Jordanian parliamentary elections were held on 10 September 2024 following King Abdullah II’s decision to dissolve the parliament on 25 July 2024. After a long durée, these elections became a comeback for the political parties in the country despite the low level of voter turnout (32%)[1]. As a result of these elections, where the new Poltical Parties and Electoral Law (2022) was implemented for the first time, party-affiliated deputies consisted a clear majority in the parliament by securing 104/138 seats as distinct from the previous post-Arab Spring parliaments which had 24/130 and 13/130, respectively in 2016 and 2020. The new parliament is recorded as the most party-populated parliament in Jordanian history with 75% of the MPs representing political parties[2]. However, I argue that this law and consequently the new political scene is a new type of authoritarian innovation rather than being a step towards further democratization.
Jordan is an electoral authoritarian regime where there have been elections and political parties since the beginning of the 1990s. However, the actual power resides in the hands of the ruling family, the Hashemite dynasty, and the king. Especially after the Arab Spring, people’s confidence in electoral mechanisms remained very low as it can be understood from the voter turnouts of the 2016, 2020, and 2024 elections where the turnouts were %36, %29 and %32 respectively. Additionally, Arab Barometer surveys show that in 2022 trust in parliament was %17 percent even though it was %58.8 percent in 2007[3]. Low voter turnouts in elections and low trust levels in parliament is something that decreases the legitimacy of the system and regime and in my opinion, the new law is a step towards overcoming this “problem”.
The new law innovated a national district list for 41/138 seats of the parliament through which political parties are expected to benefit compared to independent candidates, in addition to local district lists, for the first time. Consequently, the main Islamist opposition Islamic Action Front Party (IAF), headed the elections by increasing its seats from 7 to 31 and became the largest group in the parliament. It has been argued that Islamists successfully capitalized on the growing anger over the Gaza war. They established a campaign in opposition to the Gaza War and called for ending the cooperation between Jordan and Israel in various security areas. Seemingly these strategies worked amid the high sentiments against the Gaza war where Palestinians constitute the majority of the society.
However, on the other hand, some difficult procedures for the existing political parties were also implemented with the new law. The government could unilaterally dissolve the parties that allegedly failed to comply with the new law’s requirements. Therefore, many of the political parties found themselves in a troublesome situation before the elections. As a novelty, the law required political parties to have a minimum of 1000 founders coming from 6/12 different provinces of the country. It required a 20% youth quota and a 20% women quota and necessitated the inclusion of at least one disabled citizen for the foundation of the party. Subsequently, 19 opposition parties including the famous, newly established Partnership and Rescue Party were closed with allegations of not complying new law’s requirements (they were expected to fulfill these requirements within 18 months). Moreover, the new law brought imprisonment and monitorial punishments for those who directly and indirectly promote a banned political party.
Therefore, the new law restricted the chance of possible new opposition parties by establishing difficult procedures. While independent and newly organizing parties are being punished, the parties that have strong grassroots or strong clientelist relations could come forward. In this sense by securing these procedures, the law enabled the emergence of new, regime-supported, clientelist parties that satisfy the legal criteria while many of the opposition parties are being eliminated. Hence, the post-law period became a scene where new loyalist parties popped up and gained influence in the elections.
New Political Parties in the Lower House
The National Charter and Erada parties secured second and third places in the elections by capitalizing on 21 and 19 seats in the parliament, respectively. The National Charter Party, which positions itself at the center of the political spectrum was established in 2022 by former parliamentarians viewed as loyalists to the Jordanian monarchy, in addition to retired army officials, and senators. The leader of the party Muhammad Al- Momani served as a state minister in charge of media in addition to its cabinet spokesman position between 2013 and 2018. Before the establishment of the party, he was a member of the senate whose all of the members are appointed by King Abdullah II. Moreover, his party’s political campaign was propagated by the state-owned Jordan news agency during the electoral campaign period.
The centrist Eradeh party was also established in 2022, by Nidal Bataineh who served as minister in charge of labor until recent times. Similar to the National Charter Party, Eradeh has also grown rapidly and both parties together consist the 28 percent of those registered with a party[4].
In addition to these two new loyalist parties, smaller parties, some of which are close to the state, such as the Progress Party, the National Islamic Party, the Azm Party, the National Unity Movement, and the Bless Land Party, have managed to enter parliament.
New Parties’ Functions
Jordanian parliaments had been composed of three components until 2024, mainly the Islamist opposition, small parties with very small numbers of MPs, and the independents who mostly represent the local tribes and ruling elite of the country. However, with its this shape, it seems that the political system achieved one more step towards neo-patrimonialism and I argue that the party system would resemble that in Morocco more in time where there are strong loyalist parties (such as the National Charter Party and Eradeh Party) who represent the interests of the ruling elite coalition ready to offer an façade alternative to the people who are not making decision merely based on tribal affiliations but also do not want to vote for the Islamist opposition. Also, I argue that these parties would serve as an instrument for the regime to limit the capacities of the tribes to act independently and would put them into a party discipline where the relations are more hierarchical.
The new parties’ functions can already be seen in the election of the new speaker of the parliament conducted in November 2024. Two candidates competed in this election, first the regime-approved Ahmed Safadi, second Islamist-nominated Saleh Armout. Mr. Safadi got 98 votes while his rival Mr. Armout got 37 votes. This situation supports that, the actual power still resides in the hands of the king and nothing is really changed in his control of parliament despite the political party domination in the parliament.
Endnotes
[1] Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), “Jordan: Majlis Al-Nuwaab (House of Representatives), Election for Majlis Al-Nuwaab (Jordanian House of Representatives) Held on 10 September 2024,”, https://data.ipu.org/parliament/JO/JO-LC01/election/JO-LC01-E20240910/.
[2] Doha Institute for Graduate Studies, “Jordanian Parliamentary Elections: Context and Results,” https://www.dohainstitute.org/en/PoliticalStudies/Pages/jordanian-parliamentary-elections-context-and-results.aspx#_ftn12.
[3] Jerusalem Strategic Forum (JSF), “The 2024 Parliamentary Elections: A Trigger Point for Positive Change,” https://www.jsf.org/uploads/The%202024%20Parliamentary%20Elections%20A%20Trigger%20Point%20for%20Positive%20Change.pdf.
[4] Atlantic Council, “Jordan’s Electoral Law and the New Parliament,” MENASource (blog), https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/jordan-electoral-law-parliament/.
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