On September 15th, 2024, former President López Obrador of Mexico signed into law a sweeping judicial reform drastically changing Mexico’s political landscape. The reform’s most prominent feature is the direct election of all Mexican judges at the state and federal levels, making Mexico the only country in the world to allow citizens to directly elect their entire judiciary. Other key features of the reform include the reduction of the number of Supreme Court justices from 11 to nine and judges’ tenure from 15 to 12 years, the establishment of a new Judicial Disciplinary Tribunal to review justices’ decisions, and lower criteria for running in a judicial election. López Obrador instated these changes using voluntarist tactics during a period where he claims corruption is rampant in the judiciary, and democracy must be restored through direct election of the judiciary. On the other hand, international observers at the UN and critics of Movimiento Regeneración Nacional (Morena), López Obrador’s party, worry this move weakens Mexican judicial independence and signals a shift toward one-party rule again in Mexico.
Inflammatory rhetoric and loss of judicial independence
López Obrador has a long history of strife with Mexico’s judiciary. He has often accused the judiciary of blocking his agendas, including his endeavors to militarize public security and meddle in Mexico’s autonomous electoral authority. 2024’s judicial reform is just another step in López Obrador’s inflammatory rhetoric towards Mexico’s judiciary, this time backed up by an amendment to the constitution.
One of López Obrador’s most cited reasons for the necessity of the reform was to root out corruption in the judiciary; opponents and critics say that it is a grand overreach of executive power by López Obrador. A strike by district judges and magistrates received an 86% approval rating among judges as the reform was introduced. Despite widespread, vocalized backlash, López Obrador and Morena continued to push ahead with the reform on the grounds that direct election would cause a necessary democratic overhaul of the judiciary.
It is paradoxical of López Obrador to state that the judiciary needs to be democratized and then advance a reform that requires direct election of judges. The UN’s Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers worries that the direct election of judges in Mexico will in fact weaken judicial independence. Opening the judiciary up to direct election has already caused lawyers with ties to cartels to run. For example, Fernando Escamilla, who has advised multiple leading members of the violent Las Zetas cartel, appeared on the ballot in June 2025. Because of these ties to organized crime, the reform will also hurt relationships with foreign investors such as Morgan Stanley, which has already expressed doubt at Mexican courts being able to protect foreign investments in the future. Additionally, direct election of the judiciary opens it up to increased politicization, going against the impartiality that is a key feature of judiciaries in democracies.
This move by López Obrador may very well lead to democratic backsliding for Mexico by lowering horizontal accountability (checks and balances) in the government. Executives looking to consolidate their power often use the tactics of stealth authoritarianism, especially when the cost of transparent authoritarianism is too high, according to Varol. Stealth authoritarianism describes when incumbents manipulate (in a legal way) the institutions already available to them to further consolidate their power, such as the judiciary. Judicial review is often seen as a more legitimate institution than others, such as the legislature, because of the independence of the judiciary. As a result, incumbents often take control of the judiciary to maintain a guise of legitimacy, as López Obrador did when making the Mexican judiciary directly elected. López Obrador’s actions weaken horizontal accountability and judicial independence, which can be direct causes of democratic backsliding.
A popular mandate?
Aside from López Obrador’s questionable claims about the need for such a drastic judicial reform, the circumstances through which Morena and López Obrador ensured the reform passed have been subject to scrutiny as well. Morena often pushes the rhetoric that they have the “unlimited power of constitutional reform” due to their popular mandate in winning the 2024 general election. López Obrador and Morena use this populist rhetoric as a way of framing themselves as protectors of the Mexican people’s interests. Populist rhetoric is commonly used by populist leaders to assert that their actions will protect the will of the people more than other institutions, bringing legitimacy to their executive overreach, according to Bessen. While Morena did well in this election, they did not win the majority necessary in Congress to pass constitutional reforms, falling short by three votes. This was no problem for Morena, however; shortly before the final vote on the judicial reform took place, they were able to secure the necessary votes, albeit suspiciously.
Two senators, Senators José Sabino Herrera Dagdug and Araceli Saucedo Reyes, mysteriously switched from their original party, Partido de la Revolución Democrática (PRD), to Morena right after getting elected under their original party and taking office. This move gave Morena two more crucial votes, but they still lacked one, which they appear to have been pursuing by any means necessary. The opposition reported that Morena attempted to intimidate members of the opposition into voting with them and even proposed lowering the required votes to pass the amendment to 85. Ultimately, the last vote flip came from Senator Miguel Ángel Yunes Márquez, the son of one of López Obrador’s political opponents and former governor of the State of Veracruz, Miguel Ángel Yunes Linares.
The Yunes family had previously been involved in a public corruption scandal within the State of Veracruz, and both father and son were indicted. However, after Yunes Márquez voted in favor of López Obrador’s judicial reform and joined Morena a few months after the election, all charges against the Yunes family were dropped. Consequently, many close to the situation wondered whether there was an association between Yunes Márquez voting for the reform and the corruption charges against his family being dropped. Regardless, these developments granted Morena the congressional votes to pass their judicial reform without holding a genuine majority.
Looking forward
While the role of weak institutions definitely played a role in the passage of the 2024 judicial reform, the power of Morena and López Obrador’s actions are ultimately what caused the passage of the reform to be so quick and successful. López Obrador has spent years defaming the judiciary for blocking his proposals and adhering to their independence, so it comes as no surprise that he is now taking action to make the judiciary more partisan, in favor of his political regime. Additionally, there are allegations that Morena and López Obrador heavily manipulated the voting process for the reform directly by bribing and intimidating senators, again demonstrating how the incumbent’s behaviors worked to pass the reform.
López Obrador’s actions, not the weakness of any institution, are likely to cause a weakening of judicial independence, which in turn raises questions about democratic backsliding. The 2024 judicial reform is a highly agent-based action that weakens democracy; according to Waldner and Lust, the agent-based theory of democratic erosion focuses on how actors’ behaviors, rather than institutions, lead to backsliding. In this case, after the judicial reform, Mexico still has a judiciary, but López Obrador has changed it so significantly that it will now act within the bounds he sets for it. According to Bermeo, weakening the judiciary by making it less of a check on and more responsive to the executive is a common step in executive aggrandizement, a form of democratic backsliding.
In the year 2024, when more than 60 politicians were killed during Mexico’s election cycle while running for office, the judiciary should be strengthening its independence from the rest of the political landscape. Instead, it is becoming more deeply embroiled in partisan politics and cartel violence.
References
Barajas, A., & Fuentes, V. (2024). Inicia resistencia del Poder Judicial. Reforma. https://www.reforma.com/inicia-resistencia-del-poder-judicial/ar2859644?utm_source=bcm_nl_noticias_reforma&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=nl_noticias_reforma_20240820&utm_term=usr_suscriptor
Berg, R.C., & Hidalgo, N. (2025). No Checks on Power? The Effects of Mexico’s Judicial Reform on Foreign Investment and the USMCA. Center for Strategic and International Studies. https://www.csis.org/analysis/no-checks-power-effects-mexicos-judicial-reform-foreign-investment-and-usmca
Bermeo, Nancy. (2016). On Democratic Backsliding. Journal of Democracy, 27(1). https://muse.jhu.edu/article/607612
Bessen, Brett R. (2024). Populist Discourse and Public Support for Executive Aggrandizement in Latin America. Comparative Political Studies, 57(13). https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/00104140231223738
Orozco y Villa, L.H., & Velasco-Rivera, M. (2025). Unpacking the Rhetoric Behind Mexico’s Judicial Reform. Baker Institute. https://www.bakerinstitute.org/research/unpacking-rhetoric-behind-mexicos-judicial-reform
Shirk, D. (2025). Mexico’s 2024 Judicial Reform: The Politicization of Justice. Wilson Center. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/mexicos-2024-judicial-reform-politicization-justice
Varol, O. (2014). Stealth Authoritarianism. Iowa Law Review, 100(4), 1673-1742. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2428965
Villegas, P., & Rodríguez Mega, E. (2025). An Ex-Convict and Cartel Lawyers Are Among Mexico’s Judicial Candidates. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2025/05/29/world/americas/mexico-judicial-election-candidates.html
Waldner, D., & Lust, E. (2018). Unwelcome Change: Coming to Terms with Democratic Backsliding. Annual Reviews, 21, 93-113. https://www.annualreviews.org/content/journals/10.1146/annurev-polisci-050517-114628
Your focus on judicial independence versus the right of the people to participate in democratic systems is a difficult dynamic almost all modern semi-democratic states seem to face. In the case of Obrador, it appears that his judicial shifts can be argued away as equitable and “for the people” when in reality they might be a broader part of the stealth authoritarian strategy you highlight.
Yes, the people have a right to want to have a say in their political systems including the judiciary. But the direct election of judges faces challenges regarding who has the financial and social power to get on the ballot in the first place.
Additionally, if there is no vetting system in place to block those it is entirely possible that a corrupt judicial system will result from this. Since the 2024 election cycle, it would be interesting to see where the judicial system is at now and what directions it will move to in the future.
Your analysis shows a great understanding of the tension between the importance of elections for democracy and the insulation from polarization that judicial independence needs, as well as the possible interpretations that stealth authoritarianism thrives within.
However, something I thought of while reading was that the previous system did not necessarily insulate judges from polarization either. Studies do show an increase in partisanship in state supreme court elections. Direct elections also mean that judges need to accept campaign money from political stakeholders such as PACs, which may influence their decisions later on.
As we have seen in the U.S., judges are often appointed by sitting presidents for their political philosophies. However, reducing their term limits reveals that this is a stealth authoritarian tactic, designed to increase Lopez’s influence on the judiciary.
This thought inspired me to research better systems for partisan insulation for judges, and I learned about the Missouri Plan, which includes a nonpartisan nominating commission that provides a binding shortlist for the executive official and retention elections, where the population votes on whether the judge should remain in office. Looking into better methods may be a good way to learn ways to strengthen institutions for democratic resilience.
Obrador’s attacks on the judiciary and arguments for opening it up to the public’s vote to represent the people sound weak and hypocritical in a time when cartels are gaining more power. Different parts of Mexican government and elites have been accused of working with cartels, and much of the public is growing increasingly aware of the cartel’s control over Mexico. Simultaneously, this increasing power and control is creating more fear within the public as the cartel is a big source of non-state violence which often sets the scene for democratic backsliding.
With so much money, it is clear that opening up the judiciary to popular vote can create even more avenues for the cartel to gain power and influence over the Mexican government. The less protected the judiciary is from politicization, the more likely it is for external forces that wish to gain power (and have the money to promote certain candidates or push certain candidates forward) to degrade democracy in national institutions. In the long run, this may cost Obrador his popularity as more cartel influence, especially if picked up on by the public, will degrade trust between people and the government, and most likely create and heighten tensions between them.