roznai, Yaniv, and Amichai Cohen. “Israel Law Review.” The Constitutional Crisis in Israel, vol. 56, no. 3, 2023, pp. 502-520. cambridge.org, https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/israel-law-review/article/populist-constitutionalism-and-the-judicial-overhaul-in-israel/604758F6B3366CE6F8C100E1B386E6CA. Accessed 2025.
Sharon, Jeremy. “Justice minister unveils plan to shackle the High Court, overhaul Israel’s judiciary.” The Times of Israel, 04 January 2023, https://www.timesofisrael.com/justice-minister-unveils-plan-to-shackle-the-high-court-overhaul-israels-judiciary/. Accessed 15 10 2025.
Shomer, Yael, et al. “Editorial: The crises of the Israeli democracy.” Front. Polit. Sci, vol. 7, 2025. frontiers.org, https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/political-science/articles/10.3389/fpos.2025.1627969/full.
Sokol, Sam. “Knesset passes law greatly boosting political control over appointment of judges.” The Times of Israel, 27 March 2025, https://www.timesofisrael.com/knesset-passes-law-greatly-boosting-political-control-over-judicial-appointments/. Accessed 1 October 2025.
I find it interesting to see the similarities of populist rhetoric in both Israel and the United States. You did a really nice job explaining how despite Netanyahu’s goal ultimately being to weaken checks and balances on power through legal means (populist constitutionalism), it’s framed entirely differently which results in broader public support. Viewing it like that, it’s almost like a form of deceit in a sense. You mention how Netanyahu frames it as a form of “democratic correction” instead of a power grab. This obviously ties into Bermeo’s concept of executive aggrandizement where executive power is increased through legal means.
This is something that we’re currently seeing in the United States as well. I think an important element of executive aggrandizement is how since actions taken to remove checks on power and limit the reach of courts and legislatures are done through legal means instead of through something more radical like a coup, they don’t generate as much public attention. As you talk about in your post, there were protests that despite being disrupted by the conflict with Hamas, we’re still effective for the most part. I think that this is an area where smaller countries can really benefit – people coming together through protest can be really make a difference. However in bigger countries like the US, I feel like that’s a lot harder to achieve; not simply because of the difference in population, but also due to the geographic size of the country as well.
In my view, this is a large part of why executive aggrandizement is such a threat to American democracy in my view. Since actions are taken through legal means, a large part of the population doesn’t pay attention to what’s happening, thus protest isn’t taken on a large enough scale to result in any kind of meaningful outcome.
Thank you so much for this thoughtful comment! You’re absolutely right that the “legal means” aspect of executive aggrandizement makes it so much more insidious. The framing as “democratic correction” really does function as a form of deceit, allowing these power grabs to fly under the radar.
Your point about scale and geography is particularly insightful. I hadn’t fully considered how Israel’s smaller size might actually enable more effective mobilization compared to the vast geography of the US. That’s a really important factor in understanding why similar threats might play out differently in different contexts. It makes the challenge of defending American democracy even more daunting when you think about the coordination required.
Thanks again for engaging so thoughtfully with the post.
The first connection I made while reading this post was to the populist rhetoric leaders in the United States are currently using to undermine democratic institutions. On the federal level, I would agree that executive aggrandizement is a threat to American democracy, and I would even argue that it is the greatest threat. I would also agree with your point that it is exponentially more difficult to mobilize public movements in the United States, for geographic reasons like you point out, but also due to American individualism; the social norm that someone else’s problems are not your own and you are not obligated to involve yourself in them.
200,000 people protesting in Tel Aviv is 2% of Israel’s population of 9.85 million people in 2023. In the United States we would need 6.94 million people to have the same statistical significance. On October 18th, 7 million people across the United States came out to attend the No Kings Protests, the largest protest in the US to date, and a direct reaction to the executive aggrandizement the Trump Administration has been attempting. That is just about the same turnout, yet the No Kings Protests has not generated any further momentum. I wonder then, if part of why it is so difficult to disrupt executive aggrandizement beyond assembly is exposure.
The No Kings Protests were generally very calm, not leading to civil disruption or negative police interaction, and because of this, did not have anything worthwhile for news outlets to post on, or adversaries of the movement to point out. This effect echoes the third lesson this post identifies, that resistance is fragile. However, in the US, there hasn’t been a specific instance of something monumental to redirect attention, rather, the attention was never there to begin with. The No Kings movement and the anti-autocratization of American democracy it represents hasn’t died off, but if being on the largest protest to date isn’t enough to result in a meaningful outcome, what is?
On the topic of protests and the overlap between American and Israeli politics, I agree that both countries are facing executive aggrandizement but the protests discussed in the piece and the No Kings Protest may be too different to compare. I think that the reason the No Kings protest did not disrupt executive aggrandizement as effectively as the protests against the reasonableness law was due to the purpose and directives of each protest.
The Israeli protests against the reasonableness law focused directly on a piece of legislation, and showed resistance to a piece of legislation that would consolidate power. On the other hand, the No Kings Protest did not focus on a particular piece of legislation, but rather general resistance to the executive branch. I believe the lack of focus on specific pieces of legislation made the protests less effective.
Generally, mass peaceful mobilization is effective, especially because the non-violence helps it retain legitimacy and gain participation as scholars Chenoweth and Stephan claim. Moving forward, the No Kings Protest and American protests alike need to be able to narrow down their goals to specific pieces of legislation or focus in order to be more effective.
Thank you for this incredibly insightful analysis, Despina! Your point about exposure is fascinating and something I hadn’t fully considered. You’re right that the statistical turnout was comparable, yet the impact was vastly different.
The observation about the protests being “too calm” to generate media attention really highlights a troubling paradox in democratic resistance: nonviolent protests retain legitimacy (as Chenoweth and Stephan argue) but may fail to capture public attention in a fragmented media environment. The Israeli protests had the advantage of sustained, unavoidable visibility in a smaller country, whereas American protests can be enormous yet somehow still invisible to much of the population.
Your question at the end is the crucial one: if 7 million people isn’t enough, what is? It suggests that the problem isn’t just the scale of mobilization, but perhaps the mechanisms through which protest translates into political pressure in the American system. Would love to hear your thoughts on what other factors might be at play.
On the topic of protests and the overlap between American and Israeli politics, I agree that both countries are facing executive aggrandizement but the protests discussed in the piece and the No Kings Protest may be too different to compare. I think that the reason the No Kings protest did not disrupt executive aggrandizement as effectively as the protests against the reasonableness law was due to the purpose and directives of each protest.
The Israeli protests against the reasonableness law focused directly on a piece of legislation, and showed resistance to a piece of legislation that would consolidate power. On the other hand, the No Kings Protest did not focus on a particular piece of legislation, but rather general resistance to the executive branch. I believe the lack of focus on specific pieces of legislation made the protests less effective.
Generally, mass peaceful mobilization is effective, especially because the non-violence helps it retain legitimacy and gain participation as scholars Chenoweth and Stephan claim. Moving forward, the No Kings Protest and American protests alike need to be able to narrow down their goals to specific pieces of legislation or focus in order to be more effective.
That’s a really good point about specificity. The Israeli protests had a concrete target, while the No Kings Protests were pushing back against something much more diffuse. It’s a lot easier to rally people around stopping a specific piece of legislation than around a general pattern of executive overreach.
The challenge is that executive aggrandizement in the US often happens through a bunch of smaller actions rather than one big dramatic move, which makes it harder to organize against. But you’re right that moving forward, American protests probably need clearer, more focused goals.
I’m also wondering if this connects to what Despina said about exposure — maybe specific legislative fights just naturally get more sustained attention than broader resistance movements?