On November 17th, 2025, Slovakian citizens in Bratislava protested and slammed their leaders, specifically Prime Minister, Robert Fico, with chants such as: “We have enough of Fico”, “Resign”, and the motto of the Velvet Revolution: “Truth and love must prevail over lies and hatred”. The citizens’ disapproval for Fico, and his government is apparent from this demonstration, but in order to understand the significance of these demonstrations, it is crucial to first examine Slovakia’s convoluted path to democracy.
A Brief History
Slovakia was a part of the Hungarian Kingdom for nearly 1,000 years until 1918, when the kingdom dissolved. After World War 1, Slovaks and Czechs joined together to form Czechoslovakia. This lasted until 1938 when Slovakia declared independence and became a German puppet state, allowing Hitler to present the fragmentation of Czechoslovakia as a natural internal collapse to the international community. At the end of World War II though, Czechoslovakia was reestablished under Communist rule.
By 1989, students in Bratislava, the capital, began protesting against communist rule which escalated into peaceful mass demonstrations that led to the collapse of the regime. This event is known as the Velvet Revolution and until recently, was considered a national holiday that represents these two nations’ transitions to democracy. Later in 1993, the “Velvet Divorce” occurred when Czechoslovakia peacefully split once more into the Czech Republic and Slovakia, allowing both nations to prosper independently.
Modern Slovakia under Fico
Currently, Slovakia is a parliamentary democracy with a president and a government led by the prime minister, Robert Fico. They joined NATO and the EU in 2004, as well as the eurozone in 2009. Recently, the political environment of Slovakia has become more polarized as a result of Fico’s pro-Russian foreign policy, culminating in his attempted assassination in 2024.
Fico is largely described as a populist, as he practices a political rhetoric that capitalizes on the idea of a “single, homogenous, authentic people” and traditional values (Müller, What is Populism? (2016)). Populist leaders also tend to portray their political competitors and opposition as corrupt, unprincipled elite who do not represent nor care for the people. This can be seen through Fico’s aggressive commentary directed towards former liberal President Čaputová, “‘The bigger a prostitute, the bigger a whore, the bigger a villain, the bigger a celebrity [you become], later adding ‘We have to take down the president’” as well as calling her an “‘American agent’ – suggesting she was a puppet of the US government”. His implication that President Čaputová is aligning with the United States and western influence represents a classic populist strategy: employing an us (the people) vs. them (the Western “traitors”) narrative, creating space for him to step up and represent the real Slovakian people and their interests.
Alongside his concerningly populist rhetoric, Fico has also been advocating for institutional changes that negatively impact Slovakia’s hard-earned democratic government. This can be seen through his attacks on the media, the judiciary, and electoral laws. More specifically, some examples include his subordination of the public media by dissolving the public broadcaster and instead creating a new entity that is under control of a government-appointed council. This action mirrors Hungarian autocratic leader, Viktor Orban, and his consolidation of nearly 500 news outlets into a pro-government conglomerate. Fico has also advocated for amendments to electoral laws, which would raise the parliamentary entry threshold for parties and increase election deposits. This move would eliminate smaller, often liberal, parties from parliament which violates contestation, a key component of democracy according to Robert Dahl.
Protests
Fico has also expanded his influence into aspects of civil society. Since 2001, Slovakian citizens have commemorated the anniversary of the Velvet Revolution every November 17th. It has been a day to celebrate the restoration of freedom and democracy to Slovakia until recently, when Prime Minister Fico’s government cancelled the national holiday. While the government cites this action as a cost-saving, austerity measure, the fact that Fico has never celebrated the holiday and his argument that “true freedom came from the East when the Red Army liberated Slovakia from the Nazis at the end of WW2” suggests otherwise. Fico’s blatant disrespect for Slovakia’s democracy has increasingly angered citizens and inspired them to outwardly express their beliefs.
The most recent protests occurred just a few weeks ago, on the anniversary of the Velvet Revolution. According to AP News, tens of thousands of people protested at rallies backed by opposition parties and civic groups protesting against Fico and his pro-Russian stance. The leader of the “Democrats” opposition party, Jaroslav Nad, states that “Fico is dragging us away from the democratic world”.
Slovakians are not alone in this battle. In Prague, Czech Republic, thousands also gathered on November 17th to protest the formation of a new right-wing Czech government and populist prime minister-designate, Andrej Babis. The protests seen in both these countries represent an overall rise in populist rhetoric, especially amongst eastern European countries.
Implications for Slovakian Democracy
These demonstrations exhibit Slovakian citizens’ determination to protect their young democracy. In his book Polyarchy, Robert Dahl identifies democracy as a system with two core dimensions: contestation and participation/inclusiveness. He classifies contestation as the opportunity for citizens to openly oppose their government and form political parties and participation as the ability of a proportion of the population to participate in the political process. When comparing these components to the recent protests in Slovakia, a sense of hope arises. The fact that Slovakians are able to safely protest in the streets satisfies components of both of these definitions.
Additionally, contestation could be argued to have been satisfied in the 2023 election. According to Politico, Smer-SD (Fico’s party) won with 22.9% of the total votes, with the PS (Progressive Slovakia) party trailing behind with 18% of the total votes. Compared to the previous election in 2020 where there was a much starker difference between votes for each party, with Smer-SD winning with 18.3% and PS only getting 7.0%, it seems like electoral competition is increasing. While more specific factors regarding the quality of the elections must be considered, these statistics present a hopeful future for Slovakia’s democracy.
Furthermore, PS is still the strongest opposition party and currently holds a leading position in recent polls, as well as winning the 2024 European Parliament elections in Slovakia. These successes, combined with a critical and active civic society, have had repercussions for the Fico government as they are now facing a potential loss of their parliamentary majority.
Ultimately, while some actions taken by Fico and his government are certainly concerning and must be closely scrutinized, Slovakian democracy may not be in as much danger as it seems. The intensifying pressure from citizens as they publicly denounce Fico’s actions, combined with the growing strength of the opposition party prove that contestation and participation are effective resistors to democratic erosion. If these defiant tactics continue, Slovakian democracy may have an optimistic future.

Your post made me appreciate the power of civil society against authoritarianism. Rather than accepting the deterioration of democracy, people expressed themselves in opposition. This illustrates how democracy is not dead as long as people refuse to be quiet. An interesting dynamic is how this wave of protests united people from all walks of life and across generations. Young activists and older citizens collaborated, highlighting Slovakia’s history of civic resistance. The legacy of non-violent activism is crucial, as it shows how Slovak identity is rooted in fighting for freedom.
You mention that public demonstrations alone are not enough, and institutional changes made by Fico have the power to weaken democratic safeguards. Something I have personally researched is how civil society can only positively affect democracy in places with cross-cutting community organizations and strong institutions. Without this combination, civil society, despite its potential strength, may not be enough alone to make actual change.
These protests are a hopeful sign, but only if they align with vigilance towards institutions and laws. It is definitely intriguing to see how these recent events in Slovakia make a strong case for the power of civil society, though I don’t believe civil society to be enough in itself to cause legitimate change.
Hi Clara!
It was very interesting to read your post as I am not quite familiar with Slovakia’s journey to democracy. The first part that caught my eye was regarding the anti-western rhetoric spread by Fico. Fico’s anti-democratic actions, compared side by side with the actions of our current administration here in the United States appear all too similar. Both leaders employ populist tactics, anti-opposition rhetoric, and acts of media suppression in order to gain support from the public (and further limit any rhetoric that goes against him, his actions, and his beliefs). What makes less sense, in my perspective, is why Fico would so deeply oppose an administration that functions in many ways similar to his own. Is there any risk Fico has of denouncing his own administration in critiquing the American administration? Is this an error in perception, that being that Fico does not see himself in any way comparable to Trump?
You also bring in the case of Turkey, which is quite important in the context of democratic erosion. Each of these three “democratic” states (Slovakia, Turkey, and the US) have exhibited similar trends in their leader’s aggrandizement of power. As follows, each of these three nations have had similar public responses to such undemocratic behaviors. Protests occur regularly in opposition of these leaders and their overreaching practices—but whether the people see any “results” is up for debate. This brings me to a new and somewhat concerning question: if the dissent of the people is not enough, then what is? How can we, as the people, work to halt and reverse processes of democratic backsliding within our nations?
Hi Clara, your post does a great job of looking at how Fico’s political movements fit into a broader pattern of democratic erosion in Eastern Europe. One thing that really stands out to me is how important symbolic political matters are in this specific case. While the decision to cancel the Velvet Revolution holiday might look minor, it’s actually a rather powerful move as leaders will try to downplay democratic movements when they’re trying to build a more centralized version of national identity. It’s all about controlling the story of how Slovakia’s freedom came to be, and who gets credit for it. This kind of narrative shaping may seem subtle, but it’s significant because it lays the groundwork for institutional shifts later on.
A possible factor worth highlighting is looking at how Fico’s media and electoral reforms mirror and effect we’ve seen in Hungary and other states in the region. Once one government is able to successfully demonstrate a weakening of media or smaller parties, those strategies tend to go across borders. Fico isn’t the only one acting like this and he’s operating within this growing network of right populous leaders.
I greatly appreciate how you mention the large scale and persistence of the public pushback. Citizens in Slovakia still see themselves is being active members of their democracy, and aren’t just being passive observers. There seems to be real electoral competition and an energized and active opposition, which helps suggest that Slovakia’s democratic society is still very resilient even if institutions are under pressure. The main question going forward then is whether this strong civic energy can translate into a substantial institutional protection.